Ideological dissention in the progressive era : uncovering the challengers to direct democracy reforms. by Sandy-Bailey, Lonce H.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-2006
Ideological dissention in the progressive era :
uncovering the challengers to direct democracy
reforms.
Lonce H. Sandy-Bailey
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sandy-Bailey, Lonce H., "Ideological dissention in the progressive era : uncovering the challengers to direct democracy reforms."
(2006). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2404.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2404

IDEOLOGICAL DISSENTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
UNCOVERING THE CHALLENGERS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY REFORMS
A Dissertation Presented
by
LONCE H. SANDY-BAILEY
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
Of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2006
Department of Political Science
© Copyright by Lonce H. Sandy-Bailey 2006
All Rights Reserved
IDEOLOGICAL DISSENTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
UNCOVERING THE CHALLENGERS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY REFORMS
A Dissertation Presented
by
LONCE H. SANDY-BAILEY
Approved as to style and content by:
*
Jerome M. Mileur, Chair
eorge^Sul:George' zner; Member
Ronald Story, Member
George Srtnzner, Chair
Department of Political Science
DEDICATION
To the memory of my father, Larry Bailey
and to my loving mother, Dorothy Bailey
and
To my wonderful wife,
Julia Lane
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Looking back. I realize that more than the completion ot a comprehensive
research project, this dissertation represents the culmination of a long process of
education and training for which I owe many people thanks and gratitude. Since there are
few places to publicly thank those who helped me with this specific project as well as my
Ph D., I will take some extra time here to recognize them for their special contributions. 1
just hope that the pit orchestra does not try to “play” me off the stage.
My dissertation chair, Jerry Mileur, has been the single most important person to
me in my graduate education and in the writing of this dissertation. My knowledge of
American politics and my approach to political science has been almost solely shaped by
his tremendous dedication to my intellectual development and unflagging support of my
research. He has provided support in virtually every aspect of my life while at UMass
and, from the beginning, saw my potential even when I might have denied it. Even more
importantly, Jerry has taught me how to be a better person and has offered guidance,
advice, support, and unflinching loyalty since the first day I met him. I would have failed
in several life goals without him.
I would also like to thank my other committee members, George Sulzner and Ron
Story, both of whom offered keen insight and assistance in the research and writing of the
dissertation but more importantly have been outstanding role models for what it means to
be an interesting academic and teacher.
Others at UMass were always helpful and took interest in my intellectual and
administrative well-being. Professors Jeff Sedgwick, Ray La Raja, Yin Moscardelli, Fred
v
Kramer, and Howard Wiarda were always willing to help me think through the specifics
ot my research and otfer professional advice as well. Donna Dove, Wendy Matys, and
Barb Ciesluk offered tremendous support and a good laugh all while making sure that 1
was never too far in administrative hock. Both Bill Thompson and Rachel Hobbie at the
W.E.B. Du Bois library provided kind assistance in a variety of ways. A special thanks
to Janet Rifkin for her kind patience, support and pep talks during our long drives to
Boston. The Department of Political Science gave me many years of support and funding
and I thank them for making me an important and welcomed part of the department over
the years.
I have developed many new and supportive friends while at UMass who have
contributed in various ways to my success. Deep thanks to Larry Becker, Alison and
Pete Dagnes, Lana Wylie and Duane Hewitt, Doug Lathrop, Alec Ewald, Jon Keller, Bob
Lacey, Brent Heeringa, and Todd Audyatis. They have been a great source of support,
relaxation and entertainment, and I have the photos to prove it. Special thanks to Michael
Hannahan for taking a particular interest in my success. He has been a blessing to have
as a friend and intellectual advisor. Many of my former students offered great support,
provided research assistance, and maintained loyal confidence in my project. In
particular, I would like to thank Raija Vaisanen and Matthew Saradjian.
I would also like to thank several people in the Amherst community who gave me
important support at crucial times including Stan Rosenberg, Steven Bradley, Sean Barry,
and Lisa Hannahan. Additionally, Chris Carlisle was always good for deep personal
conversations or an afternoon of laughter. He was absolutely key to helping me keep a
proper perspective in my work and in life.
vi
I would also like to thank those that helped lead me to my time here and continue
to be a source of inspiration and support. Special thanks to Eric Thompson and Mary
Lusk for their tremendous friendship and intellectual input into my research.
Additionally, Charles Everett, Jan Schonauer and George Gutman, Tom Lugo, Kimberley
Spears, Darlene Dunham, Paul Minicucci, and Anne Williams, all deserve thanks for
their help over the years. From my time at U.C. Irvine I owe much credit to Mark
Petracca, John Diggins, Harry Eckstein, Pamela Kelley, and Doris Earnshaw for their
important contributions to my education and training. From my time at the University of
Virginia I owe sincere gratitude for the guidance and support of Michael Brint and Carl
Stenberg. Special personal thanks to Dennis Carocci, Ron Severson, and Rusty Weaver
who all still influence my work and my life.
Of course, even with all these people playing an important part in my success, my
family has been the greatest source of strength support through the graduate school
process. Coach and Marylane, Robin and Steve, Jay and Joanna, and the extended Sandy
family have been tremendous cheerleaders and offered couches, beaches, baseball games,
and an occasional “bear in a cage” for much needed decompressing. My lovely aunt,
Betsy Worsh, offered great support and advice and even provided expert editing services.
My sister Gwen and her husband Rod are two of my biggest fans. They provided
constant inspiration and bubbling enthusiasm as well as that special type of support that
only your family can offer. Thank you both for all your love and confidence in this
project and in my life pursuits - it would have been impossible without you. My sister
Felicia and niece Zarathena offered a loving and relaxing home and provide unusual
support and acceptance of my work. Thank you both for understanding and knowing just
what to say at just the right time. Having you and your love nearby kept me sane and
grounded.
I dedicate this dissertation to three people who have made my hie complete Mv
lather, Larry Bailey, who passed away during my graduate work, is the most central,
lifelong inspiration to how I live my life. I have always wanted to be more like him and
this degree is evidence of his continuing influence on me. He would have loved this
particular accomplishment, perhaps more than anyone. My mother is a continuing
inspiration to me and offers, through personal example, extra-human strength, resiliency,
compassion, and love. My determination to finish this and other life goals undoubtedly
stems from her and the lessons she taught me. I offer all my love, thanks and gratitude
for what she has given me in this life. Finally, this journey would have been meaningless
without my loving wife, Julia Lane. Every day in graduate school was a beautiful and
interesting day simply because she was there to share it with me. Even with the stress of
both of us finishing our graduate work and dissertations together, Julia constantly knew
how to love, guide, and support me through this process. She has been an intellectual
inspiration, a compassionate and loving wife, and a source of great joy. My life makes
sense with her in it and graduate school was the dream of dreams because we could share
it and experience it together. Dedicating this work to her is only a small recognition of
her uncompromising commitment to me and our life together.
viii
ABSTRACT
IDEOLOGICAL DISSENTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
UNCOVERING THE CHALLENGERS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY REFORMS
MAY 2006
LONCE H. SANDY-BAILEY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jerome M. Mileur
This dissertation attempts to expand our understanding of the most important
political reform period in American history - the Progressive Era. Academic literature on
the Progressive Era has focused almost exclusively on the reformers of the time and has
ignored the question, “With whom were the Progressives arguing?” By attempting to
answer this question, we can develop a better understanding of the intellectual and
ideological conflict that gave rise to the direct democracy reforms of the time and extend
our understanding of the development of the American state.
What this research reveals is the existence ot a dynamic and lively resistance to
the direct democracy reforms of the Progressive movement. This Anti-progressive voice
provides intellectual and political arguments against a variety of direct democracy
reforms including the direct primary, initiative and referendum, judicial recall,
and the
direct election of senators. These voices of dissent come from a variety
ot sources that
represent different ideological backgrounds, various professions,
and a range ot
IX
geographic origins. Together, these dissenters to Progressive reform include academics,
politicians, public servants, and socialists. Those identified for this dissertation include:
Henry Jones Ford, Nicholas Murray Butler, William Howard Taft, Emanuel Philipp,
Elihu Root, Bernard Freyd, Charles Hollingsworth, and Victor Berger. Analysis of their
arguments and of the debates of the time reveals several central themes that offer a way
to initially define the claims of the Anti-progressives. These included a belief in
representative institutions, constitutionalism, a strongly independent judiciary, and the
primacy of politics and political parties.
x
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CHAPTER 1
ANTI-PROGRESSIVE IDEOLOGY AND THE PROGRESSIVE DEBATE
I he Progressive era of American history has occupied generations of writers,
thinkers, and academics. The length and diversity of topics is a testimony to the priority
that students of American politics and culture place on the changes and ideas of this
period. Their attention has generated hundreds of books and articles that have addressed
an impressive list of topics: urban reform, Catholicism, gender, public administration,
environmentalism, juvenile courts, food and drug control policy, presidential-press
relations, gender conformity, social anxiety, health insurance, and ethics and spirituality,
to name a few. Most of these works recognize the important changes of this period that
defined the face of the American Republic and shaped the social and political institutions
of the twentieth century. And in terms of politics, the Progressive era reforms completely
“transform [ed] the relationship of the citizen to government .”
1
The primary thrust of Progressive reform came in the form of challenges to the
prevailing political institutions and traditions of the time .
2
In particular, the Progressives
1
Eldon Eisenach., The Lost Promise ofProgressivism (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), 8.
2
Ibid.
1
were concerned with the type of power institutions held and the type of political
democracy citizens used in their interactions with these institutions. Political reforms
centered on the creation of a stronger set of national institutions, the sublimation of both
political parties and the localism that accompanied existing institutions, the
democratization of the electoral system, and the creation, reinforcement, and use of
public opinion to guide institutions and educate voters . 3 Progressives desire in creating
these new relationships was to confront the emergence of new and powerful business
trusts, remove corrupt political parties from the decisions of the state, and provide for a
more professional and efficient public administration that was in close concert with the
will of a properly educated electorate. It was a new vision of the republic that
materialized from evolving ideas and new interpretations of politics and political
institutions. The emergence of these Progressive ideas has been, and continues to be,
well documented. However, even with great scholarly attention paid to the reformers,
very little has been examined as to the ideological battles that birthed these reforms. In
other words, virtually all studies of progressive political reforms focus on the
Progressives themselves, the types of reforms they advocated and implemented, and the
impact of these reforms. Attention to the development of their ideas and their
involvement in debates with those that opposed their ideas are limited mostly to
introductory chapters on the subject. In almost every study, those who opposed these
reformers or those who offered a different vision have been ignored, dismissed, or
sequestered as atypical voices or outliers. In short, we know what the Progressives' ideas
were and the logic they used to reach them but we fall short in recognizing and
3 Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, Progressivism and the New Democracy (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 9, 264.
2
understanding that these ideas were formed in the context of various and opposing
concepts of the American state.
Studies of the Progressives do recognize that the reformers were reforming
"against" something - primarily the status quo. However, these studies assume that the
only opposition to Progressivism was self-interested business groups such as the
Southern Pacific Railroad and corrupt party bosses such as Plunkett of Tammany Hall.
There is little in these studies to suggest that there was any intellectually or politically
“respectable" opposition to the ideas of the Progressives. All contention appears to be
within the framework of Progressive beliefs and assumptions. The fight for Progressive
reforms often appears in rather simple terms of “good” versus “bad.” That many
Progressives may have seen it in these terms (La Follette's autobiography on the bad
bosses and Theodore Roosevelt on good trusts and bad trusts) does not, in itself, make it
so. If indeed this is not the case, then the question becomes: with whom were the
Progressives arguing? Was there an alternative tradition of thought against which
Progressives mounted their case? Was it reform for reform's sake or a morally centered
reform that saw all other options as “corrupt?” In other words, were there critics of
Progressive ideas with their own body of beliefs and assumptions, akin to the Anti-
Federalists in the Founding Era, who challenged Progressivism on ideological grounds?
The lack of research into and understanding of the ideas competing with
Progressive claims is not a small issue. A complete understanding of the significant
political and institutional change of the Progressive era requires a strong understanding of
the ideas that were at the center of this change. More importantly, it is not enough to
consider only one set or range of ideas to explain the sea change of the time but rather we
3
must look at the intersection ot competing ideas. As Robert Lieberman argues, “where
triction among multiple political orders is more prevalent, the likelihood of significant,
extraordinary political change
. . . will increase .”
4
What Lieberman, and others, argue is
that tor change to occur (or where change has occurred) there must be sources of conflict
and disagreement. In the case of this work, to understand the emergence of significant
changes of the Progressive Era, we must identify the conflicting voices as well. If we
want to understand the changes of the time, it is not enough to simply understand the
winners or the dominate voices, for as Lieberman argues, “Part of understanding political
development and institutional change is understanding which ideas win (or, in fact, which
ideas are in the arena to being with), why, and with what consequences for whom. The
important point is not only where ideas come from or how they cohere or collide but also
how they come to be prominent, important, and powerful .’0 Changes of this sort “occur
at the intersection of ideas and institutions .”6 The apparent lack of research and
recognition of the ideas of the Anti-progressives results in a weakened understanding of
the ideological and institutional change of the early twentieth century.
This, of course, assumes that ideas matter in institutional and political
development and in the development of ideas. Many political scientists subscribe to the
prominence and importance of ideas even if they debate the level of impact or causality
that can be attributed to them. Brian Glenn, in his discussion of the various aspects of the
field of American Political Development points to “ideation” scholars who argue for the
4
Robert C. Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,"
American Political Science Review
,
96, No. 4 (December, 2002), 703.
5
Ibid., 700.
6
Ibid., 700.
4
importance and significance of ideas in shaping the American state. What is most
interesting about his discussion, in terms of this dissertation, is not only the claim that
ideas matter but that they become particularly important or powerful when they “clash
against one another .”
7
Critics can often point to the lack of uniformity in ideas or in their
conflicting ability to explain or predict political change, but, as Glenn and Lieberman
would argue, this does not diminish their importance. As Glenn argues, “for every
policy, there is a strong theoretical underpinning that can be called upon both to support
and to argue against the policy. It is not that ideas are inconsistent or unimportant; rather,
it is that they are very important, only contradictory to one another .”
8 To uncover this
clash and its importance to political change, we must understand the various ideas and
voices involved. The failure of current research to recognize this in the study of ideas
around the Progressive Era results not only in a partial understanding of the conflict but
also in the limited credit given to ideas for the role they played in originating much of the
institutional change of the time. Lieberman explicitly confronts this point and calls for
the continued study of ideas, particularly at points of important change, as a way to better
understand the influence of ideas. As he states, “The challenge of identifying and
measuring friction ... is a serious one. . . . Most important to the enterprise is simply the
careful historical reconstruction of the relevant elements of the political setting of the
moment under consideration .
9
It is the explicit purpose of this work to better identify a
7
Brian J. Glenn. “The Two Schools of American Political Development,” Political Studies
Review
,
2, No. 2 (April 2004), 158.
8
Ibid.
9
Lieberman, 703.
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significant, competing voice of the Progressive Era and, in doing so, contribute to our
understanding ot the great change associated with that time.
Considering the importance of the period, surprisingly little effort seems to have
gone into either understanding or finding Progressive opposition which has led to the
incorrect assumption that "the men who
. . . were opposed to the democratization of state
government either have not kept their papers or have been reluctant to place them at the
disposal of the student ." 10 Some academics have a more sophisticated understanding of
the reform period but still do not fully engage the “conversation.” For example. John
hpperson concludes that those opposed to direct democracy reforms have "been ignored
or lost in the rush to ‘purify’ American Political Parties,” adding that the critics of
Progressivism "point to issues and problems which have not received the attention they
deserved .” 11 Arthur Lipow contends that "the cogent and prophetic views of
[progressivism' s] critics have simply gone down the memory hole. For the most part
they have been derided as blinkered conservatives .” 12 Political scientist Eldon Eisenach
identifies the importance of the debate as well and admits that “every regime change has
clear winners and losers” and that they “represented distinct sets of social and economic
interests and cultural, moral, and religious values.” He even goes so far as to say that
“to understand the language of Progressives also requires an exploration of its opponent’s
1(1
George Mowry, The California Progressives (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), vi.
1
1
John W. Epperson, The Changing Legal Status ofPolitical Parlies in the United States (New
York: Garland, 1986): 152-53.
12
Arthur Lipow, Political Parties and Democracy (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996), 13.
11
Eisenach, 1 8.
6
discourse." 14 Yet, at the same time, he chooses to limit the opposing regime to defenders
ot the status quo which omits those who were opposed to reforms on more ideological
grounds and had nothing (or little) to lose in a battle for institutional legitimacy. In the
end, Eisenach and others simply define the opposition in terms of their Progressive
opponents or leave the project of identifying these critics to someone else.
This study attempts to address this gap in the understanding of the debates of the
Progressive era and, in doing so, discover and define a new voice engaged in the debate.
It explores those critics of Progressivism who challenged the Progressives on their own
terms in a debate over the type of politics and institutions that were formed within the
Articles of the United States Constitution. It reveals a lively debate over how the United
States, as it entered the twentieth century, should deal with the problems posed by the
new industrialism and the old political machines to which business interest were often
closely linked. Essentially, I will locate, explain, and organize the voice of resistance of
the period - those who I call the "Anti-Progressives.” For the most part, we know the
outcome of the period, we know the legacy of the verdict, and we know to a great extent
the depths to which the reforms penetrated. But we do not know the complete
conversation that engaged the period, for we know little about the ideas and people who
resisted the reforms and lost. This dissertation is an attempt to complete this
conversation, uncover a lost voice, and to give historical “life” to the Anti-Progressives.
Much like the Anti-Federalists of the American founding who put forth a partial
ideology that failed to convince a more powerful and convincing federalist argument, I
propose to detail how a wide variety of individuals from many different parts of
14
Ibid, 19.
7
American life opposed the reforms ot the time with their own vision and understanding of
American politics and institutions.
Who Were the Anti-progressives?
The critics of progressivism are a collection of voices that have no single or
simple connection with one another, many ot whom had limited communication or
interaction with one another. Separate, their individual arguments may seem of little
consequence, but together they create community of voices that form a clear and
consistent alternative to the reformist claims of the Progressives. Indeed, the professional
and geographic diversity of the resistance is impressive, which may explain, in part, why
it has been ignored for so long. Academics, politicians, labor leaders, socialists,
capitalists, and community organizers across the country advanced arguments for a vision
that differed from that of the Progressives. In some cases, these critics provided analysis
of political reforms and warnings of their adverse affects that are impressively accurate
from a contemporary view. Like the debates of the American founding, the Civil War,
and the New Deal, these conversations were at the heart of the debates over
Progressivism. Issues of representation, constitutionalism, political parties, campaign
finance, term limits, primaries, and public administration continue to be relevant today,
and the arguments of previous generations continue with them. This gives even greater
importance to the Anti-Progressives. By understanding their concerns and arguments we
might better understand and broaden the political debates of today.
This study is primarily an intellectual history of the development of American
ideas and institutions of the early 20
th
century. It focuses on those who were engaged, in
8
public ways, with the debates over Progressive reforms that took place at the local, state,
and federal level. The study is not concerned with the outcomes of these debates. That
seems clear from the historical record. Nor is the study concerned with the full range of
debates over Progressive reforms, but rather focuses on the so-called “direct democracy”
reforms in the area of the initiative, referendum, and judicial recall; the direct election of
senators; the rise of direct primaries and attacks on parties; and the dilution of
representative and legislative institutions. For the most part, the Progressives won on all
these fronts. They did not, however, win all of their battles, failing for example to
achieve the short ballot reform that would have erased one legacy of Jacksonian
democracy and also strengthened the capacity of state governorships. They also failed to
implement most of their reforms on a national scale. Additionally, the Progressives
certainly did not have wholesale control over political reforms and they did not leave a
clean, neat, and consistent legacy. To some extent, this incoherence is a result of fatal
flaws in the workings of their reform measures and it also suggests that others, including
the Anti-progressives, had a hand in the outcome. By looking at these core issues, this
work hopes to clarify the development of American political institutions and identify why
Anti-progressives felt that these developments would weaken the American state.
At its heart, this is a study of the losers of what is the most important reform
period of American social and political history since the American founding. It is a study
that attempts to give meaning and coherence to a diverse body of American ideology and
provide a voice to a forgotten segment of the Progressive debate. The direct democracy
reforms of the Progressive are perhaps the most identifiable and distinct reforms of the
era and the ones which, in turn, also reveal a particularly clear view of Anti-progressive
9
ideas. That is, the debates between these two sides around direct democracy reforms is
the most clear and identifiable set of disagreements. Social, economic, administrative,
and health reforms are certainly a core part of Progressivism and ideally future studies
will reveal the Anti-progressive voice addressing those reforms as well. One hope of this
work is that consistent ideological themes uncovered in the Anti-progressive voice on
direct democracy can then give insight into Anti-progressive resistance in other areas of
the Progressive reform program.
Although there are many Anti-progressives from a variety of backgrounds, this
work will locus primarily on eight individuals who represent some of the strongest and
clearest examples of Anti-progressive thought. By using these individuals we will find
common themes and arguments that provide a more coherent voice to their ideas. These
individuals include: journalist, political scientist, and government appointee Henry Jones
Ford; academic leader, educational reformer, and Republican party loyalist Nicholas
Murray Butler; United States President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William
Howard Taft; businessman and Governor of Wisconsin Emmanuel Philipp; lawyer,
public official, and politician Elihu Root; two lesser known academics Charles
Hollingsworth and Bernard Freyd; and socialist leader and politician Victor Berger.
From this group of eight, we find experiences in both public and private industries,
academics and laymen, conservative politicians and social reformers, well-known
national leaders and little known local public servants. The diversity of their
backgrounds provides a better sense of their legitimacy as a truly present voice of
resistance and discounts any sense that opponents of reform were simply disgruntled
losers or scandalous politicians. Like all political actors, including Progressives, self-
10
interest certainly played a role, but this particular group of Anti-progressives is
highlighted because of their attempt to define, in clear terms, their concerns over the
range ot electoral reforms the Progressives were implementing across the country.
Although specifics will be revealed in the chapters to come, one common element
of the Anti-progressives may be usefully noted in advance. In essentially all cases, the
Anti-progressives emphasized in the value and role that institutions and organizations
play in democratic societies. This brings out the different preferences of each of the
critics of reform by highlighting the types of institutions they particularly revered and the
extent to which each of them felt certain institutions contributed to the wellbeing of
American government. What is important about this commonality is that it is the basis
from which all their other arguments derive. Each of those considered has different
views or slightly different understandings of the negative impact of Progressive reform
efforts, but in all cases the need for institutions is essentially an assumption for the Anti-
progressives.
These Anti-progressives expressed their opinions in a variety of forms. Speeches,
books, articles, and editorials, were all used to convey their concern over impending
reform measures or to rail against perceived failures in reforms that had been carried out.
For those critics who were more involved politically, many speeches and news articles
exist that document their opinions and reasons for opposing reformers. Others, who
come from a more academic background, used both academic journals and books to
detail their reasoning and analysis. In most cases, their writings were available to the
general public. Speeches by the Anti-progressives reveal exposure to a broad selection of
groups including political, civic, and business organizations. The 1912 Presidential
election provided a particularly good setting to locate and analyze Anti-progressive
writings in a context ot explicitly Progressive claims. Speeches by both Taft and Butler
during this election illustrate the clear presence of Anti-progressive arguments and their
consideration within a public political discourse. In some cases. Anti-progressive
exposure may have been limited to more localized audiences. This is particularly the
case where a writer focuses on an issue of local consequence. But clearly, the Anti-
progressives offer a voice that was available on a broad scale and through traditional
forms of communication. Although they might have been essentially separate individuals
with little coordination, they nonetheless participated in public political discussions in a
way that gave social value and legitimacy to their voice.
The process of locating and identifying Anti-progressives was conducted
primarily through historical research into the published materials of the time period.
Initially, the process involved attempting to find people in disagreement with the
Progressives by researching the writings and speeches of the Progressives themselves.
This was the case for two reasons. First, many times Progressive writers and activists
would identify their “opponent” by name which would then lead to further research of
that person. Second, it identified more clearly the political reform priorities of the
Progressives which, in turn, allowed me to search for individuals making different or
contrary arguments. Along these same lines, by identifying the geographic location of
Progressive leaders, I could also search in similar areas for voices of opposition. This
led, for example, to finding Emanuel Philipp. It was natural to research political debate
in Wisconsin due to its key role in Progressive political reform. Wherever there was
great change going on, one was more likely to find some form of resistance against it.
12
Anti-progressives were also located by reading through prominent academic
journals of the time period. As would be expected, political scientists of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century were active observers and critics of political
developments. As the Progressive movement grew, it became a subject of great interest
to American political scientists and, out of that concern, I was able to locate voices that
were critical of these new reforms. Likewise, investigation of newspapers, particularly of
editorial sections, revealed additional candidates for consideration. Political events,
conventions, and elections were all detailed in newspapers and periodicals and from these
pages voices ot dissent emerged. Essentially, the approach was designed to look in those
places where Progressives spoke and acted to see what kind of opposition could be found.
The more prolific and prominent Anti-progressives also provided their own
wealth of information that occasionally pointed to other reformers and issues. Ford, Taft,
and Butler all left a large amount of publications and papers that not only gave
exceptionally good detail as to their stances and reasoning, but also identified, if only
indirectly, others who agreed with them. This was certainly the case in locating Charles
Hollingsworth and Bernard Freyd. Others not used in this dissertation also came to light
through following convention and legislative floor speeches by likeminded individuals.
In the case of Taft, his well-organized extensive collection of public papers allowed me
to track his 1912 campaign speeches and watch the indirect exchange and response
between candidates.
The process of historical research allowed me to identify individuals who could
clearly be identified as Anti-progressives. As I have stated, for this work I kept my focus
on those Anti-progressives who were primarily concerned with political reforms and
13
limited these reforms to issues ot the initiative and referendum, judicial recall, direct
primaries, direct election ot senators, and general support for representative institutions.
The individuals in this work were chosen for their attention to these issues, for the quality
of their critique, and the representative nature that they provide my argument. I have
sought to include a relatively broad, but not exhaustive, sample of critics who illustrate
the diverse nature ot resistance both in terms of their arguments, geographic areas, and
professional background. In some cases, the critics I chose held a number of Anti-
progressive beliefs and incorporated these beliefs into many of their views on politics. In
other cases, the critics I chose held only one or two Anti-progressive beliefs or sometimes
they only expressed their opinion on one or two issues. The extensiveness of any
particular critic’s argument was not used to select individuals for inclusion. Individuals
like Victor Berger and Bernard Freyd concerned themselves primarily with one issue and
in the case oi Berger, he did have some sympathy for Progressive reforms. But in
building the Anti-progressive voice, I found it important to include opinions from these
narrowly, or partially-focused individuals. As with other forms of unorganized
resistance, there is no defining measure of membership. Even conditional agreement
adds force to its voice. As we will see, Berger, Butler, and Taft find grounds for
agreement which gives tremendous importance to Berger’s narrow critique of the
Progressives. Essentially, Berger adds ideological legitimacy to the Anti-progressive
argument by the very fact that he agrees on some issues with the Progressives and shares
others with the more conservative Anti-progressives.
One thing that should be made clear is that this work does not argue that the Anti-
progressives represented a “movement.” Rather, it claims that they were a source of
14
resistance or a challenge to the Progressive drive to institute political reforms. They did
not maintain a coherent ideology that motivated others to join forces nor did they
oiganize themselves into a political party or organization. Except for, perhaps, the
conservative wing of the Republican party of 1912, there was no gathering place or
combining influence that brought them together as a movement. In almost every case
they were responding to a movement (the Progressives) and did not articulate in a
comprehensive way their own vision of reform apart from their opponent. The
commonalities in their thought does not necessarily make them a movement - they were
not a force for social change or an organized group with aspirations of institutional
control.
I o accomplish the goal of defining the Anti-progressives and their voice in the
Progressive Era, this work is organized around the thinkers and writers themselves.
Since the literature on the Progressive debates has not recognized this particular voice, it
is important that we come to a clear understanding of what some of the primary actors
believed and argued. By focusing on each of them individually we can best uncover the
details of their various arguments and then identify similarities and themes in their vision
of the American state. The Anti-progressives are a collection of individual voices who,
once heard, reveals a more unified voice and one that provided resistance to the
Progressive changes of the time.
The next three chapters will each focus on individual Anti-progressives who offer
the best example of critics of reform and provide an exceptional number of writings and
speeches from which to draw their ideas. The first of these is Henry Jones Ford who, in
addition to being a journalist and academic, was also an ally of Woodrow Wilson. The
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fact that Ford can be considered as an Anti-progressive adds to the claim that these critics
were An the mix" of the debates of the time. Although he shared many ideas with
Wilson, it will become quite clear that the political reforms offered by the Progressives
were antithetical to his understanding of politics and government. The second major
critic is Nicholas Murray Butler. Butler was perhaps the most prolific and staunch Anti-
progressive of the group. Rooted in conservative political ideologies that drove much of
his analysis, Butler was also a trained and accomplished academic. This gave his staunch
Republican views an unusual depth and sense of reasoning that brings out many details of
how Anti-progressives viewed the American government. The third major thinker is
William Howard Taft. Obviously a Republican leader, Taft nonetheless provided a
complicated critique due to his torn loyalties and the difficulties that stemmed from his
campaigns in 1908 and 1912 and his relationship with Theodore Roosevelt. More than
anything, Taft focused on issues surrounding the judiciary and his thoughtful intellect
provides for outstanding examples of Anti-progressive ideology.
The final chapter offers a collection of individual Anti-progressives who fill-out
the ideas and backgrounds of this group. They include more prominent types such as
Emanuel Philipp and Elihu Root; lesser known and local figures such as Charles
Hollingsworth and Bernard Freyd; and a voice from the far left, socialist politician Victor
Berger. These individuals typically critiqued only one or two issues of Progressive
reform and, except for the case of Root, addressed issues of a state or local nature. They
came closer to offering signs of a grassroots voice - one concerned about the type of
government and politics that they lived with on a daily basis. This voice was particularly
16
important given the fact that most Progressive reforms took hold on the state and local
level.
The work concludes with an analysis of these various voices that made up a core
of Anti-progressive thinkers and writers. From these preliminary discussions of
individual voices we will find several strong themes that run through their ideas and a
foundation from which we can better understand and analyze the Anti-progressives as a
whole as well as other Anti-progressives who are not covered here but could emerge as a
result of these conclusions. The conclusion also makes clear the Anti-progressives'
contribution to the important conflict of ideas of the period and, at least indirectly, gives
us a better understanding of the institutional, cultural, and ideological changes that took
place at the time. To fully understand why the direct democracy claims of the early
Progressives have now become an assumed mode of politics among the broader citizenry,
we must also come to terms with the influence and meaning of competing arguments and
their relevance in today’s political realm. The evidence seems to suggest that Anti-
progressive ideas, unlike Anti-Federalist ideas, are not part of continuing debates over
multiple decades. Ffowever, even though the Anti-progressives and their arguments are
not an active part of today’s political debate, they do offer insight and answers into many
of the problems and difficulties that are persistent in the American polity today.
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CHAPTER 2
HENRY JONES FORD
Henry Jones Ford, in many ways, embodies the energetic confluence of
intellectualism, politics, journalism, and reform that was an important dynamic of the
early 20lh century. A reporter, turned academic, turned politician who was engaged in the
progressive reforms of the day, Ford is difficult to define and hard to place into the
complex debates of the time. An early member of the new field of political science and
an advisor to Woodrow Wilson, Ford is often viewed as a progressive reformer who
argued for its cause. These conclusions are drawn primarily from selected chapters of his
defining work. The Rise and Growth ofAmerican Politics , and have mostly ignored the
body of his writings that portray a public intellectual who was suspect of reformers and
opposed to many of their proposals.
1
Relatively little has been written about Ford, and his work is infrequently cited in
the subsequent writings of political scientist. But his numerous academic articles, books,
and journalistic contributions all point to a thinker who had a strong command ol
constitutional development, public administration, and reform. His diverse training also
1 See Martha Joynt Kumar, “The Rise and Growth of American Politics: A sketch of
Constitutional Developments by Henry Jones Ford.' PS: Political Science and Politics, 32, No. 2 (June,
1999), 226-228.
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adds to his sharp political sensibilities and a clear writing style that is lacking in many
academic volumes. But what is most interesting about Ford, considering his colleagues
and profession, is that his understanding of American politics and constitutionalism in the
mam dissents from the political proposals of reformers that defined the progressive era.
In particular. Ford tackles issues of municipal corruption, direct primaries, civil service
reform, and political parties. And his ideas offer a consistent understanding of politics
that mostly rejects the progressive reformers and their concept of the American polity.
Born in Maryland in 1851 to working class immigrant parents of English and
Welsh decent. Ford essentially stumbled into a career path substantially different from
that of his parents and peers. Although his father died when Ford was only nine, his
family managed to keep him in school until the age of seventeen at which point he went
to work in a wholesale store as a stock-boy and, eventually, a bookkeeper. Although the
details are unclear, at the age of twenty-one Ford found a job, by chance, with the
Baltimore American and after six years with that paper became its managing editor. This
sealed Ford's fate for the next several decades and provided him a career that exposed
him to politics and educated him as to the workings of the American state. After his time
at the Baltimore American he went on to leadership roles at the New York Sun, Baltimore
Sun and then of the Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette and Chronicle-Telegraph and
eventually became the editor of the Pittsburgh Gazette where he served from 1901 to
1905.
Although few details exist, apparently while serving at New York Sun Ford was
influenced and shaped by the strong direction of the Sun ’s founder and editor, Charles A.
Dana. Dana was a well-known and often outrageous editor whose penchant for hard
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attacks and confrontational editorials earned him a reputation as an important force in
politics. He was also highly regarded as an editor who placed a premium on clarity and
vividness in writing and was the professional mentor for many important editors in early
twentieth century America. Perhaps the greatest influence that Dana had on the young
Ford was his views of reforms and political parties. Dana was often critical of
Progressive reforms and engaged the rough and tumble nature of parties in the late
1800 s. As this chapter will show. Ford used his experience as a newspaper writer to
inform his political writings later in life. Certainly his love for parties and politics
stemmed in part from his experience at the Sun and his skepticism of many Progressive
reforms undoubtedly emerged from his early exposure to Dana.
Ford's move out ofjournalism began with from his 1898 publication The Rise and
Growth of American Politics; a Sketch of Constitutional Development. This led to
lecturing at Johns Hopkins and the University of Pennsylvania and eventually, in 1908, to
an appointment to Princeton University by the university’s president, Woodrow Wilson.
As a professor of politics, Ford would continue writing about American democracy,
administration, and politics. His migration into public administration came from his
affiliation with Wilson. As governor of New Jersey, Wilson appointed him
commissioner of banking and insurance, and as president, Wilson first assigned him to a
special mission to the Philippines and then appointed him to the Interstate Commerce
Commission.. During his time at both Princeton and in government service. Ford wrote
prolifically. From 1901 to 1924 he wrote more than eight books and was a frequent
contributor to newspapers and magazines. These writings form the core of his political
beliefs and of his Anti-progressive views. The quotations from his work used in this
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chapter will reveal a grounded, methodical writer whose vast exposure to current events
and engagement in historical analysis inform his opinions and conclusions. There is very
little political hyperbole in his writings and, regardless of his affiliation with Progressives
like Wilson, he let his conclusions rest on analysis, personal experience, and historical
evidence as he viewed it . 2
This chapter considers Ford’s ideas around several concepts that are at the
intellectual core of his writings and comments on progressive reforms. These include
politics, constitutionalism, and power and authority, and in each of these areas Ford
reveals himself as a public intellectual who disagrees with the arguments and solutions of
the progressive reformers. He is, instead, a consistent defender of a constitutional form
of government that ties together representation, authority, power, and politics into a
modern republicanism which is devoid of the direct democratic arrangements that remove
institutional controls in favor of popular moral sensibilities.
Power and Authority
At the core of Ford’s view of American politics is his understanding of power and
authority. In most of his writings on the American state. Ford is primarily concerned
with the location of power, who has the ability to use it, and how a populace can hold
responsible those in authority. In many of Ford's writings, he sees progressive reform as
having the effect of separating responsibility and control from the locus of power and
authority. As he asserts, “[p]ower will rest somewhere,” but that with progressive reform
proposals “few will know where, so that it will be released from any responsibility for
2
“Henry Jones Ford." Dictionary ofAmerican Biography, base set (New York: American
Council of Learned Societies, 1928-1936).
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results." Like the progressives. Ford is concerned with responsibility and good
government but, unlike them, good government will not necessarily emit from simply
“devolving" power to the educated, democratic masses. For Ford, power exists, and will
always exist, so creating properly arranged institutions that can hold power clearly
responsible is key. But power for Ford does not rest simply in the moral consciousness
of the people, and he rejects as “mere sentimental cant” the reformers claim that “if there
were no organized control, the people would select their wisest and best for public
office .”
4
One ot the strongest examples on which Ford draws on to illustrate this problem
of separating authority is the progressive drive to reform municipal and state government.
In particular. Ford targets the movement in state and local government toward the direct
election of executive offices. The reform itself was offered as a way to influence more
directly, and thereby better, the various executive authorities and, arguably, hold these
directly elected office holders more responsible for their activities. These reforms were
meant to produce better government that was more responsive, honest, and democratic.
But, as Ford points out, experience teaches precisely the opposite lesson:
If direct popular supervision of the conduct of government had the importance
which the dominant school of reformers attach to it, municipal government should
be best administered, since it comes closer to the people than state or national
government, and the consequences of mal-administration are more direct and
immediate in their effect. By like inference, state government should be superior
to the national government in quality of administration; but as a matter of fact, the
graduation of satisfactoriness is just the other way.^
1
Henry Jones Ford, “The Direct Primary,” North American Review
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190 (July 1909): 12.
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It is this direct popular control of a multiplicity of executive offices that has led to the
“disintegration of administrative authority.”6 Ford feels that progressive reforms have
shitted authority from an elected executive body (mayor or council) into the hands of the
voters and left it at too great a distance from the location of power or elected official.
Rather than using suffrage as a legitimating act that affirms or denies the policy and
activities of a centralized executive body, the progressive reformers have made them
essentially managers of each separate department or agency. By doing this, no one
administrator has the authority to execute his duties properly. More importantly, overall
responsibility for government action has been dispersed in a way that fails to hold anyone
responsible for governmental outcomes. He is arguing that the progressives have
confused administration and control and in doing so they fail to realize that “[t]he people
are called upon to control the government, not to administer it; and they can do the one
because they do not have to do the other ." 7 The result of dispersing authority away from
a centralized executive power is a situation where “in state and municipal government the
people are called upon to administer the government, and their control is proportionately
defective .”
8
Failures in administration cannot be attributed to a centralized executive that
has both power and authority to coordinate outcomes, take credit for accomplishments, or
be held responsible for failures. Ford’s admiration for the constitutional system of the
national government is due in part to its centralized executive that places the act of
legitimizing government in the hands of the people but gives balanced authority that can
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 187.
8
Ibid., 187
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properly use power with the full knowledge that the electorate will judge the activities of
that executive and their party. He considers it to be a “higher” form of government that
has evolved from “lower” torms of direct democracy and only “when state and municipal
elections become simply a consultation of the people upon administrative policy, as in the
presidential election, then the people will acquire a real control over the government there
too. He concludes this criticism of the reformers by claiming that “[t]he great
hindrance to constitutional growth in this direction is the habit of reform in the structure
ot government, unsettling the type and arresting functional development .” 10
Although Ford's main issues with the problem of power and authority rest with
state and local governments he also finds the national system problematic and the
solutions of the progressives equally difficult to endorse. But unlike the electoral issues
that are present in lower levels of government, at the national level the problem lies in
overcoming the difficulties of widely separated branches of government. The separation
ot powers does indeed limit power and authority and blurs some lines of responsibility.
Many observers point out the fact that the party system was created to overcome these
limitations and Ford does see the party as a “necessary phase of political development” in
our constitutional system." For Ford, the party system “supplies administrative
connections between the executive and legislative branches of the government, and
9
Ibid., 187-88.
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Ibid., 188.
" Henry Jones Ford, “Political Evolution and Civil Service Reform,” The Armais ofthe American
Academy ofPolitical and Social Science, XV (March 1900): 155.
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furnishes public opinion with an organ of control which, although imperfect, is certainly
better than none at all .” 12
But progressive reformers, looking to undermine party activity and deal with the
executive/legislative problem by strengthening the executive and introducing civil service
reform, saw the solution in terms of giving authority to the public and introducing
expertise into an administration that could then be managed by a popularly elected
president. In short, the progressive solution was to write the legislature out of the
equation as much as possible. Ford sees this as causing two problems regarding the
arrangement of power and authority. Most obviously, it further alienates the legislative
and executive branches and therefore further separates the authority of legislative action
from the power ot execution. This is particularly true with the attack on parties which,
for Ford, is a legitimating force in negotiating and communicating the wishes of the
electoiate to the elected leaders. By once again shifting managing authority further into
the hands of public opinion we separate executive power from authority and strip the
legislature of its important role. And as Ford sees it, the reformers were intent on
molding a model of executive power that placed the executive at the head of a
bureaucracy based on civil service principles and motivated by public opinion regardless
of the concurrence of congress. He sees the reformers as arguing that the president
should rely on a sense of “duty” to the administration of government and that if congress
did not concur with this loyalty then “it was not the fault of the president, but of politics .
. . He had done his duty and was not to be blamed if Congress did not do its duty.” 13
12
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This last passage leads to the second problem the reformers create - the
repression ot politics. In Ford's primary criticism of civil service reform, "Political
Evolution and Civil Service Reform,” he details the necessity of politics in effective
government and argues that progressive reformers’ attempt to circumvent politics and
create a civil service system discounts the role of politics in the administration of
government. As Ford sees it, this offers “pernicious results” that lead directly to the
break down ot relations between the president and congress, and to reforms that are
imposed on a political system rather than “a gradual outgrowth from them, [which]
explains the superficial character of [civil service reform] effect and the dangerous
reactions it has excited .” 14
I he danger is two-told in this instance. The process of civil service reform (via
executive order and rule changes) avoided politics and therefore dismissed party input
and minimized its relevance. Secondly, civil service reform itself attempts to de-
politicize executive administration and responsibility. The first problem resulted in poor
outcomes that turther alienated the branches ot government. The second problem is more
serious tor Ford because it eliminates politics and therefore removes an important level of
protection from independent executive action. If a president is responsible in part to his
party then independent action that ignores the politics of the situation are rare - the
citizenry is protected by a president's self-interested political obligations. But with this
aspect removed, as civil service reforms attempt to do, “it is possible for a president to
purse an individual policy regardless of consequences. This involves a risk to
constitutional government, against which the high character and sincere patriotism of our
14
Ibid., 153, 156.
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presidents does not afford complete security .”' 5 The progressive reformers essentially
maintain "false but plausible theories of civic virtue” that risk the constitutional
arrangements that use politics as a key guardian of governmental corruption
.
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In the case of power and authority, the problems the reformers introduce have a
decentralizing effect on governance. In place of institutional relationships, extra-
constitutional bodies such as parties, and executive responsibility, the reformers want to
rely on expertise, individual democratic virtue, and the direct power of public opinion.
Both progressive reformers and Ford see serious problems in party corruption, an
overwhelming spoils system, inefficient government, and unresponsive officials. But
Ford sees the degree of these problems, the methods for reform, and the proposed
solutions as lacking any substantial reasoning that justifies their advocacy. He is a strong
advocate for the role of political processes in creating change, he is very protective of
constitutional arrangements as established by the founders, and is concerned with making
government more responsible and responsive by creating clearer lines of responsibility
and maintaining political organizations that hold their elected members accountable
.
17
It
is clear that Ford sees public endorsement of elected officials as the primary role of
elections and believes that civil service reforms undermine the power and authority
relationship, and, opposite of reformers desires, takes away public control of the agencies
of government .
18
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It is not that Ford does not recognize the problems that the reformers do but he
sees their solutions as only exacerbating the problems. As detailed above, unlike the
reformers, Ford is not afraid of power or authority and he sees both as always existing in
society. It is the arrangement of these conditions which will dictate outcomes. It is the
vibrancy of politics and the health of institutional and electoral relationships that can
guarantee stable and legitimate outcomes. But for the reformers it was about corrupt
people and their ability to corrupt government. Change the relationship of the corrupt
officeholders with the electorate and you will get sound results
.
19
For Ford the opposite
is true. I he relationships ot the institutions and the activity of politics is part of the
evolution of the political body. It is only through accountable institutions and healthy
politics - or what Ford calls “hygienic processes” - that sound and stable results and
reform can emerge
.
20 Quick reforms and an over reliance on directly democratic methods
only harm arrangements. Turning to suffrage as the defining institution is the chief
mistake that undermines authority and power. As Ford concludes:
While the suffrage is incapable of serving as an organ of administration, it is
capable of serving as an agency of control; but to be an efficient instrument of
control, it must act upon some organ of government possessing administrative
authority so complete that it may be held to full accountability for results . 21
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Politics
Inherent in his ideas of power and authority is a belief in the processes of politics.
Progressive reformers often touted the baseness and corrupting influence of politics that
could only be overcome through scientific expertise and the morally cleansing effect of
direct democracy and reliance on public opinion. However, tied into most of Ford's
commentary on reform and government is a strong belief in the process of politics and
the healthy results it can produce. And tied to the primacy of politics is the connection it
must have to politicians - another pariah of progressive reformers. The two are strongly
connected for Ford and both are essential and omnipresent in government: “Politics has
been, is, and always will be carried on by politicians.”22 The desire to take power away
from politicians is a fruitless endeavor because “the only thing that is open to control is
the sort of politicians we shall have.' Calling the progressive push to remove power
from politicians as “pure nonsense” he drives his rejection of the reformers by claiming
that “we can never put the politicians out of business, although we can put the reformers
out of business .”24
The central setting for Ford's explication of his ideas on power and politics
centers on his criticism of the direct primary. In his North American Review’ article titled
The Direct Primary, Ford challenges the popular sentiment of the direct primary as a
way to give power to the people. More specifically he attempts to look at the systematic
consequences of such a reform and critically analyze its stated goals. It is in this analysis
22
Ford, “Direct Primary,” 2.
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and through his “scrutiny of the conditions it will establish” that we find his
understanding of politics and the essential role it plays in conveying public preferences
and holding officials accountable. Like many of his ideas, he is primarily concerned with
the health, stability, and contributions of political systems, and is more skeptical and less
concerned with popular concerns of democracy and efficiency. He is a consummate
constitutionalist and, in many ways, unlike the progressives, a Madisonian federalist.
In a little recognized article published by Ford in 1904, we get a sense of how
primal he views politics and the state. 2 " In clear terms Ford explicates his understanding
of man’s origins and bases it primarily on the belief that “[m]an is born a religious being
just as truly as that he is born a political being, and the one involves the other.”26 It is an
Aristotelian understanding that places the state as the “permanent, universal and absolute
condition ol human existence, anterior not only to society and government but to
humanity itself”- 7 Essentially, Ford’s understanding of politics as imbedded in human
natuie rejects the progressive idea that politics is simply a condition that corrupts good
policy and can be removed through social scientific engineering and aggressive moral
development. We could sum up Ford's understanding by quipping - you can take the
man out of politics but you can’t take politics out of the man.
The direct primary, for Ford, is a classic example of the misunderstanding of
politics and human nature by the progressive reformers. By failing to understand the
primacy of politics in human activity and its value to the implementation of government,
25
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the direct primary compounds problems of legitimacy and governance. As Ford sees it.
only the "conditions" of a political system can produce change. It is the type of political
and institutional conditions that we create which will produce a particular type of politics
and a certain kind of politician. As Ford fully explains:
Therefore, when any reform is proposed, we should form our judgment of its
merits not by the pretences accompanying it, but by scrutiny of the conditions it
will establish and by consideration of the sort of men it will tend to bring into
power — that is to say, the kind of politicians it will breed . 28
Reform can have an impact on politics through its impact on “the conditions that
govern political activity, thus determining its extent and quality.”29 The suppression of
politics and the elimination of politicians are all impossible goals for Ford. The types of
institutions and reforms we create can have an impact but primarily in terms of changing
the character of our politics by creating new conditions, or as Ford summarizes, “[a]ll that
the direct primary, or any other political reform can do is to affect the character of the
politicians by altering the conditions that govern political activity, thus determining its
extent and quality.”30
Based on this belief in politics and reform. Ford delivers strong opposition to the
progressive direct primary reform as the “most noxious of the reforms” by claiming that
when examined “its true character is revealed. Its pretence of giving power to the people
is a mockery. The reality is that it scrambles power among faction chiefs and their bands,
while the people are despoiled and oppressed .”31 It negatively affects the conditions of
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politics by expanding the number of elections, the number of offices being offered to the
voters, and increasing the governance responsibilities of the voter via increased suffrage.
Politics cannot be removed and power cannot truly be shifted away from those who
organize and deal in power. But this does not mean conditions cannot be changed, it is
that the reformers’ sensibilities are flawed.
With politics as a central component of government. Ford becomes more
interested in how we organize politics to produce good and representative outcomes.
Once again he has a distinctly constitutional approach that advocates for the slow
evolution of the American state through various stages. In fact, he sees the push towards
more directly democratic organizing principles as a devolution of political organization
and a rejection of constitutional development in favor of quick reform that ignores
political structures.
32
For him the push to decentralize politics, remove organizing
bodies such as parties, and increase the number of elections only further burdens the
politician, confuses the electorate and drains clarity, responsibility, and power away from
executive government/ 3
Keeping in line with his conviction that what can be changed is the condition
under which we execute politics and government. Ford considers the direct primary as an
arrangement that only complicates governmental processes and confuses political
relationships to the detriment of society. They do this, primarily, by increasing the
number of elections and thereby increasing the burden and distractions of the elected
official. For Ford, elections should actually be “reduced in number,” but instead “[t]he
" Henry Jones Ford, “The Results of Reform,” The Annals ofthe American Academy ofPolitical
and Social Science
,
2 1 (January - June 1 903) 227.
” Ford, “Direct Primary,” 8, 9.
32
direct primary proposes to give the politicians more to do, it provides for a series of
elections in advance of the present series .”34 Essentially he sees the increasing of
elections as an opportunity for the “political class” to engage in even more electioneering
and not in governance and as an opportunity to behave in a more oligarchic fashion
through personal politics, as the primary tends to encourage, than in a more party
centered broader based politics. They, through numerous non-party-centered elections,
will become professional politicians and will result in the replacing of “existing boss rule
[with] a far more corrupt, degraded and impervious sort of boss rule .”35 The effect is the
replacement of elections via party for elections via factions resulting in conditions that
eliminates party responsibility by providing that party agents shall no longer hold their
posts by efficiency, as now, but by faction favor.”36
Much of his concern about politics and the direct primary is focused on the
negative impact it has on parties. Although he confesses that a party system is “gross and
imperfect, “unconstitutional,” and a “poor substitute for representative government” he
sees it as “at least an integrating force [that] makes towards responsible government.”37
Parties, for Ford, help to fix the problems created by a constitutional system that
separates power and makes it difficult for politics and governance to get done. As he
explains:
Whatever may be the defects and disadvantages of this theory, it is a necessary
phase of political development, for it rests upon the incontestable fact that under
existing political conditions party mediation supplies administrative connection
34
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between the executive and legislative branches of the government, and furnishes
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This concept of parties as central in “mediating” governmental and political
process runs through many of his writings. He often points to their defects but insists that
they have strong organizing principles that are “genuine” and “at least sets up barriers
against the anarchy and terrorism that always in the past have been the outcome of
ochlocratic methods .”39 He essentially makes a differentiation between rule by faction
and rule by party and he chooses the latter. One of the primary factors for his support of
parties, and a strong concern about the possibility of factions, is the unusually
complicated nature of the American federal system. The simple ability of the United
States to maintain some level of order amidst an inordinate amount of governance units is
impressive lor Ford and results in a high level of political activity and expense . 40 This
multiplicity has been largely controlled through the role of parties and stable systems of
elections based on Republican principles but the introduction of direct primaries threatens
these controlling factors. The enormous numbers of elected officials compounded by a
large number ol elections creates more and more politicians. Parties can act as one
effective check on the personal power of politicians and help in communicating the
wishes of people, but the direct primary would actually do the opposite by weakening
parties and increasing the number of elections in which politicians engage. As Ford
argues, “the only effectual way of curtailing their number and diminishing the burden of
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their support is to have less for them to do .”41 Parties, through internal processes, deal
with much of this burden
- particularly due to the number of officeholders necessary in a
federal system. This, coupled with a limited number of elections used for approval of
policy outcomes and for maintaining legitimacy, is difficult but viable for Ford.
Undermining this with direct primaries actually makes the system more confusing and
less democratic. As Ford claims: “Nothing is further from the truth than to describe the
direct primary as a democratic institution. It is the negation of democratic rule, and
nothing ot the sort is lound where democratic government really exists,” and he
continues, “The rule ot bosses and party machines, while a poor substitute for democratic
government, is better than any other substitute available in the conditions to which
American politics has been subjected .”42
As a thinker. Ford is dedicated to the development of constitutional democracy
that attempts to achieve many of the goals that the founders aspired to during the original
drafting of the constitution. Moderate politics, balanced power, clear lines of
responsibility, representative republican-based governance, valuation of executive unity,
and a belief in the inherent political nature of man are all goals that the founders pursued
and that Ford also believes in. And, like the founders. Ford also believes in the
development of the constitutional order over time. As discussed above. Ford very much
sees the growth and maturity of politics as one of the key components of making the
United States federal system more accessible and responsive to the electorate. Politics is
41
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central for Ford to contributing to the “functional development'- of the constitution
.
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He
applauds the rise of political parties as the key factor in making the electoral college
insignificant and in transferring control of the presidency to a popular base. They were
able to do this, in part, because they "brought the political activities of the various states
into subordination to centralized party authority .''44 And likewise, parties and the
organization ol politics is key to municipal reform and not the fractioning of elections
and expansion of elected executive officials as the progressive reformers would argue.
As l ord sees it, only until politics and parties are able to organize and integrate power
will |p)opuIar control over state and municipal government” be possible
.
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But it is
essential, in his view, that the electoral process be the final control mechanism and not
the management mechanism that he sees the progressives trying to install. This is his
concept ot the conditions of politics - a system which promotes vigorous politics and its
organization amongst the electorate, and one that engages in activities that result in the
periodic endorsement and legitimization of those in power. It is a set of conditions that
allows f01 clear lines ot responsibility, a reasonable amount of freedom and power for the
office holder, and a properly checked and energetic government that can address the
needs of the state.
Constitutionalism
All of this, as may be clear now, comes together in his views of a system of
politics that is centered on a belief in constitutionalism and constitutional development.
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His overriding concern in critiquing progressive reform proposais is their impact on the
constitutional mechanisms and constitutional order. He sees the progressive insistence on
quick reform that disregards institutional arrangements as detrimental to political and
constitutional evolution. It is the reformers' drive to “force conditions to suit their
institutions instead of following nature's method of suiting institutions to conditions."
that concerns Ford the most .46 It is in this vein - a belief in right ordered institutions that
evolve slowly with changing conditions and a rejection of swift change that ignores
institutional integrity - that Ford rests not only his understanding of constitutional
government but his other core ideas of power, authority, and politics.
One of the more interesting explorations of institutions and defenses of the
constitutional development approach appears in an article by Ford titled “The Results of
Reform. In this article Ford begins by framing the concept of the American
understanding of reform by comparing it to the British concept. Ford explains that while
in the United States, opposition to reform is taken to mean the rejection of good
government in favor of corruption, in England, one can be a statesman and still be an
anti-reformer. As he explains:
In England, it appears that there is still no sense of incompatibility between active
solicitude for good government and opposition to reform, whereas in this country,
to say that a public man is solicitous for good government is taken as implying
that he is a reformer, while on the other hand opposition to reform implies callous
partisanship or habitual subserviency to sordid motives .47
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In some ways, the reader senses that Ford is partially defending himself since he opposed
many of the proposed reforms of the time and he is eertamly commenting on the
moralistic quality of reformers and the demonizing of their political targets.
Where the British understanding of the word reform centers on making new or to
“form again,” the United States version has “become synonymous with improvement .”48
He is essentially arguing that in Britain to oppose reform is to oppose one particular
vision, but in the United States it is to resist good and improving government. The
consequences ot this difference is significant for Ford and his understanding of
government. In particular, this understanding “begs the question of improvement” and
points to the reformation of institutions as the only path. Considering its meaning, this
leaves little room tor debate and rejects other paths for improvement such as political or
party based solutions or allowing tor slow paced constitutional development that emerges
from changing conditions
.
4
“That retorm may be pernicious sounds to the average
American reader, writes Ford, “like a contradiction in terms, and any argument to that
effect has to combat a settled tendency of thought.” It is a double-edged danger in that
reform itself ignores institutional balance and evolution, and is furthermore accepted as
the only approach - unless you are a scoundrel. One can draw a parallel with current day
campaign finance reform which otters little debate in how to deal with concerns over the
role of money in politics, casts opponents of campaign finance reform as corrupt money-
grubbing special interests, and, for the most part, ignores institutional and free speech
questions that surround the issue. It is an understanding that rejects an organic
48
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understanding of government and instead subscribes to organizational models which
dictate that quick reform to components can change conditions and achieve
organizational success. One tries to treat symptoms by “excising the organ,” and the
other looks beyond symptoms and attempts to find organic balance by treating the
disease. Just as organisms respond and slowly adjust to conditions. Ford’s view of
constitutional development sees the polity as a slowly evolving entity that may be
imperfect at times but attempts to meet the needs of its citizens
.
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Ford s understanding of political parties is a case in point. Although they may be
problematic they are an organic response to both the difficulties of communicating
between separated institutions and to the difficulty that the electorate has in
communicating political preferences to the elected. They are not ideal. He prefers
republican representative forms of government, but given the conditions and institutions
it can be an effective model and certainly better than direct democracy which rejects
republican government as a solution to the problems of parties.
Where the progressives aimed for constitutional reform. Ford champions
constitutional development and he supports his claim by pointing out the difference
between the national government and state and local government in their experience with
reform. The national constitution is structured to resist quick reform and avoid change
that is geneiated from temporary fluctuations in public opinion. Both the amendment
piocess itself and the system of federalism makes it difficult for the electorate to center a
reformist agenda at a distant and complicated system of government. But municipal and
state constitutions rarely offer as much resistance as the federal articles. For Ford the
50
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result of such a changeable system is the progressive's ability to significantly change
state and local government. Bu, the “immobility of the federal constitution” stalled such
attempted reforms as the popular election of the president and instead, “the same end has
been so completely accomplished by processes of constitutional development that the
mass of the people now do not even know that there was a time when they had no vote as
to who should be president.” He continues, “[t]he whole character of the government has
been popularized and the presidency has been converted into a representative institution,
without any reform whatever in political structure.” 51 This “immunity from reform
has permitted the gradual adaptation of institutions to the needs of the community” and
has resulted in a more stable national government and a weakened state and local
system
.
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But the example ot constitutional reform - in municipalities and states - reveals a
different outcome. In these cases, according Ford, responsibility is lost, parties and
politics are attacked, and stability in institutional capacity is weakened. Where reforms
failed at the national level, they succeeded at the local and state level, laments Ford. As
he summarizes:
The waves of impulse which beat in vain upon the impregnable constitutional
barriers of the federal union went roaring over the state constitutions. Then began
the multiplication of elective offices which dissipate public responsibility and
destroy popular control in state and municipal politics. The people can control the
national government because every administrative office is comprehended in a
system of responsible appointment at the head of which stands the president
whom the people elect/ 3
51
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Only through a “gradual adaptation to the needs and responsibilities of public service” do
we create a stable and responsible governmental system
.
54
Ford's developmental focus is grounded, as has been suggested, in an organic
interpretation of political and social organization. This alone explains much of his call
for slow and deliberate change that is sensitive to conditions. His view, in this way, ties
him closely to many of the founding arguments, even if his model is a Darwinian
orgamcisim as opposed to the enlightenment understanding of the government as a
machine. Biological models may replace models based on physics, but they are both
committed to a constitutional framework that views humans through a “realist’s” lens.
Ford is satisfied with imperfect or “moderate” outcomes and avoids “extravagant
expectations from the every-day human nature which forms the stuff of politics .”55
Parties are not ideal but they serve the purpose for now, government is slow to change
but in return we get stability and consistent responsibility. Ford makes it clear that there
are worse things than slow change: “National hypochondria is a worse evil than national
corruption. 6 And in a Tocquvillian conclusion, Ford feels that the “American people
are tree from [hypochondria] at any rate; they are disgusted but not dismayed by the
situation, and they have deep conviction that they will eventually find ways and means of
dealing with it .’° 7 The constitution, republican government, and the people in general all
point to a dedication to development instead of reform.
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Ford also sees less risk in development than in reform movements. Activity itself
has value, much like his views on politics, and therefore development that comes out of
activity is better than reform which looks to limit and drastically change activity. This
may mean that in developing we work with less than ideal arrangements. Likening the
existence of Boss rule to the “necessary" step of feudalism. Ford maintains that "It is
better that government and social activity should go on in any way than that they should
not go on at all. Slackness and decay are more dangerous to a nation than corruption."58
It is a type of teleological view that sees an ever-evolving system which moves to a
higher order through a slow process of development. Reform threatens this, and can.
according to Ford, lead to "lower depths of corruption than those so far reached.”59 It is a
peculiai ly American notion that reform necessarily means improvement and Ford
repeatedly challenges this approach and tries to convince his audience “that reform by no
means implies improvement but rather the contrary.”60
By revealing these central concepts that run through Ford’s writings a clear image
of a significant writer and thinker of the early 20th century emerges. An unambiguous
critic and opponent of progressive political reform. Ford almost always returns to
constitutional principles much in the vein of Publius to make his argument for the
American polity. He sees failures in the progressive organizational concepts that lead to
the separation of power and authority and the blurring of responsibility. He also sees
attempts by the progressives to deny the basic nature of man by suppressing politics and
Ibid., 678.
59
Ibid., 679.
60
Ibid., 230.
42
the “stuff" that allows for negot,aliens over demands and holds officials respons.ble.
This is particularly evident for him in the attempt to dismantle a party system that serves
to bridge gaps between executive and legislative institutions. Finally, in pointing to these
problems, he points to a constitutional development model as the way for change. Like
many other anti-progressives Ford is driven and dedicated to protecting constitutional
arrangements. This is not motivated by an anachronistic view of the polity but rather by
a belie! in organic evolution and a reliance on maintaining founding principles.
It is surprising to see such a central figure such as Ford be so squarely against the
progressives of the day. Considering his loyalties and commitments to the Wilson
administration it is curious that his critiques could be so overlooked. Much of this can be
blamed on the historical emphasis on his primary contribution in The Rise and Growth of
American Politics which, in places, argues for a strong executive. This, coupled with the
company he kept, has prevented many of his contributions from coming to light. This is
a central problem with much o! the writings on the progressive era. The focus has been
on a horizontal expansion of the understanding of the progressive understanding.
Academics have successfully shown how progressivism influenced much more than
political reform. In doing this they have left a simplified argument in its trail. By mostly
ignoring writers, thinkers, and politicians like Ford, our understanding of progressive
reform falls victim to oversimplification. In complicating the discussion by revealing
Ford s attacks, we gain a clearer and more textured view of the debates. In turn, this
gives us the potential for a broader view of political debates that have waged throughout
the 20 lh century. If the progressives did indeed launch a second founding, it is only
43
through locating voices like Ford's that we ge, a sense of how this second founding
influenced the development of the American state in the 20 th century.
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CHAPTER 3
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
Robert La Follette, the great Progressive from Wisconsin, once denounced
Nicholas Murray Butler on the floor of the United States Senate as a sycophant who is the
bootlicker of men of fortune" and “the handyman of privilege .” 1 La Follette, of course,
did not have the last word on Butler but this immensely influential educator, university
president, and statesman left a mixed legacy that typifies the wide ranging success and
failures of many Anti-progressives. His overly egoistic personality and his legalistic.
“neo-Kantian” approach to social analysis produced a curious blend of reformer and
staunch Hamiltonian republicanism who argued for the status quo and a republican form
of government lead by enlightened elites. As much as Butler was the grandfather of
progressive educational reform and a champion of administrative professionalism and
efficiency, he was also adamantly against virtually all of the progressive political reforms
of the time including the direct election of senators, direct primaries, and the initiative,
referendum, and recall. As one short bio-essay quips, Butler was an “elitist by
1
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temperament with a Hamilton-like fear of demagogues.”2 By almost every aceoum.
Butler clearly did not believe in broad-based democracy and maintained a strong belief.
rooted in a combined sense of natural rights and btolog.cal determinism, in the proper
evolutton of the federal system
.ha, would engage the best sens.bilities of those with
superior “natural talents.”
Butler’s inclinations and personality were tremendously influenced by his
childhood and astonishing academic and professional success a, a young age. He was
born in 1862 in Patterson New Jersey, to a comfortable middle-class. Republican family
ot English descent, he attended public school and graduated from high school at the age
ot thirteen, spent two to three years studying Latin, Greek, and mathematics and began
Ins collegiate studies in 1878, at the age of 16, at Columbia College - the only university
from which he would receive degrees. He received his bachelors degree, with a host of
honors, at the age of 20. received his MA at 21, and his Ph.D. at the age of 22. He paid
for almost all his college expenses by working and going to school at the same time. In
his memoirs, he devotes a chapter to his graduate studies and entitles it, somewhat
strangely considering how briefly he was in graduate school, ‘’The Years of Graduate
Study." (my emphasis) A one year post-doctoral fellowship in Gennany gave Butler his
ideas about pedagogy and philosophy and influenced his opinions on a host of social and
political issues. His masters degree was on Kant, and during this time in Germany he
continued his study of German philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Hegel.
2
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Butler clearly saw his life's work as an academic one with “the philosophic study of
education as its cornerstone and university building as its foundation.”3
With his graduate work completed, Butler returned to Columbia in 1885 and was
hired as an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the age of 23. Five years
later he became a full professor and dean of the Philosophy faculty and then in 1901. at
the age of 39, he became president of Columbia. He would remain president for more
than forty years. During this tenure, Butler was involved in a variety of activities
including the founding of the Teachers College, membership on the New Jersey State
Board of Education, leadership in the battle to rid New York of decentralized schools,
president ot the National Education Association, founder the College Entrance
Examination Board (CEEB), and was founder and editor of the Educational Review 4
He also involved himself in Republican Party politics and “viewed himself as a
lory reformer who stood for an enlightened gradualist approach that avoided the
extremes of standpatism and radicalism.”5 But by most standards, Butler was much more
of a old Republican with Tory sensibilities than he was a reformer. His reform activities
were almost solely limited to education and, on occasion, administration in the vein of
promoting expertise and professionalism as president of Columbia. His pride in
attending fourteen Republican National Conventions shows itself in the fact that he
named a chapter of his memoirs “Fourteen Republican National Conventions,” and he
devoted the entire first page ot this chapter explaining how unusual it is for someone to
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so many. He goes on to describe the conventions and his involvement in them,
and concludes that conventtons
-‘most clearly and most fully reveal the nation’s political
habits and the forces
... at work in shaping our public policies.”6
There is ample evidence in the form of letters and journals of relationships with
several presidents to a greater or lesser degree as well. He was a close friend of Theodore
Roosevelt until the two parted after TR’s support of business regulations and his handling
of union disputes. His close personal affiliation and support of William Howard Taft led
to Butler s appointment as his vice presidential running-mate in 1912 following the death
of the original candidate, James Sherman. He considered a run for the presidency in
1920, and then ran in earnest in 1928 as an anti-prohibition candidate. Later in life he
was a much less influential voice to presidents but did keep some cordial but insignificant
relations with both Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman. In the case of FDR. he
was supportive initially of his plans, especially when they included members of his
faculty, but wholeheartedly rejected his plans for the National Recovery Administration
and his attempts to change the Supreme Court. 7 He also had sharp words for Woodrow
Wilson’s administration which he viewed with disdain and, at a dinner party asserted that
"the new tyranny, sometimes known as ’the new freedom’, has in this respect at least
proved a beneficent instrument of government in that it has prevented the Democratic
legislative majorities
. . . from wreaking the full fruits of its incompetence and folly upon
the American people.” 8
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Beyond the university and his role as a political activist and advisor. Butler was
also involved with international affairs and was a chanrpion of peaee. Along with Jane
Addams, he won the Nobel Peaee Prize in 1931 for his work with "Peace Societies”
oversees and his advocacy of peace issues through his creation and leadership in the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peaee. As in other parts of his life, Butler found
ways to take diverse opinions and bring them together in an apparently coherent form.
As one biographer summarizes: Butler “was a remarkably symptomatic figure; his talent
lay in gathering and harmonizing, embodying and reflecting, diverse tendencies, giving
them wide and incessant publicity.’” An example of this is the juxtaposition of his work
in world peace and support for the World Wars and his visits and relationships with
Kaiser Wilhelm in 1905 as well as Benito Mussolini in 1924.
But laced throughout all his activities - university president, politician,
international statesman - was a commitment to leading a public life in the private sector
dedicated to “public service in the sphere of liberty - not working against others as a
rival, but working with others as a comrade.” 10 By every estimate, Butler was an active,
recognized, and influential public intellectual whose opinion and approval was often
sought. He was a prolific author and speaker and he weighed in on a variety of topics
pertinent to social and political life in the United States and the world. Considering this
breadth and length of activity, Butler maintained a reasonably consistent track record of
opinion and views on a variety of topics that allows us to come to some reasonable
conclusions about his arguments and feelings. These conclusions point to perhaps the
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strongest example of Anti-progressivism and one of the most
opponents of progressive political reform.
consistent and vigorous
Butler's Anti-progressive vtews on government and politics can best be explained
by looking at three strong themes that emerge. These include a belief in universal truths
and nahtral rights, a strong belief in the primacy of liberty as the defining quality of the
individual and society, and an unquestioned dedication to a republican form of
government and the centrality of representation as the protector of freedom and liberty.
Dividing his ideas in this way, we will first look at his arguments regarding the founding
principles of society, then at the primacy of the individual, and finally at the proper place
of government.
Universal Truths and Natural Rights
Virtually all ot Butler’s views on the individual, society, and government stem
from a world understanding that accepts the existence of a set of universal truths, divine
laws, or biological determinism. This belief in a set of immutable truths was ingrained
and developed in Butler from a young age and contributes to the consistency of his
arguments foi over five decades ot public lite. From his early years at Columbia to his
post-graduate work in Berlin, Butler was exposed to Hegelian and Kantian metaphysics
that argue toi unsuitable truths. In addition, Butler was also exposed to the social and
intellectual wave created by Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. Coupled with
extensive exposure to the writings of the founding period and the natural rights
arguments that they are based on, Butler was primed to turn often to this understanding of
society.
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Although he rarely incorporated spectfic reference to either Hegel or Kant, his
attachment to these theorists and other similar metaphysical philosophers is clear.
Butler's masters thesis, which has been lost, was on Kan, and biographers have detailed
his attachment to faculty who taught him the German philosophers. Of the three primary
professors who had the most profound influence on Butler, John William Burgess of
Columbia College had the greatest. He "furntshed a metaphysical theory of the state,
defining the terms in which [Butler] would view American political institutions.""
Burgess was one of the founders of political science, had a thorough training in German
philosophy and was one of the first Americans to train in Germany. He passed this
philosophy on to his star pupil and laid the groundwork for Butler's understanding of the
state. According to Charles and Mary Beard, Burgess trained a tremendous number of
political scientists and taught many in the legal profession to the point that Burgess’ ideas
and teachings "became the generally prevailing scheme and cast of thought in legal
education, legal ideology, and juristic speculation by the close of the nineteenth
century.” 12
Butler s attachment to Burgess' teachings was more important than any of his
other college experiences. As Butler adamantly claims after over forty years of
university service, "if any more remarkable instruction than [Burgess'] was ever offered
in an American college, I do not know of it.” 13 In particular, he give credit to Burgess for
helping form his understanding of government - based on the immutable existence of a
1
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'sphere of liberty” and a “sphere of govern™,, - where governs, must be a servant
to the purposes of free men.- This distinction, Butier clainted. “has controlled my
thinking and my public activity during nty entire life.
. .
. „ offers a sure foundation for
true philosophy of democracy .” 15 And Butler concludes his treatment of Burgess by
Claiming, “if I were to pu, my finger on any one person or any one series of ideas that has
most profoundly influenced my thinking, that person would be Professor Burgess and
that senes ot ideas would be those which he expounded in his lectures.”"’
The intellectual climate for Butler’s acceptance of a metaphysics based on natural
truths, was dominated by the ideas of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. Their
theories of natural selection and evolution contributed to his ideas about republican
democracy as being a superior form of government. Albert Martin claims that:
Butler eagerly grasped the Spencerian view that the existence of a dominant idea
.institution, or political process was self-evident proof of its right to surviveThus evolution and the history of mankind confirm that certain things after trialand error, are ‘settled once and for all.’.
.
. similarly, any ahernpfm aher dieprinciples upon which the Constitution rests is atavistic - is, indeed, in a favoriteButler term, reactionary and foredoomed to failure
.
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Butler also used Spencer’s ideas of specialization of function to support his feelings
regarding complex political organizations. The development of a federal system, the
institutionalization of separation of powers, and the rise of a representative form of
government all illustrated the progress of constitutional development in the United States
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and its advanced state.'* To suggest, as the pt„gress,ves did, that we should ntove toward
a more dtrec, democracy, or
-backwards” towards a more simplified form of government
as Butler would say, would not only be dangerous bu, against the laws of nature. 1 ’
Butler's commitment to the ideas of Hegel and Kan, also lead to his appreciation
for the centrality of a cons, itu,ton as the main defense of liberty. Both thinkers, much
like Aristotle, rejected democracy as dangerous, fleeting, and a threat to liberty. Butler
too d,sliked the power of the masses and argued for a limited or perhaps "negative”
government, governed by a written constitution and a bill of rights to "protect the
individual against the worst, the most cruel and the most selfish of despotisms, which is
that ol the majority.” 21 ' This understanding of democracy and of majority rule, for Butler.
has "permanent significance.” I, is a law of nature and cannot be challenged by even the
most well-meaning progressive or by advances in society. As he continues:
Human history and human experience have taught and are teaching lessons ofpermanent significance and value [among which]
. . . that the civil liberty of theindividual is at all hazards to be protected by fundamental law against the attacks
and invasions of temporary majorities, whatever may be the speciousness or thepower ol the cause which they advocate; that the representative republic erected
on the American continent under the Constitution of the United States is a more
advanced, a more just, and a wiser form of government than the socialistic and
direct democracy which it is now proposed to substitute for it . 21
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Reference to the “permanence” of laws, the “progress” of nature, and the "advance” of
the constitution runs throughout his writings. Considering all this, his reverence for and
reliance on the founding fathers and the argument of the Federalist Papers should be no
surprise. In fact, one of the founders’ virtues was their ability to learn from history and
from what came before in order to establish the new. These “giants,” for Butler, engaged
in a “stupendous achievement” by developing a representative republic by using their
historical advantage because they knew what happened “in Greece, in Rome, in Venice,
and in Florence.- Quoting Madtson and the Federalists often, he particularly draws on
their concept of representation and their distinction between "ultimate authority” and
“administrative authority.” The former restdes with the people and later with those
selected by them. This distincfton between the “people” and the “government,” as will
become clear, is central to Butler’s understanding of society.
But unlike writers like Ford, Butler does not subscribe to a process of
constitutional development or a slower or more deliberate path to reform. Rather, he
seeks a reconnection and re-entrenchment towards the natural foundations of government
and the natural law that has been uncovered from thousands of years of social
development. Where Ford is critiquing the reforms on developmental grounds, Butler is
using historical “tacts ’ as his motivation: “Need we destroy fundamental principles in
order to correct temporary infelicities? Need we pull up our institutions by the roots
because they do not grow quite fast enough to please us?”23
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His evolutionary beliefs seem to draw also on ,deas of race and ancestry. In a
clear reference to Ten,onto Germ Theory, Butler quickly traces the heritage of the
governmental system that we live under. Referring to the dangers of the direct
democracy movement, Butler posits: “It strikes a, the very root of the institutions that we
call Anglo-Saxon, and i, proclaims a failure that great movement for the establishment of
liberty under law, controlled and earned on through the institutions of representative
government, a movement winch had its origin more than two thousand years ago in the
forests of Germany, and which has persisted with constantly growmg force and power
throughout the history of English-speaking peoples down to our own day.”24 Indeed, he
claims that it is the foundation of “everything which we call western civilization.” It is
the most basic foundation. From these ancient Anglo-Saxon origins, we have evolved to
our current system of constitutional government. These foundations stem from "the
product of the settled habits of thinking of the Anglo-Saxon race. It took many hundreds
ot years and countless struggles to discover and to establish them .”25 It is the
incorporation of history, genetics, and natural law all in one.
The overall end ot this confluence of ideas - Kantian truths, natural laws, genetic
inheritance, the teleology of history - is the premises that he learned and further
developed from his mentor Burgess. This principle idea, that rests on his reverence for
the universal truths of our constitutional republic, is the separation of society into two
spheres - the sphere of government and the sphere of liberty. It is this distinction
between two spheres that defines virtually all his arguments and drives most of his
24
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disdain for reform. Besides his disdain for the arrogance of reformers trying to change a
system that was right because, in a Kantian sense, it had survtved the dialectic of history
and so reforms against nature would fail, he also disdatned the reformers for violating the
proper roles held by these two spheres of government. In the contemporary sense. Butler
was not only a Constitutional literalist, he was a staunch libertarian.
This idea of universal truth does impact Butler’s overall view that he gathered
from Burgess. Marrin’s biography details this difference between Butler and Burgess by
claiming that Butler took Burgess one step further in the understanding of spheres of
government and liberty. This distinction helps to clarify and solidify Butler as an Anti-
progress,ve. According to Marrin, beyond the distinction Burgess makes between the
sphere of government and the sphere of liberty there is also a difference between Butler
and Burgess in their understanding of the “state.” Burgess’s definition of this “state.”
Marrin argues, is “the society, the sovereign people as a whole, as opposed to the
government, [which is] merely an administrative instrumentality.
. . . The state is anterior
to government, its servant ."-'1 The state, under this definition, is a “sovereign" power,
above individual liberty and above government, that draws out these two spheres. This
idea of the “state" can be seen as a type of “common will” and the ultimate authority. In
offering this concept of society - where neither government nor the individual is
ultimately sovereign - Burgess clearly runs against most interpretations of natural rights
which places ultimate sovereignty within the individual via some conception of God or
nature. For Burgess, in the case of the United States, the expression of this will from the
state came in the torm ol the Constitution - a common agreed upon document that is
Marrin, 103.
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above government and above individual liberty. Butler, in a move that can either make
him more "conservative” or perhaps more sensitive to natural rights conceptions, takes
Burgess' ideas (with which he agrees) and clatms that although the common will or
"State” does define the spheres of liberty and government, it must also obey a higher
authority and therefore displaces the ultimate sovereignty that Burgess gives the "state.”
This
-higher" power, that Butler speaks of, is the immutable laws of nature or the
universal truths that have come to us through experience. These truths are beyond the
common will of the state, the sphere of government, or the sphere of individual liberty
and must be obeyed. Marrin claims that Butler argues, "beyond the people's will and that
of their representatives, beyond the necessities of the moment, there is an inviolable area”
of natural law .’ 7 Marrin punctuates this point by illustrating Butler's conviction that
ultimate authority rests in "the everlasting distinction between right and wrong, between
justice and injustice. A majority may make theft legal, but they can never make it
right .”
28
It is clear now how this understanding informs Butler’s views on the various
political reforms of the time. He sees the "will of the people,” in its establishment of the
spheres of government and individual liberty, as bound by universal truths and natural
law. "The people" certainly can define this relationship but if it violates the history of
observable truths it will run the risk of failure. Recall of elected officials and judges
(who, according to Butler, are "primarily the servants not of the people, but of the
27
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law-,, the initiative and referendum the iong ballot, the d.rect primary, and the attack
on parties all violated Butler’s sensibilities and his world view.
One clear example that draws on many of his ideological foundations is his
understanding of part.es, A great defender of parties, even when his own Republican
Party was extremely weak, Butler no, only saw part.es as key to advanced systems of
government bu, he also argued that the two-party system was a natural reflect,on of
innately human propensit.es and therefore an inevitable and expected outgrowth of the
type of representative republic we had dev.sed. Again, he draws on the experiences of
history as evidence of this truth: ‘The history of Government both in Great Britain and in
the United States makes it pretty plain that free government functions best - and perhaps
can only function at all - under the two-party system .”30 In addition to history. Butler
also draws on the “natural order” of things and biological determinism by claiming that
parties conform to two "types” of the human psychology that determine the nature of the
two parties that exist. Where one
w^hes to go ahead and make changes, the other wishes to keep things
su stantially as they are and to combat changes when proposed. Therefore the
one party is Liberal or Progressive and the other is Conservative. These two
parties and the two types of mind which they represent fit themselves to theframework of almost any form of free government. 1 '
The consequence for violating this necessary, historically proven, biologically
determined arrangement is the loss of “one of the most powerful instruments of political
effectiveness” the American people have
.
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The
-natural order" argument regarding parttes is a good example of Butler's use
of biological determinism to rebut progressive reforms. Its natural birth, shortly after the
founding of the republic, was essential in organizing human activity within a constitution
that was also born of and the result of a historical dialectic and natural law. Without
parties, the natural divisions of men could no, be properly organized and an imbalance
would arise. Much as Spencer argued agatns, government tamper,ng with the natural
order of the human condition which led him to reject poor laws, state support of
education, and welfare, Butler also saw the overregulation of parties by the state and the
destruction of parties through the implementation of direct primaries and long ballots as
disturbing nature in unproductive ways. 33 Without the ability to organize human
disagreement through a natural line that runs "through all classes alike,” we end up with a
politics devoid of principles overrun by "demagogues” and by "the professional
politic,ans and the men who can provide or secure the great sums of money needed to
carry on a campaign for several weeks or months before a large and widely distributed
body of electors.”34
In fact, Butler sees the antagonisms between parties as inherently valuable as a
force to drive men towards principles and create the agitation necessary to produce the
most responsible and honest government. This is true even during periods when one
paity was substantially weaker than another, such as the Republican Party after 1912. In
a speech that addressed this very issue, Butler challenged his fellow party members to
take on the role of the party in opposition, because “the Republican Party never had a
n , pi
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greater obhgation resting upon i, than at this moment, and i, never had a greater
opportunity.”35 This roie, as Buder says in several of his writings, is an ”hon„rab,e and
important one, and the public duty that i, has to perform is hardly less significant than
that which rests upon the party in control.”3* I„ addition to promulgating the existence of
principles among the party and the members who lead it, opposition, through its friction
in the legislative process, provides an educative role that helps broaden the views of the
electorate. This is key for Butler who sees the lack of principles and principled men as a
sign of a dysfunctional political system that demands order. As he laments in a 1935
speech entitled “Is Jefferson the Forgotten Man?”:
the Republican Party went on the rocks in 1912 and while there are still many
bodv of
RepU
,
bllCanS
.
tlrol«hout the country, they are without any commony political principle and without any definite political program The
.stone Oemocrat Party was practically destroyed by Bryan and has never been
rehabilitated and reunited. We must not be misled by appearances- there arc-parties but only in name. Many of those who call themselves Republicans andmany of those who call themselves Democrats are in flat contradiction as to manydamental principles and policies with others who claim the same party name
rius illogical and, indeed, ludicrous situation has contributed mightily to bring
Z nZoT'f' '° lt?PreS,ent, UnhaPPy PaSS - We Can n° lon«er tru3t the Promisesd pledges of a political platform, because when elected, those who bear theparty name may and often do, treat that platform with entire unconcern and
sometimes with flat contradiction. 37
It is clear that Butler saw dire consequences from tampering with institutions that were
born from natural conditions and proven as a “truth” through historical example. As we
will see in the following sections, this conflict continues for him in his understanding of
the individual and the formation of government.
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Liberty and Society
At the core of Butler’s understanding of liberty and society is the location of the
individual as part ot his broader understanding of natural law. Like many other thinkers
and philosophers, the “placement” of the individual between government, society, God,
and other similar spheres is key to their understanding of the human condition. Butler is
no exception. Considering the nature of the progressive reforms, his ideas about the
individual and, in particular, about liberty come to light within the context of this reform
penod. He sees progressive political reforms as a threat to individual liberty and a
return to tyranny, with a many-headed majority in the place of power once held by the
single despot .”38 He shares with the Federalists the view that the greatest threat to
individual liberty is majority rule and direct democracy.
Liberty, ot course, is expanded or limited by the arrangement of society and
government. The social structure and limitations that are created define the type and
level of liberty individuals enjoy. Indeed, most of modem political theory is about this
specific issue in terms of the individual and the state. Virtually all of Butler’s criticism is
about this relationship between the individual and society. At the most basic level this
relationship is about how individuals are trusted to act and participate in society.
Confronting the progressives directly, in an attempt to turn their arguments on their head,
he rejects the progressive reforms as a way to once again “trust the people with
governing,” arguing instead that “nothing could be fiirther from the fact.” Indeed, Butler
ix
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differenfates between those who truly understand liberty and trust the people, and those
who only think they do. and he sees Progressives as the latter. He writes:
have Confidence ttTi^TjIC" indiVidUa ' Bb"* who
charaeter better than any one else ean work it 'outTr'
T
d.strust the people are the ones who wish to regulate the r everv a ,o I
With Butler's strong Spencerian influence, the primacy of liberty in society is
even clearer. To tamper with human endeavor and human struggle would be to tamper
with nature itself and all that we have learned from history. Much like the good that
comes from the conflict between political parties, the conflict and inequalities in
individual human capactty drives the human race in a natural progression. The rejection
really lies over an understanding of the need for equality in society. Both the
progressives and the Anti-progressives argue, at least on the face, for maximizing liberty
but where the progressives argue that equality is part of expanding the opportunities of
liberty, Butler would argue that equality is impossible and that to get equality you have to
jeopardize liberty
- you cannot have both. As Butler proclaims, “equality is very easy to
gain, but the penalty of equality is social, political, and economic death. Liberty is
life .”
40
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c uriously enough, the primacy of individual liberty does seem be trumped by a
natural order ” for it does not allow for sovereignty in the individual. For Butler, liberty
dictated and superseded by both natural law and the general will. The general will or
".he state" (as he was taught by Burgess) defined the sphere of liberty for individuals and
therefore had control over the amount that was given. But the check on this general will
is nature and not individual sovereignty. The progressives, on the other hand, who do see
individual rights as a primary component of the individual/state relationship, look to
lurther engage individual interaction through the regulation of politics and parties and
through expansion of the ballot. Butler, who sees individual rights as emanating from
universal truths and historical experience, makes more staunchly libertarian arguments.
One would not expect the progressives, who recognize individual sovereignty, to be more
sensitive to issues of liberty and Butler, who relies on universal truths, to be less so.
For Butler, the insistence on maximizing individual liberty is clearly tied to the
ends of society. These ends, as he sees it, come from "two thousand five hundred years”
ot progress and a path that “leads every individual to exert himself to the utmost, not
alone that he may profit, but that he may be the better able to serve .”41 With this natural
path established in Butler's eyes we must, in determining the soundness of reform,
always ask:
does it tend to exalt the individual at the expense of the community in a way that
makes for privilege, monopoly, anarchy? If so, reject it. Does it tend to exalt the
community at the expense of the individual in the way that makes for artificial
equality, denial ot initiative, stagnation? If so, reject it. Does it tend to call out
the individual constantly to improve himself for wider and more effective service
and good citizenship? II so, adopt it. It makes for progress.
41
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With this criteria, Butler can then ca„ for responsihie citizenship and a rejection of a„
that tantpers with nature in the nante of equality. Equality is the nentesis of liberty and a
hindrance to progress. "There is no progress in abandoning liberty ,’’43 Butler argues in
claiming that the progressives do not wan. progress they want “change” which is a
‘’restless and ill-considered disturbance of condition with little or no regard for the
teachings of experience .”44 True progress can be found on the “sunlit heights of
individual opportuntty, where a fair chance is given to every man to stand erect and to do
a man’s work in the world, knowing that thereby he is serving the state and helping to
build civilization on a yet securer basis .”45
To accomplish this task of preserving liberty and therefore the natural order of
humanity one must rely on institutions to organize conflict and to regulate human and
institutional activity. It is the Progressive assault on these very institutions that draws the
ire of Butler. A primary example of this is the judiciary. Butler’s love for the judiciary
and his disdain for the idea of judicial recall bring out his harshest attacks on any of the
political reforms. This is primarily because he sees the judiciary as being the safeguard
of the individual through a loyalty to law and the constitution - the institutions designed
to protect individuals. For Butler, the creation of the independent judiciary is one of the
most important and original contributions to our understanding of government because
the independent judiciary provides "the protection of fundamental law [to] the humblest
individual and [holds] both legislature and administrative officers to the strict observance
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Of their constitutional limitations.- This, he concludes,
“is the chief glory of our
American system of government.- In a speech before the Commercial Club of St.
Louis in 1 911
,
Butler proclaims that the idea ofjudical recall “is much more than a ptece
of stupid folly. It IS an outrage of the first magnitude!”48 The results of such a reform,
both in the judiciary and for other elected officials, will be diminution of “the
consistency, the intelligence, and the disinterestedness of government.”40
In the specific case ofjudges, Butler takes a clearly Federalist approach claiming
the judiciary's primary role is in serving the Const,tution and not the whims and wishes
of the people. Like the Federalists, Butler points to the fact that the nature of the bench
stems from the method of judical selection, the courts designated constituency, and the
institutional character of judicial office. Responding directly to the progressives claim
that the judiciary is the servant of the people and is therefore responsible to them. Butler
exclaims “No! The judges stand in a wholly different relation to the people from
executive and legislative officials. The judges remain primarily the servants not of the
people, but of the law."50 As an institution, it is their judicial responsibility to “hold law-
making bodies to their constitutional limitations, not to express their own personal
opinions on matters of public policy.” 51
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Turning again ,o history to defend the institution, Butler warns that tyranny and
iniustiee will result if we create a judiciary reliant on the will of the masses. “The
History of England,” he claims, “tells a plain story of the tyranny and injustice which
grow on, of a judiciary that is made representative no, of the law, bu, of the crown.- He
continues by claiming that it would no, be long before we suffered a simtlar fate if we
made the judiciary “immediately dependent upon a voting population.- Without an
independent judiciary, the sphere of individual liberty is threatened as well as the natural
progress of society. “A fearless and independent judiciary,” for Butler, is needed to do
the job and to preserve the actual system of government that was designed by the will of
the people from the flippancy of public opinion. Using an easier targe, than the socially
acceptable Progressives, Butler offers the example of the words of Eugene Debs to make
Ins point clear. Quoting a Debs speech in which he advocates the recall of elected
officials and judges ("Don't you see what it means, comrades, to have in the hands of an
intelligent, militant working class the political power to recall the present capitalist
judges and put on the bench our own men?”), Butler takes him to task, questioning his
sanity, and asking “Can anyone outside of Bedlam support a public policy such as
this?
,M
Concluding with the strongest possible language, Butler exclaims:
To make the actions or the words of a judge the subject matter of popular revision
at the polls with a view to displacing a judicial officer because some act or word
IS not at the moment popular, is the most monstrous perversion of republican
institutions and ot the principles of true democracy that has yet been proposed
anywhere or by anybody.
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The basic way in which institutions can protect liberty, is by upholding the laws
•ha, define the actual sphere of liberty and the limits of government.
“I, is iaw ,
according to Butler, “which imposes the limitations that are characteristic of liberty. Law
is nothing more nor less than the system or collection of principles and rules of human
government in their application to property and conduct.”* His strong objections to this
reform only point to the centrality of liberty and limited government in Butler's thought.
I le sees the particular combination of separated powers in our governmental system to be
uniquely equipped to protect the laws that protect liberty because “the principles
underlying our civil and political liberty are indelibly written into the Constitution of the
Umted States, and the nation's courts are instituted for their protection. We Americans
are thus in possession of an apparatus unlike anything which exists elsewhere in the
world to protect the principles of liberty.”57
One reason that liberty is so key for Butler is what i, does for individual activity
and, therefore, to the overall good of society. Individual liberty is not something that is
good in and of itself. It is simply the ideal condition for the individual and, by the
unleashing of his potential, the ideal for society as well. Again, with a nod towards
Spencer s ideas surrounding biological determinism, Butler feels that you must allow
natural leaders to act. The imposition of reforms that provide for equality goes against
his understanding ot the society. Equality of talent does not exist for Butler; there is only
equality before the law. Equality cannot exist due to "the deepest law of nature.”58 And
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because inequality of talent and economic condition is part of nature there is little you
can do about i, that would no, violate the natural order and impede real societal progress.
Liberty has its value, in this regard, as the fuel of progress, bu, to limit liberty for the sake
Of creating equal conditions would undermine the onward march of history. “All
progress,” Butler writes, "is the result of inequality, or difference.” He explains:
Set a thousand men free at this moment and make them all absolutely equal andto-morrow at sundown not two of them would be alike. Nature forbids foAmenca and in other nations we are face to face with the question "do you prefer
,. .
y ’ 0r ™
-
ou seek e
<luahty at the expense of liberty?” That is the rulinepolitical problem m the world to-day and in every part of the world.w
%
In another speech in .919 before the commercial club of Cincinnati, he drives the point
home more directly: "where there is individual opportunity there will always be
inequality.
... the only way in which this inequality can be prevented is to substitute
tyranny for liberty and to hold all men down to that level of accomplishment which is
within the reach of the weakest and the least well-endowed.”60
In explicating his view of liberty as the fire of progress he describes a society in
which individuals are allowed to exercise their talents and responsibilities and where the
stronger leaders, the more responsible individuals, the more ingenious capitalists both
survive and hit society as a whole. But this requires conditions in which the individual
can exercise his own capacities.”61 Laws exist to guarantee this realm of liberty both for
each individual and as protections against other individuals and the government from
encroaching on your liberty. His understanding of liberty and society is that the latter
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Will be raised by unleashing individual talent, which
sense, will enhance the individual’s
“usefulness
with some control and a good moral
as a citizen.” For Butler, liberty means
‘I13 * ” indiVidUa
' Sh°Uld "be Permi,,ed 10 h0 'd opinionfs] of one's own choosing, ,o
pursue the calling of one's own preference, to move about as inclination and opportunity
may lead, to retain as one's own possession the rewards of one’s labor and skill .”62 This
type of liberty, within the proper governmental system, will allow men to grow “in power
and in grace as he lives and works with others who have the same privileges and
opportunities as himself.- „ is a relationsh.p between liberty and law, between
individual action and rightly ordered institutions that will lead to progress as Butler sees
it. The reforms of the progressive, on the other hand, will lead to the sacrifice of
responsibility and the diminution of liberty through the backwards march toward direct
democracy.
Another example of how law, liberty, and responsibility come together to inform
Butler on his views of progressive reform is found in his view of the initiative and
referendum. Although my treatment of Butler on this issue will be continued in the next
section, his view of liberty leads him to argue that taking away legislative responsibility
from elected officials will undermine their role in the constitutional framework and limit
then liberty in making decisions for the public. It would undermine the very nature of
legislative bodies as we have devised them and remove much of the motivation to serve.
In a long critique of this particular reform. Butler offers a rhetorical question to
this point, “should we get a better class of representatives, or worse, if we took away their
Ibid, 104.
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sense of response, lty
,
took away their dignity^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
every side to duplicate or posstbly to overturn their every act?”66 The result of
undermining legislative liberty would be to ‘-reduce them to intellectual, oral and political
impotence .”65 In undermining representative liberty you also undermine the legislative
process that allows these “men of intelligence” to debate in committee, take time to
reason through legislation, and consider, on the whole, what is best for the nation. In his
dual judgment, the initiative will not “bring support to the fundamental guarantees of
civil and political liberty upon which our national government rests .”66 Taking the
critique straight to progressive claims, he concludes, “This is not a policy which makes
lor stable and consistent government. This is not a progressive policy. This is not a
policy which will develop and strengthen the institutions that we have inherited and that
we are seeking to apply to new conditions .”67
Then, with respect to political parties and the legislature, Butler employs his
understanding of liberty and society to define the role of the individual. He clearly relies
on a biological determinism and an understanding of institutions that are designed by the
immutable truths garnered from nature and historical development. He attacks the
progressives on their own grounds, critiquing their understanding of how societies
progress and how individual liberty, and not equality, are the core of this progress. In
fact, he attempts to turn their arguments against them by demonstrating how maximizing
liberty treats humans with more respect than by undermining effective and efficient
Ibid, 27.
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governmental institutions that trust a biological and historical order that demands that the
best and the bnghtest will rise to serve government and society. His understanding of
republican government and society is where we turn next to explore his criticisms of
progressive refonns such as the direct primarily, the short ballot, additional aspects of the
initiative, and the role of parties.
Republicanism and Representation
Butler’s love for the republican form of government is laced throughout his
wnt.ngs on virtually every topic from economics, to education, to politics. Although he
maintains certain phriosophical understanding as detailed above, most of his public
speeches and writings avoid such specific detail and instead focus on defending the
institutions that were devised by the Founders and then completed by the vision and
statesmanship of Lincoln
.
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The basis for his support of these institutions is situated
mainly in his strong belief in representative government.
Butler essentially uses a Burkean understanding of representation and
administration, much like the American Founders, by drawing on Burke’s understanding
ot the responsibilities of elected representatives to parliament. For Edmund Burke, an
elected representative was a free agent who could act according to his own insight, moral
compass, and understanding of the greater issues facing the state. They were not
delegates who should consult the constituency on issues and act as a mere reflection of
the opinions ot the district. A true and effective representative, Burke argues, brings his
judgment to public matters, not the directives of his constituents, and indeed, “when we
68
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[reduce] t ,le representative from the high, splendid, and dignified status of a real
representative chosen by his constituency to give i, his experience, his brants, his
conscience and his best service, [we make him] a mere registering machine for the
opinion of the moment.- He quotes Burke a, length, drawing from him a famous
passage that defines Butler's views of representation, as well as Burke's: “Your
representative owes you no, his mdustry only, bu, his judgment; and he betrays instead of
servtng you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
... You choose a member indeed, but
when you have chosen him. he is no, a member of Bristol, bu, he is a member of
Parliament .’' 70
With this understanding of representation, it is easy to see where Butler's views
would conflict with the progressive push toward direct democracy. In a general criticism
of this overall progressive attack on representative democracy in favor of the power of
public opinion and instruments that remove the monopoly that elected leaders have.
Butler invokes the Federalist explanation of the Constitution and wonders why
progressives could so easily reject founders who clearly considered, and then rejected, a
direct form of democracy:
We are now told that the people are either incompetent or unable to choose
lepresentatives who will really serve their highest interests, and who will bebeyond the reach of the temptation offered by money, or by power, or by place.
The remedy is said to be to appeal over the heads of the people’s chosen
representative to the people themselves
.
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The result of such a plan to shift away from representative institutions is truly
revolutionary in Butler's mtnd and a dangerous step backwards toward more simplified,
less complex, and less evolved forms of governance.
“It is not difficult,” he writes, "to
prove that the substitute of direct democracy for representative institutions is and must
necessarily be a long step backward.” It is a rejection of evolution and history. “When i,
IS proposed to strike down those [const,tutional] safeguards,” claims Butler, “when i, is
proposed to modify those provisions, believe me, my friends, i, is a programme of
reaction, not of progress; that is to return to the shackles and chains ou, of which, through
long generations and through centuries, our ancestors had to come with toil and
tribulation and suffering, and even at pain of death .”72
Butler sees this shift of representation as a shift from protection of minority
interest by Madisonian principles to one of majority rule that allows for the mob of public
opinion to trample others and threaten the liberty of individuals. Giving power directly to
the people and eliminating effective legislative functions will mean, in Butler's eyes, that
Any majority, however small, however fleeting, however unreasonable, or however
incoherent, would then have at its immediate disposal the life, liberty, and property of
each individual citizen of the United States." He concludes with a classic Butler line,
“this may be a good form of government, but it is certainly not the American form .”73 It
is a rejection of republican government that was agreed upon by the states and their
people at the founding and, because, it is to his eyes much more than a simple reform and
closer to revolutionary turn that threatens tyranny.
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The initiative represents the main form of shifting institutions away from
representative forms toward more direct reforms. Using quintessential Butler language,
he refers to the initiative as “the most preposterous and the most vicious" of the
progressive reforms.” One of his main difficulties with it, beyond issues of
representation, was the fact that a “very small number of persons" can instigate these
proposals and then move on “without any opportunity to perfect it, even phraseology;
without any chance to receive and ac, upon suggestions for its extension, its narrowing,
or its betterment."75 For Butler it is not only an tssue of bypassing the benefits of
legislative process, it is also minority rule. To support this he often cites the small
number of people who vote on initiative and referendum questions and to the lack of
debate that accompanies these proposals. Under the action of the initiative,” Butler
argues, “a community is called upon to say yes or no to a proposal framed by five per
cent of anybody.
. . . some preconceived scheme for which there is a sentiment among a
small portion of the community must be accepted or rejected in toto .”76 Overall it strikes
at the heart of representative government and dismisses all the benefits that are associated
with it.
Besides the initiative, another clear example of the Progressive attack on
representation is the advocacy of the direct primaries. As detailed earlier, Butler saw
parties as natural outgrowths of the human condition, needed to manage conflict in a
complicated system of politics. To Butler, political parties were private associations, in
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many ways like churches and other social groups, and therefore the state should no, be
involved in regulat.ng parties and writing legislation controlling party functions. This
was "no, a step forward, bu, rather, backward.” "The attention of state government”
Butler argues, "should be fixed on the election, and on the election alone.” Engaging in
some prognostication, Butler claims that the result of state interference in party activity
will be that "we shall find ourselves confronting problems artsing ou, of this legal
relation
. . . that will rival in complexity and difficulty those that have already arisen in
European countries between the state and legally recognized churches. The result will
not be progress, but reaction .”77
Butler's predictions about the effects of the direct primary are particularly
accurate and show the relevance of his warnings about progressive reform even today.
Conceding that direct participation might work in small homogenous settings (he
mentions the New England town meeting), he finds it "highly disadvantaged” when used
on a scale such as a state or the country as a whole. The result of substituting direct
primaries tor party conventions is that, among other things, it will exalt the professional
politician and the man who can provide or secure the great sums of money needed to
carry on a campaign for several weeks or months before a large and widely distributed
body of electors. 8 The solution is in "freeing the convention system from abuses, not in
abolishing it."
79
Butler is not naive to some of the problems of the party convention is
selecting the party slate. Even the convention can produce elected officials who are not
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Burkean representatives but deiega.es of the party. L.kewise, Butler, who had
considerable convention experience, knew well the dark side of closed door politics and
•he reality that many party leaders (and even the panics themselves) lacked principles
that would move the nation forward. Nonetheless, Butler insists that:
~ ---
SL0' I" "" fa« Elnlain. F™«, H.l2SS"anada. t is our own invention, and it has become one of the chief obstacles to
the pubh°cwm “
rnmem tn,ly representative of the P^Ple and truly responsive to
Again, like the initiative, Butler is concerned that small minorities can utilize the
system to exert their will over the majority. There is no doubt some tension in his
thinking here. He deplores the possibility of a ruling majority that can crush the liberty
of minority interest, yet he warns also of the rule of a small minority that could result
from progressive reforms. But what Butler, and also the Federalist, is worried about is
the suppression ot minority opinions within representative institutions by the majority.
With the case of direct democracy systems, the concern is in the opposite direction;
minorities can overwhelm a majority through the workings of initiatives and direct
primaries. In the specific example of direct primaries, Butler is concerned with the real
possibility that the majority can manipulate the technical process of these elections. With
such a system, he writes, “a very small fraction of the qualified electorate regularly name
candidates tor public office, conflict over personalities takes the place of conflict over
principles, and the attention of the electorate is increasingly distracted from issues to
80
Butler, Faith ofa Liberal , 96.
76
individuals.”81 What he is describing is a politics of demagogues
organization. Even considering Butler's admonishment of
principles, he still thinks that, as organizations that ex
rather than a politics of
parties over their own loss of
grew out of the nature of mankind,
they are better than leaving such an important political
a “cult-of-personality.”
process to a process that demands
Parties, tor Butler, are institutions that foster a better quality of social and civic
Ide and protect citizens through the maximizing of individual liberty. In a speech
delivered in 1924 at the Republican State Editorial Association in Indianapolis, Butler
bemoans the direct primary system, even, at this point, in its infancy:
The Conditions that result [from direct primaries] have certainly lowered the toneof our public life and have made new openings for the demagogue for “hep istent office-seeker, and for the man who can command large financialicsources ,n support of his candidacy. Public office is now beyond “the taste aswe 1 as beyond the reach, of many of those who, in earlier days, were the mostdistinguished and most effective servants of the people. 82
I he remedy he offers is the political party:
It is important to discard formulas and phrases, to think straight and clear, and to
ung into existence a less elaborate, a less costly, and a more democratic electoral
machinery
. .if organized political parties were left free to name their
candidates for office in whatever way they might choose, if other groups were
given precisely the same privilege, and if all candidates so named were placed on
an equality [sic] on the ballot, the annual election in November would, in effect,
be both a primary and an election, and upon it the whole attention and interest of
the electorate might be centered.
As this solution suggests, Butler was also interested in reducing the system of
elections as well as simplify the number of offices that are elected. The effect of such a
81
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simplified system wou,d be the further separation of the activity of se,ec,„g of elected
representatives from that of administration. Butler’s strong belief in a republic with
Burkean representatives led him to conclude that voters should no, be admtnis,rating
government from the ballot box, hut rather should be gtving elected officials the
opportunity to lead and defend their work at each election. This, of course, is in
opposition to the progressive reforms which embraced the new science of public policy
and sociology and felt that individuals, through the ballot and through public opinion,
could more effectively express themselves via direct democracy systems. In Butler’s
eyes these reforms only encouraged discontent with democracy and subsequent low
election turnouts. He felt that, without parties and with complicated long ballots, the
efficacy of democracy would at leas, appear diminished and would only serve to frustrate
voters who were told they eould administer from the box but found that they could not.
He argues:
[It is incumbent] upon those who would stifle the widespread discontent withdemocracy to make sure democracy works. It can only be made to work if the
machinery of government be simplified, if the number of elections and electoral
processes be reduced, and if the length of time between the choice of public
officers and the date when they enter upon the performance of the duties for
which they have been chosen be reduced to the lowest practicable limits
.
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Simplifying the ballot can also improve peoples’ views of democracy. Railing
against the progressive tendency toward diversifying the number and types of elected
officials, Butler advocates lor the short ballot as a way to centralize responsibility and
allow for a more efficient administration of the state. For the most part, the long ballot
reforms appeared at the local and state level, and Butler calls upon these governments to
84
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look ,0 the success of the federal ballot (and his home stale of New Jersey, as successful
examples of employing the short ballot. will be a step in advance." he asserts, "when
we extend this principle to al, the states."*' The result of adopting the short ballot in
Butler's opinion is that "public interest and a,tent,on are centered upon the most
important executtve and legislative officers, and they are chosen and held responsible for
the selection of their associates in the minor offices of government .”*6 In this way, Butler
is similar to Henry Jones Ford, who was also concerned about the problems of the long
ballot and, in particular, the negative results of poor administration of government
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agenc.es. Like Ford, Butler believed that the long ballot diffuses accountability and
hinders a common direction for government. “A large part of the extravagance and
maladministration in county government throughout the United States,” laments Butler,
"is due to the election by the people of a long list of minor officials who have no common
sense of responsibility and no common purpose .”88
Conclusion
Butler was a long-winded and stern man of great intellectual capacity. He
attempted to hold to strict philosophical grounds when thinking about everyday politics.
Albert Marrin relates a joke that was popular at the time to describe Butler:
85
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Ford was particularly concerned with issues of responsibility. He felt that by diversifying the
number of offices in municipalities no one elected official could be held responsible for the success or
failures of the government. In this way, citizens can easily be disenchanted with their officials and
distrustful of their municipality to act properly. See Henry Jones Ford, Politics and Administration, p 187.
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Having arrived at the pearly gates cj omnnri p ,
“Come with us quickly " they implored T SanomieA “gels.
But beyond his ego, Butler was a public intellectual in the truest sense. Devoted to a
public life “in the sphere of liberty" in a role that was played by very few. He spoke on a
national stage but through local audiences, was involved in politics on all levels of
government, and found a way to take seriously the progressive debates of the time. He
was, as Albert Marrin says in his biography of Butler, a man constantly battling against
prevailing political current of the time. That is exactly where we would expect the
“poster-boy" of the Anti-progressive to be. Much like this chapter is organized - first
around his philosophy, then the more spectfic ideas about the indivtdual and liberty, and
then the most directly relevant conversation about all levels of political reform - Butler
had a similar organization to his thinking as well. He had a rigorous intellectual
grounding that he used consistently to define and explain his interpretation of society and
government. Even his decision not to seek elective office was based on his intention to
stay m the “sphere of liberty" and away from the “sphere of government.” He
maintained, as best he could, an internal logic.
But Butler, like most of the Anti-progressive, is the “loser” in the debate and so
we are left with the question of why his argument did not resonate. Although we could
point to any number of reasons, it seems clear that his unrelenting Spencerisim and his
elite sensibilities removed him from human suffering and voters’ disaffection with
government and society stemming from the tremendous tension of the time.
Immigration, growth of cities, expansion of communication and transportation all led to
incredible social changes. Butler's views, for the most part, did not address these
80
concerns or. a, least, did no, draw the attention of those who instead preferred a new
science as the solution to the older enlightenment view of government. One thing is
striking, however, namely tha, many of the issues of concern to Butler is his time remain
issues today, and much of wha, Butler said was happening and would happen has indeed
materialized. We have a progressive system ofpolit.es and we are left with virtually all
the problems of representation, efficacy, participation, and access the progressives
reforms were expected to correct at the beginning of the 20'" century.
The foundations of Butler’s thought - the belief in natural law, in a fixed division
between the public and private realms, in Social Darwinism - may seem quaint today.
But Butler’s critiques of progressivism also draw heavily upon Edmund Burke and the
American founders, and it is here that his predictions of the effects and consequences of
the direct democracy reforms seem prescient still.
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CHAPTER 4
WILLIAM HOWARD TALT
W.lliam Howard Taft was a writer, thinker, jurist, and politieian who spent most
of his life ''between things" - caught in the center of a dynamic period of American
Instory and politics. In terms of geography, his parents came from Vermont. While he
was born and raised in Ohio, Taft went to school in Connecticut, vacationed in
Massachusetts, and spent much of his life in Washington D.C. As one biography put it,
"Taft Belonged to New England rather than the Middle West ." 1 Politically, he has been
viewed as a politician who lived in a modern era but viewed it from an earlier one. as a
great administrator but an "average” president2 and, most succinctly, as a “conservative
progressive." ’ He was a conservative “book ended” by the two most important
progressives in American history. In terms of reform, he was at the center of massive
progressive reforms yet was always at odds with the “true believers” of the insurgency.
1 Dumas Malone, ed. Dictionary? ofAmerican Biography. Vol. 18. (New York- Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1936) 266.
’ James McGregor Burns, quoted in: W. Carey McWilliams, commentary for The President and
His Powers in The President and His Powers and The United States and Peace
,
ed. with commentary byW Carey McWilliams and Frank X. Gerrity in vol. 6 of The Collected Works of Williams Howard Taft
edited by David H. Burton (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), 4.
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He was the most aggressive and effective
“trust buster." ye, he rejected many political
reforms as well as the idea of an activist presidency. Personally, he was often viewed as
an upbeat, jovial, and humane man with many friends and admtrers, ye, during much of
his private life he was unhappy, dtsgruntled, and qui,e bothered with life around him. I,
is this “be,weeness” of William Howard Taft and his location a, the crossroads of the
progressive reform that makes him an ideal representative of the An,,-progressives.
Where Nicholas Murray Butler would be the “poster boy” for the Anti-progressives.
William Howard Taft is a more typical representative with all the tensions and conflicts
ha, can be found in someone who lived in the era of reform ye, rejected many of its
tenets. As one commentator concludes, “Taft’s presidency was rife with ironies. Even as
he led the conservative charge for fundamental principles, his administration pursued a
host of reforms in other arenas.”4 Taft benefited and worked with many consummate
progress, ves yet always felt ill at ease with them. And when he rose to the presidency, at
the height of progressive activity, Taft tried to lead by a presidential model that rejected
many of the progressive ideas about the foundations of authority on which the office of
chief executive rested. It was only when Taft accepted his final job as Chief Just,ce that
he tell at ease and in his proper place. It was a position that called for impartiality and a
reverence tor the written law and was mostly devoid of the personalities, debates, and
political battles of his former life.
Born in Cincinnati in 1857, William Howard Taft was the son of Alphonso Taft,
an accomplished attorney and politically connected and successful public servant in his
David Potash, commentary for Popular Government in Popular Government and The Anti-TrustAct and the Supreme Court
,
ed. with commentary by David Potash and Donald F. Anders in vol. 5 of The
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own right
.
5
Mos, important,* in terms of Taft’s development, his father was a party man
ot the Wing persuasion and was involved with the founding of the Republican Party
.
6
This, of course, sealed the young William Howard's fate as a faithful Republican and one
dedicated to the success of the party. An unadventurous man. Taft’s early career was
much like his father's: graduation from Yale, admission to the bar after attending law
school m Ohio, successful law practice, involvement in local and state politics and party
activities and, eventually, active in federal government and politics both at home and
abroad. William s success, obviously, exceeded that of Alphonso’s but both his
mannerisms and approach to life was much like his father's
.
7
He was considered
unusually kind, jovial, and enjoyed recreational activities such as sailing, baseball, and
golf. He was a well-liked man who was driven by a combination of his father's
insistence on always doing one's best and his mother’s constant ambition and drive that
pushed an otherwise un-ambitious William
.
8
Taft was essentially a lawyer and jurist. His other activities were certainly
important and influential in his life, but Taft was always most comfortable and happy in
the law. It was this propensity and inclination to the law that defined how he approached
his activities in public administration and politics. For Taft, law was the basis on which
th R , ,
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AI Phonso Taft ’ was a successful attorney, a superior court judge, an active leader inthe Republican Party, Secretary of War and Attorney General under Grant, was a candidate for Governor ofOhio twice and was appointed by President Arthur to be the U.S. minister to Austria-Hungary SeeMalone, 264-65. &
’ Malone, 264.
Judith Icke Anderson William Howard Taft, An Intimate History’ (New York' W W Norton &Company, 1981), 40-42.
8
Anderson, Intimate History
,
39-40. Also see H.F. Pringle, The Life and Times of WilliamHoward Taft (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939) vol. 1
.
84
civil society survived and upon which government should operate. This strong reliance
on the law and belief in constitutional arrangements guaranteed that, in politics, Taft
would always be a bit hesitant; he would be always caught between the imperatives of
polit.cs and his reverence of law. Taft, i, should be clear, was a partisan politician and
believed strongly in the conservatism of the Republican Party but he did not care for raw
machine politics and the ambiguous personal alliances and relations that dictate politics
in a boss-centered system. Stuck between these two worlds, Taft would find his most
notable success in those endeavors that required impartiality and the ability to rely on
laws to administer justice and, at the same time, had most trouble with those that required
personal political moxie. Indeed, even as a young man, after accepting a political
appointment as collector of internal revenue for Cincinnati, he resigned his position in its
first tew months rather than carry out the orders of his party leaders to fire arbitrarily
several competent officers under his command. He immediately returned to the law after
this experience and always found it difficult to participate in such activities.9
After his early days as an attorney and local party man, Taft spent the next period
of his life engaging in activities that were more to his liking. In 1887, at the age of 29. he
was appointed to the Ohio Superior Court to complete an unfinished term and then in
1888 was elected to a full five-year term. This judgeship and his first presidential
election were the only offices for which he ran and won. 10 While on the superior court.
Taft was already being considered, with some prodding by Taft himself, as a potential
Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice - a goal that “became Taft's one consuming
9
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desire."" He would no, join the Supreme Court for some time, though he would be
offered an appointment three times before accepting, but he was named by President
Benjamin Harrison to be the U.S. Solicitor General in ,890 a, the age of thirty-two.
Alter a successful two-year term in this role, he was appointed in 1892, to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals - a position that he cherished, as i, valued his legal mind and his
disposition for constitutional analysis over political battles. In each of these three
appointments, state judge. Solicitor General, and ctrcui, court judge, Taft did well and
established an early reputation for legal reasoning and intellect. As Solicitor General, he
won fifteen ou, of his eighteen cases in his firs, year alone. 12 Many of these cases deal,
with timely and important issues surrounding labor and railroad issues, and his decisions
were typically negative in their impact on labor and would label him for the remainder of
his career as a conservative, a “stand-patter,” within a progressively leaning Republican
party.
From these early successes, Taft took on what would be probably his most
successful project, managing the transition of the Philippines from its
colonial/revolutionary status to one of self government. As President of the Philippine
Commission beginning in 1900, Taft was successful in resolving disputes between the
Catholic Friars who were the chief landowners and the native peoples, as well as in
dealing with the remaining rebels. He also began the rebuilding of infrastructure,
governmental, and economic systems that would lead to some level of self government.
The foui active years he spent in this role, as well as his subsequent work as the Secretary
" Anderson, Intimate History
,
58.
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Of War under President Theodore Rooseveh and his peace efforts in Cuba on behalf of
«he present, gave hint a we.,
-deserved reputation as a eapable administrator and
conciliator. 13
His success in the Philippines and as Secretary of War put him in dose proxim.ty
to Roosevelt and soon made him a trusted advisor and a leader in the Republican Party.
Reluctantly making good on a promise not to run for reelection in the 1908 election. TR
anointed a successor after pressure from other party elites. After considering the likes of
EI.hu Root and Charles Evans Hughes, Roosevelt chose Taft. 14 The 1908 campaign was
not as much about Taft setting his own agenda as it was about continuing the Roosevelt
trad,hon. Not until his reelect,on campaign do we get the fully developed presidential
candidate in Taft, as he stumps around the country and better defines his type of
Republicanism including his rejection of parts of the progressive reform agenda. In fact,
with both Wilson and Roosevelt in the 1912 campaign and the progressive movement in
full bloom, Taft goes to great lengths to define what a progressive is. accepting and
rejecting various issues that for others were central to progressivism. and thereby
differentiate himself from Wilson and TR. 15 As we will see later in this chapter. Taft's
approach to the presidency and his explication of his views during the 1912 campaign
help define his Anti-progressive inclinations.
13
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The years following his presidency were spent as a professor at Yale where he
invested constderable time to organ,zing and cataloging his voluminous personal and
public papers before being selected as Chief justtce of the Supreme Court in 1921 by
President Warren Hardtng. His tenure as Chief Justice was marked by less than his
dec,sion making and more by his administrative accomplishments and attempts to
manage a court that was severely behind in its work. This was the case for two reasons:
the lac, tha, the court system needed serious administrative overhauling and management,
and tha, Taft was a strict constitutionalist
- a view that did no, lead to bold new
decisions. 16 He was primarily concerned with issues surrounding the pro,ee,ion of
private property but, more than anything, he helped reform the federal court system by
changing the llow of cases and the types of issues that the Supreme Court was required to
hear. Through these reforms and his management of the court, he took a bench that was
severely backlogged and made it current and on schedule by the time he left in 1930. 17
Taft s prolific career gives us a full record on which to understand his views of
law and politics and, for the interest of this chapter, his problems with progressivism and
Its arguments in terms of political reform and constitutional interpretation. Clearly, his
belief in the constitution and the founders as “God-appointed,” for which “there were no
greater in the history of the world,” is central to his thinking. 18 The fact that he was
always more comfortable and at ease when acting as an administrator or judge attests to
the fact that he always preferred the role of the law over the role of politics. It was
16
Anderson, An Intimate History, 260.
17
Pringle, 994-96. Malone, 271.
18
Taft, “Address at Manchester Armory.”
88
moreover his belief in representative government, limited by the rule of law, and
tempered by slow institutional processes that pu, him a, odds with the more impatient
political reform agenda of the Progress,ves. The persona! politics of TR, the more
aggressive panic,pa,ory wing of the progressive agenda, and the idea of a government
energized by public opinion and an unhindered majority wen, against virtually everything
in which Taf, believed, namely that while government had an important and powerful
role to play in the lives of people and the economy, i, should no, do so by sacrificing the
rule of law and the Madisonian principles of republican government, checks and
balances, and institutional organization. This chapter outlines Taft's Anti-progressive
thought and influence through his views on judicial recall, the centrality of representation
and republican institutions, and his approach to the presidency. In detailing these strains
ol Anti-progressivism we see a constitutional conservative whose belief and experience
wtth the law gave him an appreciation and belief in the slow deliberation of
representative institutions and also a dislike of political expediency and the reliance on
public opinion as the primary force in government. As an Anti-progressive, Taft's ideas
centered on a primary concern for personal liberty and the protection of private property
secured by self-imposed constitutional restraints that organize and check individual
interests and temporary majorities through an institutional system of parties, elections,
legislature, executives, and an independent judiciary.
Recall of Judges and Recall of Judicial Decisions
The recall ofjudges and the recall ofjudicial decisions is Taft’s central complaint
with the progressive and direct democracy agenda. It gets to the heart of most of his
89
Anti-progressive ideas and touches upon issues of rule of law, representation, republican
institutional government, and justice. It is also the one Anti-progressive
,ssue tha, Taft is
most firm about throughout most of his career. His choice of language makes it clear tha,
he is fiercely opposed to this reform, which he sees as a potential death knell of the
American republic. His conception of the presidency and of institutional arrangements,
although typically consistent, evolved and is emphasized a, different times through his
long public career depending on his place in life and his current responsibilities. Bu, the
idea of a judicial recall was “inconceivable and outlandtsh” 19 and undermined the most
important par, of the American form of constitutional democracy - an independent
judiciary entrusted with the protection of the constitution and the liberty of all who lived
under it. The Recall, a state level mechanism, allowed for judges to be removed from
the bench through a popular election. This applied to both elected and appointed judges
and was often added to state constitutions along with the initiative and referendum.
Although the mechanism varied between states, they essentially involved a petition drive
that required a small percentage of signatures to put a recall vote on the ballot. Once on
the ballot, it was simply an up or down vote as to whether the judge should be recalled or
remain on the bench. This was a particularly odd situation for judges who were
appointed and therefore had most likely never organized or run a political campaign. Taft
saw the recall as an attack on all progress made in western democracies, “so utterly at
variance with any procedure that ever was suggested in respect to civilized government
'
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3 proposal stems from his
that it is hard to deal with it.” 21 His shock at such
understand,ng of the role of the judiciary in an American-styled republic. For Taft,
democratic and representative governments had evolved for thousands of years. Greek
democracies and Roman republics through the Magna Cana and the slowly evolving
relationship of British Parliament and the Crown. 22 The version of republican
government that the United States founded, accordmg to Taft, rests almost entirely on the
creation of an independent judicial that can protect minority rights and property rights.
Unlike progressives who argue for strong leadership with aetive and responsive
institutions as the pathway to a strong democracy, Taft believed that the strength of
democratic governments came primarily from “its capacity to do justice to the individual
and the minority. Lack of this is what destroyed ancient democracies.”23 It is the “corner
stone of good government”24 and the whole “background of our civilization
... and
Government.”23 The development and logic behind his feelings on the recall of judges
and their decisions stems from this understanding of the courts as the centeipiece of
American founding principles. In particular, his understanding of liberty and property.
Ibid., 168.
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the primary institutional role of the courts and law, and the independence of the judiciary
from public opinion form the core of his argument in rejecting recall proposals.
Taft maintains an essentially utilitarian understandtng of the purpose of
government as one that seeures “the greatest good of the greatest number, in order that
the individual may enjoy his inaltenable rights of life, liberty and property and the pursuit
of happiness .” 26 ft is the “classic,” pre-twentieth century, libera, understanding of
government's role in society and its purpose for existence. In many of his discussions of
republican principles, Taft begins with the “origins” of government and proceeds through
the arrangements of the American republic to justify and explain the need and role of an
independent judiciary. Tied into this utilitarian understanding is a view of government as
a means to an end and no, an end itself. Government, for Taft, is only good insofar as it
achieves these desired conditions of human relations, namely, the preservation of liberty
and property. As Taf, explains: “We are not in favor of the rule of all the people as an
end desirable in itself. We love what is called democracy not because of the name but
because of what it accomplishes.
... The result will be good because i, secures the
happiness ot the individual. Government is a means to an end. and the means are to be
selected on account of their adaptability to the end .”27 These ends, as detailed above, are
at the core ot the founding: the preservation of liberty and property which is the
foundation upon which civilization prospers and advances. According to Taft, “there are
certain rights that can not be taken away from us, liberty and the right of property.
26
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The right of property next to the right of liberty in the history of this world has nrade
more for the advancement of eiviliza.ion than any other institution that we have.”2*
Taft is essentially arguing that the American republic was estabhshed to pursue
Lockean ”ends” - the objective in establishing government is to reach a certam set of
ends which include life, liberty and property. To this end. the founders created a written
constitution that defines various powers to be given to three separate branches of
government. Where the executive and legislature have a role in the establishment and
execution of laws, the jud,clary was created to protect the constitution and the most basic
governmental goal of liberty and property. This is why the judiciary was created. It
answers to the primary laws established in the constitution and ‘'represents” every
individual who is a member of the republic. As Taft details in his message to Congress
explaining his veto of the resolution admitting Arizona to statehood (which had included
the recall of judges in its proposed constitution), “In a proper sense, judges are servants
ot the people; that is, they are doing work which must be done for the Government and in
the interests ot all the people, but it is not work in the doing of which they are to follow
the will of the majority except as that is embodied in statutes lawfully enacted according
to constitutional limitations."
21
’ Taft is arguing that, in terms of an independent Judiciary
and, as we will see later, in terms of legislative and executive representation, the rights
and happiness of "all” the people are more likely to be properly considered under a
republican system than under a system of majority centered direct democracy. In other
words, if, for the more ‘‘radical" progressives, the goal of democratic reform is to have
28
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•he interests of nrore people represented. Taft would argue that wha, you truly want is a
representative repubhc where an independent judiciary and reflective representatives can
consider all who are of the republic - whether of the minority or of the majority, whether
they have suffrage or not, regardless of their political affiliations, profession, race, or
creed. Taft’s veto of Arizona’s statehood application was for the sole reason that they
included a judicial recall in their constitution, and he makes it clear that the need for “an
independent and untrammeled judiciary” exists for the purpose of guaranteeing the
”nghts of life, liberty, and property” for everyone, “not only the voters, but the nonvoters
and nonresidents.”’" A judiciary, cautious of popular opinion, in Taft's view, could not
possibly secure and represent the rights of all individuals and therefore would undermine
the possibility that the social ends of liberty and property would be jeopardized.
The proposals for recall of judicial decisions draws even greater ire from Taft.
Cons,dering his objections to the impact of popular will on individual judges, this should
not be a surprise. The ability ot a direct recall ot specific decisions infringes, in Taft's
mind, even further into the independence of the judiciary and allows majorities to have an
even greater influence on how judges rule on legal decisions. Much of Taft’s reasoning
regarding recall of judges applies to his views on recalling decisions. There are.
however, additional concerns that surface with this proposal, and these draw out more of
his Anti-progressive views. First, court decisions are essentially based on the requisite
standing of at least one individual and would now be subject to a popular voice - a force
that would potentially be party to the outcome of the case and at least indirectly
motivated by self-interest to influence a specific case or particular bench. Even if one
Ibid., 157.
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were ,o eoncede tha, judges have political and ideological preferences, it is rare,y the
case tha, they have a personal tnvestnren, in a parttcular case in which they wouid not he
required to recuse themselves. Tha, would no, be the case in a judicial recai, where fuliy
interested parties could influence a judge who is looking ,o avotd a possible recall. Taft
asks, “Wha, kind of court is i, tha, you are going to have if that court can be wiped ou, of
existence by the very persons who are to be litigants in that court?”31
Taft also expresses concerns over the general population’s ability
,0 interpret law
in any reasonable way. This issue takes on one of the Progressive assertions that
individuals, through education, are capable of governing in a more direct way and that
cons'! 1ufonal arrangements and protections are therefore not as necessary. He addresses
this issue directly by asserting one of his main views of government - that some citizens
are better equipped and better able to lead government than others:
The main argument used to sustain the recall of judicial decisions is that if the
and
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' theT are competent to interpret itt t ecall o decisions is nothing but the exercise of the power ofinterpretation. The fallacy of this argument should be manifest.
... the approvalo general principles in a constitution, on the one hand, and the interpretation of a
statute and consideration of its probable operation in a particular case and its
things 3
mfnngement of a general Principle, on the other, are very different
He continues this line of reasoning in his stump speeches during the 1912 campaign
bringing out his non-populist view of representative government.
The question of the interpretation of the constitution and the application of laws to
that constitution is just as technical a question as engineering business, or violin
playing. We are sensible people, and when we want a thing done we employ men
Taft, “Address to Jewish Citizens.’
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the controlling majority
1
^ electorate T™ T ***** qUCStion like lhat t0
interpretation ^at one ti^e that “7^°" «° »
another time by another consideration consideration and at
instances. 33
er , and you will have a government of special
The result of law by
-special instances” is a “tyrannical government. It is despotism.
A government that makes law uniform is the only government that is consistent with
freedom and liberty ordered by law."” I. does the ultimate harm by inserting instability
and confusion into a system of laws that is supposed to offer precedent, contmuity, and
attachment to found,ng principles. Agatn, Taft is ultimately concerned with the health
and maintenance of these founding principles - the “means” of social relations - and their
ability ,o secure human happiness. Recall of judicial decisions is the ultimate insult to
republican institutional arrangements in government and he argues, “lays the ax at the
foot of the tree of well-ordered freedom and subjects the guaranties of life, liberty, and
property without remedy to the fitful impulse of a temporary majority of an electorate.”35
In one of his many attempts to define what it means to be a Progressive, Taft concludes
this speech and criticism of the recall of judicial decisions by asserting that, “instead of
being progressive, [it] is reactionary; instead of being in the interest of all the people and
of the stability of popular government, [it] is sowing the seeds of confusion and
tyranny.”36
Taft s strong teelings about the centrality of private property in American society
gives him a distinctive stance that was not found in the writings and ideas of other Anti-
" Taft, “Address at Manchester Armory.”
34
Ibid.
15
Taft, “Judiciary and Progress,” 12.
36
Ibid., 13.
96
progressives. many ways it separates him and sets ^^ from^
republicans and anti-progressive insti,u,ionaiis,s. Considering his involvement in
limiting the rights of both labor unions and trusts, Taft’s constant concern over the
protection of properiy rights might seem odd. In fact, i, is another case that illustrates
Taft’s ’’betweeness.” Where most political discourse regarding labor and business was
divided across serious debates about the value and place of labor and the meaning of the
aggregation of corporate wealth, Taft maintamed a more complex, legalistic view, that
puts him between (and therefore a, odds) with these two camps
- progressives on one
side and capitalist and conservatives on the other. His position draws some from both
camps but starts from the proposition that private property is at the heart of civilized
society and the motivator for the advancement of society. As historian A.E. Campbell
observes, ’’Perhaps the single truth to which he held most firmly, other than the necessary
supremacy of the law, were [sic] that property rights were sacred. The right to hold
property was next only to liberty in the great pantheon of American rights, and the two
were so intimately linked that they could hardly be disentangled. Unless a man had
security in his property, he could hardly be said to have liberty in any sense.”37 He was,
however, still concerned with social responsibility in terms of how wealth was used or
how wealth was achieved. In this understanding, he made decisions that limited unions
ability to strike at will but allowed for workers to make claims for work-based injury. 38
At the same time, he viewed property as key to democratic society but knew that
37
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unchecked wealth leads to corruption and the rise of trusts threatened to tip the scales of
power between business and government. Bu, the solutton to this was not broad-based
government control or strong governmental support for unchecked unions or the
redistribution of wealth. It rested in legislation that considered the public good and
respected the boundaries of liberty and constitutional rights as defined by the courts.”
Dancing this difficult line, Taft talks of the tension between property and greed:
"Corporations there must be if we would progress; accumulation of wealth there will be if
pnvate property continues the keystone of our society; the temptation to use money to
corrupt legislatures and other political agencies will remain potent as long as undue
privilege for corporations can be thus secured.”* The solution, for Taft, is the
intervention by citizens and the reliance on "incorruptible public servants” - a true
expression of progression, within this conservative view of property rights. As
Campbell summarizes Taft’s views, “Self-interest, vital though it was as the engine of all
progress, must always be checked by social responsibility.”41 Essentially he attempted to
be a conservative in terms of fundamental principles and republican values but was
progressive in terms of social welfare legislation, reliance on moral citizens, and
attempting to meet the ends of government - the securing of happiness and liberty for the
greatest number. His efforts to sustain such a position was rooted sincerely in his
understanding of law and government, but nevertheless left him clearly outside the
Progressive camp at a time when it was at its height. As Campbell concludes, in his
39
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assessment of Taft, his approach “made him an excellent administrator, a conscientious
reformer, a careful expositor of the Republican credo. I, did no, make him a politician.”
At a time when political ideas were moving in one decisive direction. Tab’s tempered
reason,ng and position between world views did no, serve him well politically, ft wa, in
fact, the fate of a politically active Anti-Progressive a, the heigh, of the Progressive era.
Institutionally, Taft saw the judiciary as playing a unique role in the
administration of government, ft is the one institution that should explicitly ignore public
opinion and the will of the majority and assure a measure of slow deliberation. Unlike
the executive and legislature, which have an electoral connection to the public interest,
the judiciary must act, ultimately, as a defender of the constitutional order and therefore
must maintain independence from majority pressure and popular appeal. As he argues.
“The recall is devised to encourage quick action, and to lead the people to strike while the
iron is hot. The judge is treated as the instrument and servant of a majority of the people
and subject to their momentary will.’”*2 This is a rather straightforward, and traditional,
understanding of the courts but i, explains Taft’s abhorrence a, the possibility that
Progressive reformers would imbue the judiciary with the possibility of recall of their
seats or decisions. He saw it as “a complete misunderstanding of our form of
government, or any kind of government that exalts justice and righteousness, to assume
that judges are bound to follow the will of the majority of an electorate in respect of the
issue tor their decision.’’
4
' By the time of the 1912 election. Taft is blunt about this and
even directs his anger over this proposal at TR in very specific terms:
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This description of the specific role of the judiciary is equally straightforward:
^ SenS6
’ ?e,her appointed ” elected.
They must no, o^ly T "according to its intention, but when the legislature in it leg,sla,“re
ssrifo ” "'™
Tat, does not wholly reject public opinion. Rather, he feels that republican
institutions are designed to slow the pace of temporary opinion and of what he calls “hair
trigger” actions by temporary majorities
.
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As he explains, “when the American people
have had time to learn all the facts and have had time to consider their bearing their
deliberate judgment is a wiser and a better guide to be followed by the State than the
judgment of the most experienced statesman, the most learned jurist, the most profound
student of history. In this proper sense the voice of the people is nearer to the voice of
God than any other human decision ."47 In many instances, Tati proclaims the importance
ot popular government and insists that the American republic is a wholly popular
.......
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g nment of the greatest kind: The truth is that in this last century we have vindicated
popular government in a way that i, has never been vindicated before.”48
But this does no, mean that all components of the government are to be
responsive and that a„ forms of representation are in keeping with repub, tcan principies.
" is one thing to “attack” the legislative and executive process with the initiative and
referendum, bu, i, is quite another to apply i, to the judiciary. I, is Taft's "domino effect”
argument, and he sees i, as an attack on the most central component of the republic:
"Indeed the recall is nothing bu, the logical outcome of the proposition embodied in the
referendum and the initiative, to wit, tha, government must follow the course of popular
passion and momentary expression of the people without deliberation and without
opportunity for full information”4’ Bu, judges, for Taft, "are no, popular representatives.
On the contrary, to fill their office properly, they must be independent. They must decide
every question which comes before them according to law and justice .”50 Under a system
of recall, judges would be unable to fulfill the very function that members of the republic,
as defined in the constitution, intended them to fulfill - the recall undermines the entire
effort. "Could there be a system,” asks Taft, "more ingeniously devised to subject judges
to momentary gusts of popular passion than this?”51 The fact that the founders and the
original thirteen states were able to exercise “self-control” by establishing a judiciary that
would limit unchecked majority action and protect individual and minority rights is a
great achievement in Taft’s mind, in fact, "the nearer a people shows itself fit [for] self-
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government, the more willing it is to put restraints on itself in dea,i „8 with the minority
and with individuals. It is a majority that is willing to recognize that the minority has as
great rights in the enjoyment of happiness and enjoyment of government as the majority,
that is the majority of a free people entitled to popular government .”52 It is this creation
a. the founding, the creation of an institutional check that has no ties to popular will that
made the framers and revolutionaries of the American republic “the greatest self-
governing people that the world ever knew.” 53
Self Interest and Institutions
As the previous sectton suggests, Taft bases most of his political thought on
Madisonian ideas of human nature and the role of institutions in government. He sees
institutions as central to the development of man and society and self-imposed laws,
restrictions and institutions as evidence of the advancement of society. A republic’s
inherent institutional complexity provides the solution to the problem of instability and
mob rule found in direct democracies which must, by their nature, listen and respond
constantly to the changing voice of public opinion. But their complexity is necessary
because they can do what, historically, direct democracies have failed to do, i.e., maintain
stability through the preservation of liberty, property, and lawfulness. When institutions,
arranged through a written constitution, are able to protect these rights, it enables the
human race to take itself "out of the category of the lower animals and [lift itself] to [its]
52
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present tnatena, and sp, ritual elevation.”” Institutions. and how they itnpac, human
action and desire, represent progress from simple forms of government, like direct
democrac.es, toward more complex forms (republics) and through this added complexity
society is better able to defend liberty for individuals and protect private property. For
Taft, these two things have “contributed more to the growth of civilization than any other
institution established by the human race.”” The key to this level of progress is
controlling individual self interest and, for Taft, that is accomplished only through the
establishment of institutions and laws that do not rely on altruism or good will bu, rather
on the ability to promote the mediation of conflicting ideas and interests and the
protection of minority groups and individuals from the arbitrary will of the majority. In
particular, Taft sees institutions as permitting the slow and deliberate consideration of
ideas and propositions and. in turn, the development of society through slow and
deliberate steps. In reacting to Progressive calls for speedier reforms Taft argues that.
“Great reforms should not be brought about overnight. They need time. They should be
marked by careful consideration.”” Essentially, institutions place a form around self-
interested human action that allows for protection against abuses of individuals and
minority groups and provides deliberative pace that avoids the passing swings of public
opinion. To understand fully Taft’s reasoning behind his views on representation and the
moderation of self interest, this section will examine his ideas of representation,
constitutionalism and the law, and of elections and public opinion. An understanding of
4
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his ideas, explain why he rejected such Progressive reforms as the initiative and
referendum, the long ballot, and the direct primary. These, of course, were the core
political reforms of the Progressives and Taft's rejection of then, Ulus,rates his unique
position of being a traditionalist in regard to political means and a cautious Progresstve in
terms of social reform and an expanded government role in a variety of social and
economic areas.
Taft sees a representative system as the key to popular governments and to
creating of society that achieves the greatest good for the greatest number of people. It is
a historical view rooted in a strong belief in republican institutions and the evolution of
democratic systems over hundreds of years. ” He often cites the failure of direct
democracy in Greece and the eventual fall of the Roman republics as evidence that we
must further develop our type of government toward more complex systems that can
protect liberty, promote happiness, and achieve some level of efficiency to assist in the
progress of civilization. "The representative system,” concludes Taft, “is the only system
by which we can maintain and carry on successful popular government in a democracy
like ours.”’’
8
Not only does Taft reject proposals for direct democracy and see representative
systems as key to successful societies, he maintains a relatively conservative view of the
role of representatives elected to serve. Subscribing to a Edmund Burke’s view of
representation, Taft believed strongly that although the people ultimately govern, the
57
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activities of government are best carried out
their representatives.”59 The popular control
by “competent agents whom they elect as
comes at the point of election and, much
l.ke responsible party arguments, at the time of electron citizens can then accept or reject
the actions and policies of those elected to serve them. But for Taft, that is as far as the
eonneetton goes and as far as the direct control government should proceed. Speaking
about the relationship between a representative and his constituency, Taft describes a
scenario in whieh the representative is confronted with an issue of which he made no
mention of during the eampaign and has made no pledge to his constituents. He asks
wha, a representative should do under these circumstances; how should he act? Taft
answers his own question by agreeing with the Burkean conception:
“Under such
circumstances, I conceive that the representative is to act on his own best judgment, even
though it may ditfer from that of many of his constituents.”60 Moreover. Taft believes
that elected representatives, even though they represent those who elected them, are there
to represent the entire populace and to protect the interests of the state or country as a
whole. Quoting and fully agreeing with Burke, he claims that “when elected,
[representatives] ceased to be the representative of the people of that district only, and
became a representative of the whole Kingdom .” 61 It is an essential part of creating
stable governments that act deliberately and protect individual and minority groups.
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Taking current nrentbers of Congress to task on this issue of representation, he
sees the trend toward the
-delegate” approach by legislative ntentbers as problematic and
one that does not serve society as a whole:
The member [of Congress] is too frequently more of a delegate th-m t •
Again, he does not reject the sovereignty of the people and their place as the final arbiters
of the legitimacy of government. Rather, he believes in institutional arrangements that
can simultaneously moderate these views, protect individuals and groups from unjust
actions, and provide processes that allow for deliberation on fundamental ideas and the
expression of them through legislative and executive activity.
Representative government is also a more truly
-democratic" system for Taft.
That is, if the desire is for a system that best considers the needs and wishes of the most
people and represents those interests in governmental decisions, then the best system is a
republican one of independent representatives and political parties that can be accepted or
rejected at times of elections. This addresses a fundamental issue raised by the
Progressives whose idea of direct participatory democracy was a partial solution for what
they saw as an unrepresentative system that favored the interests of trusts, railroads,
bosses and the wealthy. For the Progressive, the solution was to give individual citizens
more direct say in the policy process and in the direction of government. The logic was
not only that suffrage should be expanded but also that the more direct say, the more
62
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chances «o express oneself at the ba.lo, box, the ntore an individual would be genuinely
represented in the decision making process and thus the less corrupt the system.
Taft repeatedly rejeets this idea and argues that, in truth, a republican system of
representative inst.tutions represents a more broadly based group of people. Thts feeds
back into his idea that government itself is no, an “ends" bu, a means to and ends. The
destred ends should dictate the means, according to Taft, therefore, he favored “a rule by
as many of the people in a democracy as will secure a good government and no more.”63
In arguing this point as a defense of parties and party conventions as a way to determine
popular will, Taft contends that “the real end that we have in view is a better government
for each individual and for all the people, and if we can ge, better candidates, and if we
can more surely secure the intelligent and deliberate consideration of party principle
through conventions, then we should adopt conventions because what we are after is
good results .”64
In many ways it is a technical problem. In a popular form of government, a
method must be developed not only to protect minorities and individuals from intrusions
by the majority but a way must also be found to process and assess what the preferences,
interests, and demands of a population are. The Progressives argue for more frequent and
more direct voting opportunities that offer speed and the appearance of greater control
over outcomes. Taft argues that this is not the best method, not simply because it
threatens individual rights and liberties but because it fails to consider preferences
properly in that it leaves out those who are not allowed to vote. It is meant to be “a
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government for the peop,e. Now that means for every one of the people. every child at
the mother’s breast, every old man tottering to the grave, every one who is a citizen of
thts country has certain rights under the constitution that all the people made,
.ha, no one
can take away under our system of government, not even a majority.” 65
section of citizens is more likely to be considered through representative
because this allows for slower and more deliberative action. Majorities that
A broader
institutions
are looking
tor immediate change, for their interest to be met quickly, are unlikely to occur under a
system of representation that gives a greater chance for reflection and input that considers
a greater variety of interests and groups. Attacking the proposals for initiative and
referendum, he again tries to frame the argument in terms of what needs to be
accomplished: ‘The voting of all the people on an issue, or for a candidate, is no, the
end. It is a means, and if i, is no, the best means of securing good candidates and of
accurately interpreting the deliberate judgment of the people, then i, is not the means that
ought to be adopted.” 66 To simply solve the problem technically requires mediating
representatives and institutions that can provide an answer to the following question that
Taft posed during a lecture at Yale University, “How is it possible to reduce the varying
wishes and views of the entire population of 80.000,000 people, or 14,000.000 adult
males.
.
,?”67 Through these representatives you get deliberate consideration of policy,
reflection as to various interests involved, and (through parties) a mechanism to cull a
multitude of interest down to main principles and values. 68
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Wha, frustrates Taft is that the Progressive destre achieve certain policy
outcomes and social changes faults republican institutions - the means of government -
for the failure to achieve these ends. He firmly believes that the problems with which
Progressives are concerned have little to do with the institutional arrangements and
constitutional arrangements of the republic. He readily admits that i, may be a slower
pace of change than Progressives want or that problems exist in terms of boss-based
corruption and corporate greed; however, but the solution is not sweeping institutional
change but rather a change in policy and political will. Arguing that representative
intuitions can produce honest results he claims that
-.here is nothing to show that all
legitimate governmental purposes sought by the so-called Progressives may not be
promoted and brought about under the representative system. Admitting that it may be
somewhat more slow m its results, it will insure wiser action in detail because of greater
deliberation.”'"' What is corrupt, in Taft's mind, is people, not laws or institutional
arrangements, and regardless of the system you will have corruption as long as honest
citizens fail to guard against it. “In other words,” Taft claims in arguing that people are
responsible, "instead of blaming the character of the representative system for recent
conditions, we must put the blame where it belongs and not upon a system of government
that has stood the test of experience for centuries as the best and wisest means for giving
effect to the popular will .”70 He places the blame for corporate corruption squarely at the
feet ot citizens enamored by the booming growth of the time: “the real defect, deeper
down than the machinery, was the sluggishness of the people and a sort of tacit sympathy
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of the people with those who were promotmg the expansion and the material progress of
the country in which the people expected to share.”7 ' 1, is no, uncommon, according to
Taft, to blame systems instead of human failure and the inability of a society to promote
the best from its citizenry:
machinery
^ofThT”
1
'7^
T*
t0 particular
protection and the other things a government shouldftmislTlt kduelo'lhTfauhof the people themselves in no, living up to their own ideals and inZ perfor
atJTS m 3 g0Vemraent that they perform, if any government is to work
And, in any case, there is no sense that the machinery necessarily has an impact on the
possibility of corrupting influences. Foretelling our contemporary and continuing
problems with campaign finance and money in politics, Taft concludes that corrupt
people and interests “might have to change their methods under the proposed changes to
a more direct democracy, bu, if the people neglect their duties in politics the same
manipulators could learn to turn the new system to their use quite as successfully as the
old.”73 Additionally, changes in the mechanisms of government not only fail to address
corruption (since people are corrupt, not institutions) they also do not guarantee certain
policy outcomes. Indeed, Taft argues that mechanisms cannot guarantee policy outcomes
or prevent the rise ot corrupt influences. In terms of the judicial recall, Taft, in his
message to Congress regarding the veto of Arizona statehood, states that:
Supporters of such a system seem to think that it will work only in the interest of
the poor, the humble, the weak and the oppressed; that it will strike down only thejudge who is supposed to favor corporations and be affected by the corruptinu
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motive it would offer to^nKrapubuf cm h"
1 ''0 ' lr°m 'he ul,imate result
- The
order to control judges is clear. 7^
m lnatlons 10 seek to control politics in
These views. Taft readily concedes, will make him rather unpopular. “Of course,'’ he
laments, “I understand the penalty that one has to undergo in taking this position, of
being charged with prejudtee in favor of special interests, and against popular
government, and with failing to recognize the great change which has come over the
people. ,,7?
Taft's assertion regarding the inability of citizens to keep corruption in check
brings out another key critique of the Progressive reform agenda. In discuss,ng
individual responsibility for corruption in government, Taft takes issue with the
Progressive assertion that the solution to corruption is to put government in the hands of
more people and expand democracy in a more direct fashion. He sees this as poor logic
and rejects direct democracy as a solution based on the fact that, if the problems stem
from the corrupting influences of people, why would the solution be to pu, more
responsibility in the hands of self-interested people who would now have access to
quicker and more powerful ways to affect the political system
.
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This is particularly the
case with the initiative and referendum which have the added problem of requiring an
electorate to vote on complicated issues and to vote more frequently. As Taft argues,
"Representative government is said to be a failure because the people are not capable of
74
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selecting pr0per representatives, and yet the whole system of referendum and initiative
rests upon the assumed intelligence and dtscretion of the people.-” In comparing direct
democracy and representative republics, Taft concludes rejecting one form due to
individual corruption does no, logically lead to the conclusion that we should rely more
heavily on individuals. As he argues, “between the two systems, if the real reason why
one does not work is the failure of the people to discharge their duty thereunder. a new
system is no, likely to work any better, when if properly discharged, the duty of the
people is more onerous than before.- Addi,tonally, the proposals for direct democracy
remove much of the deliberative and reflective attributes that go along with institutionally
driven legislation. To make up for that loss, voters must overcome their own self interest,
then lack of knowledge of the subject, and pay the cos, of voting more frequently, you
also lose the chance of allowing a legislative proposal to evolve and be amended. There
is no opportunity for deliberative public debate that can help mold a particular policy -
the vote is an up or down vote. As Taft states, “the great advantage under the
representative system is that it gives room for intelligent discussion and amendment,
whereas under the initiative and referendum such opportunity for bettering the proposal
and making it practical and useful is wholly wanting.
... the opportunity for amendment
is one of the most important steps in securing proper laws .”79
These concerns about the initiative and referendum attack the heart of
constitutional arrangements and offend Taft's sense of the role of law and its place as the
77
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"substratum upon which civiiization rested.- Although not as egregious as the recai, of
judges and their decistons. the initiative and referendum do strike a, the basic components
of repub, ican government. There is a difference, in Taft's opin.on, between popuiar
government that is based in the consent of the governed and executed through seiected
representatives and direct democracy which undermines those institutions that can
prov.de for reasoned outcome and protect against fast moving majorities. As he claims.
"The proposed remedies for our present condition are so radical that they are no, the
constitution and the structure upon which our ancestors reared this government.” 81
Indeed, for Taft, these proposals are not progressive at all but attacks upon the most
honored institutions that have “proved useful [for] 125 years.”82 An attack on the system,
rather than the implementation of policy reforms, is no, progressive for Taft, and he
reserves his harshest criticism for such proposals. During a campaign speech in early
1912 Taft addresses this issue:
™e
?
ff0rt ,0 ™ke ,he selection of candidates, the enactment of legislationd the decision of courts to depend on the momentary passions of a peottle
necessarily indifferently informed as to the issues presented, and without the
opportunity to them for Ume and study and that deliberation that give security andcommon sense to the government of the people, such extremists would humy us
!u ?
a
k
C
T?°n Wh 'C^ C0U 'd tmd parallel except in the French revolution, or inthat bubbling anarchy that once characterized the South American RepublicsSuch extremists are not progressives - they are political emotionalists or
neurotics, who have lost that sense of proportion, that clear and candid
consideration ot their own weakness as a whole, and that clear perception of the
necessity tor checks upon hasty popular action. 83
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Thus, for Taft, progressive political reforms are truly radical and, on several
occastons he tries to define the defenders of these reforms as sociahsts or communists in
an attempt to better frame himself as the “true” Progressive. In another campaign speech.
Taft makes reference to socialists and warns that “the progressive movement has assumed
.he character of a crusade, and many radical remedies were suggested, the catrymg out of
which would only be less destructive than the threatened fatal course of the disease."84
He continues to warn his audience that “progressives of this stripe
. . . thought [political
reform] might come without destroying the present structure of our Government and
without affecting the guarantees of life, liberty
,
and property
.
. . they are reactionary and
unsympathetic with the cause of the people .”85 Clearly, the threat Tali sees in socialistic
inroads links back to his insistence on the protection of private property and he argues
that, while the call for the initiative and recall may sound like it is grounded in the voice
of good-willed progressives, the motivation in more radical:
This movement back of the referendum, initiative and recall does not find its onlypromptings in a desire to stamp out corruption. There is another basis for themovement to-day which gives strength to the proposal to put unrestrained andimmediate control in the hands of a majority or minority of the electorate. It is inie idea that the unrestrained rule of the majority of the electors voting will
prevent the right of property from proving an obstacle to achieving equality in
condition so that the rich may be made poorer and the poor richer In other
words, a spur, conscious or unconscious, to this movement is socialistic It mav
not be recognized, even by those who are acting under its influence, but it is there,
and ultimately it will manifest itself so plainly that no one can be blinded as to its
real meaning and purpose. 6
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The result of such an action would be the slowing down of the progress of civilization
and the removal of the energy that has motivated
the elimination ot property
society to succeed. As Taft details, with
II IS an tssue that is ultimately between “socialism and an unlimited control of the
majority of the electorate on the one hand, [and] our present government on the other.’’”
He also criticizes the initiative and referendum as impractical in its
implementation because it does not understand what voters are able and willing to do.
Both the complicated nature of initiative questions and the increased frequency of
elections (or at least the number of issues on a particular ballot) will, worries Taft,
undermine the benefit that Progressives claim will occur with direct methods. Taft cites
statistical evidence of low participation in initiative elections as evidence that people
either think that they have no ability to answer the question or that the whole system is
too burdensome. In the case of a voting public that simply neglects or gives up on their
duty to participate in the initiative process, the potential exists for corrupt people to turn
this direct democracy reform to their advantage. As Taft warns, “the ease with which the
so-called pure democracy can be turned to the advantage of the corruptionist [sic] has yet
8/
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.0 be shown. His opportunity will be in the fa,lure of the majority of the people to
perform them heavier political duty under the new system.- He provides evidence that
•here is a common practice of voters who part.cipate in elections and only cast votes for
candidates and ignore the proposed initiatives on the same ballot. This points to the fact
that for Taft, part.cipants feel they “are far better able to select candidates than they are to
pass upon complicated questions of legislation.
. . .Tins very act of the people themselves
Shows that they think that the intricate legislative issues submitted are not proper
questions to be submitted to a popular election’* This
“disenfranchisement" via a
complicated initiative system will lead to less engagement of people to assess and pass
judgment on their elected leaders. Again he tries to differentiate himself from reformers
by labeling those calling for changes to the republican system as either simpletons or
radicals bent on subverting the stability of the constitutional system. With the current
passion tor reform Taft feels the need to frame the issue in a way that does not make him
appear unenlightened or reactionary. He again tries to div.de the line between “real" and
misinformed’' reformers:
We live in an age of reform - I hope real reform, but the sham reformers and the
crank reformers, the men who have no practical sense with reference to what
reform is, will seize upon an opportunity like this initiative to bring the people tothe polls so often, and to increase the questions to be submitted at the polls to
such number as to utterly disgust the voting public.
This perceived reticence by the electorate to engage in the initiative and referendum can,
1 aft argues, also lead toward a less representative result because fewer people are voting
90
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on ha„o, issues «ha, are placed on the ballot by a relatively small percentage of the
eligible voting population. Reformers may claim that i, ts a more direct process that will
involve the broader population, but in fact ‘-they involve the electorate in such a
complicated and oppress,ve task in considering the demils of legislation, that the voters
will no, respond to the duty, and the settlement of the issues presented is left to a
comparatively small percentage of the electorate, so that the vote recorded is no, really a
satisfactory evidence of the popular will.”® With such a system, it is not the voters’ fault
that they are unable to properly engage the process of direct legislation. Indeed. Taft
argues, “It is no reflection on the most intelligent voters to say that they can no, exercise
a useful judgment with reference to statutes which they have no, heard debated, and
which they are unable to give the necessary time fully to understand .”93 The result is that
the initiative process will simply “clog the wheels of government, [and] invite people to
the performance of duties which they will not perform .”94
For Taft, the initiative and referendum is a fundamentally constitutional question
that challenges and undermines institutional processes designed to encourage individual
representatives to reflect on legislation and judge proposals on their worthiness to the
country and not as a response to changes in public passions. These Progressive proposals
can only nullity and defeat the very advantages of the representative system which made
it an improvement upon direct government .” 95 Additional negative effects on the
constitutional order also include the sublimation of the Constitution to something other
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tha” Pnmary “ foUndmg PrindP 'eS
- “ '"Sti ‘Utes * system that bypasses legislate and
executive institutions by giving an entire popuiation con,to, over statutory
.natters and
thereby lessens the importance and significance of these institutions. For Taft, the idea
that the electorate as a whole should weigh on questions regarding common statutory
law is alien, for in doing so they erode the importance of the founding principles and
subsequent amendments.
-‘The strongest objection to these instruments of direct
government, however,” Taft asserts, “is the effect of them constant use in eitminating all
distinction between a const.tution as fundamental law, and statutes enacted for the
disposition of current matters.”’6 I, undermines essential reverence and respect for
founding principles and dilutes the prime importance tha, constitutionalism has in
guaranteeing liberty. He warns that. ”The question which is really a, tssue in the
adoption of the initiative and the referendum is whether we shall abolish constitutions,
shall abolish the standard of individual rights and shall justify the action of the majority
of an electorate which is a minority of all the people as necessarily the only guide to right
and justice ."97
It will also change the constitutional character of government by negatively
impacting the spirit of legislators and their primary place as the instigators of legislative
and policy action. It essentially changes the nature of legislative bodies by undermining
their confidence and shitting their focus to these issues that are of interest to temporary
majorities. It is a significant shift in power away from reflective legislative action toward
popular will. Taft claims that "the effect of the initiative and referendum upon the
96
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power, to take away its courage and independence of action, to destroy its sense of
responstbmty and to hold i, up as unworthy of confidence. Nothing would ntore certatnly
destroy the character of a law-nraking body.- As with pros, of his arguments, the
primacy of const,, u,ions and of the process of law making comes to the surface. Reform
an-angements and founding principles no, through the subversion of these principles or
the undermining of their essential role in protecting individual liberty.
‘That is the
orderly way; that is the deliberative way; that is the commonsense way; and i, is order,
deliberation, and calm that secure in the popular judgment, as I have already said, its
likeness to divine judgment.- No, tha, conuption does no, exist, for as Taf, states, “1 do
not mean to say tha, we can not improve those methods by which we can more directly
eliminate corruption, and where we can I am in favor of it, but 1 am not in favor of
tearing down the complete structure of government” to do it. 100 For Taft, there is a
process tor establishing and amending founding principles and there is a process for
addressing current needs through legislative processes as defined by these principles.
Issues ot expediency, will, or even corruption should not force the abandonment of this
process. In his Arizona veto message, he warns of the ultimate result of such reforms:
Real reforms are not to be effected by patent short cuts or by abolishing those
requirements which the experience of ages has shown to be essential in dealingjustly with everyone. Such innovations are certain in the long run to plague the
inventor or first user and will come readily to the hand of the enemies and
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corrupters of society after the
prompted their adoption
.
101
passing Of the just popular indignation that
Other aspects of eiectora, refonn were also a threat to sound representative
government for Taft, includmg the expansion of the baiiot to cover a wider variety of
offices and the frequency of the elections. Taf, was a firm believer that, for responsible
government to exist, representatives must be chosen a. reasonable intervals and that
citizens should concentrate their judgment of them to enough elections to maintain
sufficient control but few enough to allow elected officials to operate with strength and
independence. He then rejects the long ballot that included a larger number of offices at
the local and state levels. Taft’s mind, this dilutes the ability of voters to locate those
leaders responsible for the actions of government rather than creating ballots rather than
securing "their general attention at moderate intervals for concentrated and effective
action.""'-’ By relying on the short ballot, it is possible to “limit the elective offices to a
small number and
. . . impose the responsibility of appointment of all other officers upon
the few who are elected.”'® Unlike the Progressives, Taft felt that electoral and
representative systems should be designed with consideration of the tendencies of self-
interested voters and their need to be able to find clear lines of representation and rather
uncomplicated elections. As Taft argues, “we should limit the political duties of the
average elector to those which experience shows he is likely to perform. This will
prevent too numerous elections. It will lead to a government more representative and less
Taft, Presidential Messages, 156.
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Where Progressives see an
direct, and it will make possible the short ballot.” 104
opportunity to pu, more peopie ntore direct,y in contro, of governmental decisions, Taft
acuafty sees the opposite resuit. He sees fewer people voting, ,ess accountability for
legislative actions, and the undermining of all the advantages of representative
government. Rather than a more robust government, it is more likely to produce one that
is controlled by an
-'active minority.” As he concludes: “A system which leads to a
continuous neglect by a majority of the electorate of their political duties, conclusively
shows its unfitness. It is condemned
... by the very electorate upon whom the safety of
.he Government depends. The Government becomes one of an acfive minority.
Experience does not show that such a minority is the wisest part of the electorate or the
part best adapted to secure good government” 105
These concerns over electoral issues with long ballots and frequent and
complicated elections also centers on rejecting the Progressive need to more closely tie
popular will to legislative decision making. He sees this effort as a desire to imbue the
legislative system and its elected members with the burden of momentary sways of
popular passion - not a good ingredient for Taft’s desire for the slow consideration and
reflective review of policy. Strong and immediate connections between temporary
majorities and representative institutions does not, for Taft, result in a better form of
popular government. It is a matter of mechanics; relying on a governmental system that
will create the greatest good for the greatest number of people is an organizational issue
and not an end itself, as he argued in a speech during the 1912 election:
104
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Agatn, he asserts his love for the founders and for the constitutional system they devised
to address issues of human self-interest and representation. Indeed, these experiments in
reform “may show the wisdom of our fathers in providing checks characterist.c of
representative government, in which the issues presented to the voters are simplified and
reduced into those that are clear and direct, and the solution of the more difficult
problems is delegated by the people to legislators and executives more capable by their
training ot discharging governmental functions in detail.” 107
As part of his criticism of direct democracy reforms, Taft also objected to attacks
on the role of parties in securing responsible and effective government. In particular, he
objected to the implementation of the direct primary, as well as other more general
attacks on the role ot parties in American government and politics. In many ways his
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Of part.es is in line with his general appreciation of institutions and their impact
on human interaction and human nature in regard to the execution of a repuhhcan form of
government. As Taft often proclaimed,
‘'Without parties popular government wotdd he
absolutely impossible.'"™ For him, it is a necessary s,ep „ ,he course
mdiVidUal PreferenCeS 3nd““ ~ policy outcomes and governmental
action. On a basic level it is a simple technical problem of assessing the preferences of a
large, diverse, and geographically dispersed population. “How is it possible,” Taft asks
regarding the presidency, “to reduce the varying views of the entire population to one
resultant executive force which shall carry on this machine of government in the public
interest and for the public weal? The problem has been solved by the institution of
parties. Preferences and values, at some point, must be narrowed and prioritized and.
for raft, parties play a role that enables this to happen before they reach the more formal
institutions of government. It is an organizational problem:
If the members of the electorate in this country who actually vote in an electionnumber twenty million, how are a majority of that number, say eleven million
g g t0 agree on any governmental policy at all? They can not reach an
agreement without organization.
.
. . They only way in which they can act together
weealf^party '"
,nera PnnC 'pleS
’
WalVe minor diffi=rences, and combine in what
On a different level, parties act as a way for individuals to discuss general principles and
retine their views on society and politics and, at the same time, select leaders who clearly
represent those values that have been chosen as priorities for the party. It is a process,
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necessary in any form of popular government, by which preferences of individuals are
expressed and. eventually, moderated by the demands of a broader group or coahtion of
like-minded individuals. As Taft describes, “In a party, those who join it, if they would
make it effective, must surrender their persona, predilections on matters comparatively of
less importance in order to accomplish the good which united action on the most
important principles a, issue secures.’"" Additionally, unlike groups that pursue more
specific sets of issues, such as unions and business associations, parties are the one
informal institution that attempts to represent a broader array of classes and interests. As
Taft sees it, the virtue of having two large parties is that it adds to the quality of
representative government because these parties “are each made up of all classes and
conditions. Their cleavage is vertical and not horizontal .” 112
The direct primary was of course the principal attack on parties at both the state
and national level. It was another threat to an important institution of a representative
republic and, in Taft’s mind, a misunderstanding of the role of institutions and of the real
source of corruption in politics. Like other areas of representative government.
Progressives charged the institutional organization of parties as the source of corruption
instead ot locating it with individual party members that proved to be corrupt leaders or
with the poor monitoring of party activities by its members. As Taft views it, corruption
can occur in any particular system, whether its process is direct or representative. If
citizens do not take responsibility for the actions of government, whatever the established
institutions, there is the potential for abuse and corruption. Corruption, argues Taft, “can
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creation of party principles out of party organizations altogether. It is part
Of .he broader attempt to shift power away from established organizations and toward the
realm of individual action and of public opinion led by the educated reformer. As Taft
sees it, this attempt stems from "the same evils which have prompted a resort to such
radical methods as the initiative, the referendum and the recall, [as a way to] change the
old methods of party government, of the selection of party candidates, and the declaration
of party principles .” 114
Not only did Taft feel strongly about the role of parties in a representative system,
but he argues in particular for a two-party system. He takes issue with small, single-issue
parties like the Socialist Party, Non-Partisan League, and labor parties which sees class-
based organizations that do not mediate ideas and issues but rather "rule their followers
with a rod of iron. This strong control, as he sees it, is not inherent in the two broad-
based parties. There may be bosses and other leaders but a large confluence of ideas and
opinions can be brought to the table. It is an issue of the proper place of citizenship and
self-interest within an institutional setting. "The two great parties,” according to Taft,
represent the conservative attitude of the body politics of the United States. They hold
us to the principle that we are Americans first and that our class preferences, if we have
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any. are second. Their continued existence keeps us in that condition of mind.”" 6 They
contrihute to moderate government as well limit the impact of smaller, minority, special
interests parties. These more "radical” parties have little chance of having an impact on
an institution that is supported by two major parties wtth broad-based moderate support.
By appealing
,0 a broader spectrum> the two-party system provjdes ^
representative leaders and increases the possibility that fundamental and core issues will
come to the surface and gain attention in republican institutions." 7 To illustrate his point
about the problem ot systems that rely on multiple parties, Taft cites France as a country
that has frequent political problems based on “the inability of the leaders to form parties
large enough to maintain a government. There are too many small groups, and the
administration is thus likely to continually change.” 118
The party system also provides for a certain level of efficiency that Taft sees as
essential in processing the will of such a large population. In particular, parties are most
efficient and effective when “the members are more nearly united on the great principles
of governmental policy. As noted previously, representative institutions for Taft,
such as Congress and the Presidency, operate best when the representatives have some
level of independence and have the institutional support to act with confidence and
energy. As part of this representative process, strong, coherent parties can lead better and
wtll better take ultimate responsibility for their actions and those of the government.
Without this responsibility, he believed that the potential is greater for weak government.
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corruption, and the loss of faith in the ability of
concludes,
“the sense of responsibility or the
government to exact results. As Taft
must furnish a power of cohesion which shall
successful operation of the Government
sufficient number of its members to make
power of initiative and action.” 120
prevent the breaking off from the party of;
its arm nerveless and to take away from it its
In many ways, Taft's arguments regarding part.es reveal the value and impact of
institutions on individual behavior and action. Organized institutions are designed to deal
Wtth individual self-interest so as to secure an outcome that is something other than
narrowly self-interested. It seeks unity and cohesion of action, with recognized
responsibility for outcomes. As Taft argues:
r
16 pr° em has been solved in the growth and the establishment of ponulargovernment by the institution of parties among the people. A useful partykumotbe formed unless those who are members of it, with a sense of responsibility forthe successful and unobstructed continuance of the administration by that partyyield their views on the less important and less essential principles, and unite withrespect to the mam policies for which the party is to become responsible.
... The
resultant solidarity of opinion is necessary to secure unity of action
.
121
Taft does not believe that individuals should sublimate their personal convictions or
completely abandon their will to the group, but rather he sees of compromise as essential
to republican government and to the stable progress and change that can only come
through the slow moderate processes of institutional mechanisms. “I do not at all
advocate,” Taft allows, “that a man should adhere to party against high principle and
conviction, but this life is all a series of compromises by which little by little, and step by
step, progress toward better things is made. All the good in the world cannot be attained
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a. one breath.- The sentiment cieariy marks Taft as different from most Progress™
reformers: speed of action in government is not a prime consideration for someone who
embraces the founders' love of deliberate and moderate government.
Taft does see problems with corruption in the current party system, as he
concedes, "Of course, no system can avoid the effect of corruption. None can be boss or
machine proof, bu, some method can be adopted which will minimize these evils and
bring about the healthy control of party agencies by the people who compose it .” 123 h,
particular, he sees the value of implementing direct elections at the local level as a
solution to local party corruption. He concedes that local government, a, leas,
temporarily, would be better off without conventions. By getting rid of local
conventions, Taft feels that you can cure most of the corruption that exists and that, once
cleared out, local conventions might possibility be reinstituted
.
124 By doing this. Taft
feels you can provide a more honest and legitimate source for nominating state and
national delegates to convention. That is, by reducing boss control at the local level,
party members would be more able to vote independently for delegates to higher level
party conventions. In this way, the state and national conventions would be less inclined
to corruption. And. he insists, the convention is "the best means of securing an
authoritative expression of the party, and offers comparatively little opportunity for boss
control if the primaries at which the delegates are selected are conducted by the same
method as in the direct selection of candidates for legislative representatives .” 125 To
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eliminate the state conventton by replacing i, with a direct printary is, for Taft, “an
extreme measure which subsequent experience will show to have been a mistake.” 1*
The main problem with the direct primary, as he sees it. is in the results that such
a system produces in terms of candtdate qualifications and interest in office. When you
eliminate the party convention and substitute dtrec, primaries, you change the dynamic of
Hie candidate selection process and the type of candidates it produces. 127 In a direct
primary, according to Taft, ambitious men can play to the current passions of the general
electorate to achieve office. Concerns with higher principles, party reputation, and
building of responsible agendas is minimized and a premium is placed on the personality
of individuals and their ability to appeal to the crowd. Taft suggests that there is a
"tendency in a direct election of candidates in a national party [to] select a popular
partisan, while that of a convention system [is] to take the more moderate man whose
name will appeal to the independent voter.” 128 Party organizations, in his view, are
concerned with and dependent upon organizational success so that finding candidates
who broaden the base and appeal to a larger array of voters will strengthen their position
in legislative institutions. Candidates selected by popular direct vote, on the other hand,
will be weakened by their reliance on the whim and fluctuations of temporary public
opinion. The result, in Taft's opinion, is that a "primary election in 1860 would certainly
126
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not
have nominated Seward, not Lincoln; in 1876 would have nominated Blaine,
Hayes.” 129
The types ofcandida.es to surface in a system of dtrec, primaries will also include
individuals who have greater financial means and who are particularly ambit,ous. As
Taft sees a system, in whtch the role for party organ,za,ion is no, primary, candidates wil,
more likely rely on them own financial wealth and on their personal ability
,0 campaign
and lead campaign organ,zations on their behalf. In a post 1912 election lecture at Yale
Umversity, he seems to be commenting on his experience in facing the charismatic and
popular style of Theodore Roosevelt and his ability to appeal to, and inform, public
opinion beyond the party machinery. Critic,zing the direct primary in tins speech, he
claims that there is an “obvious advantage which the men with wealth and of activity and
°f lmle modesty’ but of g^t ambition to be candidates” have over-qualified candidates
who are perhaps more moderate in temperament, personality, and wealth. 130 It essentially
undermines any potential for the broader group of party members to influence and elevate
individuals to office. In a direct primary, individuals would need wealth or they would
be selected exclusively from above from a “boss” who could provide needed wealth.
Again, Taft recognizes that bosses can and do control parties but that is not an
institutional limitation in his view. It is the failure of individuals. From a pure
institutional point of view, the convention system has the potential to allow for moderate
men to be selected from the party ranks where the direct primary essentially guarantees
that a candidate selected by the organization boss or a candidate of wealth will prevail.
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D,rec t primaries lake consider* organization
,o execule and “such an „rganization
requires money legitimately spent and a great dea. of it. The result therefore usually is
•ha. the candidate is either the candidate of the organization or a wealthy man who has
spent a large amount of money to beat the organ,za,ion candidate. All other candidates
usually fail. The boss is no, dethroned.”' 3 ' I, stays constant with his theme that
corruption is no, found in the institution itself. An institution is a means and should be
judged on wha, i, produces. If failures are found in its system, then it should be changed:
il no,, then i, is a fa, lure of men. In this case, to devise a system that relies more heavily
on men is, for Taft, a ridiculous solution based on poor analysis. "The general primary,”
he argues, “does not avoid corruption where wealthy men are candidates, and it greatly
increases the amount of money used by candidates.” 132 It also changes the type of
motivation that brings candidates and their elected position together: “the direct election
of candidates very much reduces the probability that the office will seek the man,” but
instead puts “a premium on self-seeking of an office .” 133 Rather than sustaining a system
where party leaders, chosen as delegates from smaller party organization, seek out the
most qualified and loyal party members capable of being responsible to the party
plattorm and values, the direct primary requires that the individual must make themselves
a candidate: “no man can be a candidate for office who does not seek it. He must make
himself an applicant in a formal method. The door is open to all who seek it.” 134 The
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result Is that the direct primary “very much reduces the probability that
seek the man .” 135
the office will
In the end. the diree, primary, as Taft argues, results in the lowering of the
-average fitness of the candidates for office.”™ With the freedom ofeandida.es to place
themselves on the ballot, individuals can vote “without d,scrim,nation” and with only the
passion of the moment in mind. Additionally, responsibility for the reputation of the
party that the candidate represents blurs as the link between candidate and party is
weakened and the connection between candidate and popular majorities increases. The
result is that an individual's credentials as a party member are no, necessarily confirmed
whtch prevents parties from truly choosing the candidates to represent them. Taft also
notes that a great abuse under the general primary system” is that “the loyal members of
the party have often been prevented from making their own selections [for office] by the
intervention of men who claim the right to vote, as members of the party, but who are
really not so, and who intend to vote the other party ticket.” 137 The result is a
significantly weakened party that has been denied its organizational “right to determine
for itself its policies and its candidates; and [its] right to exclude from its councils and the
selection ot its candidates the participation of non-members.” 138 For Taft, this assault
undermines the usefulness of a key institution, brings out the selfish, self-interested
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organization, to create factions in them prompted by selfish motives .’" 39
In all these areas, representation, constitutionalism, elections, human self-interest,
Taf, maintains a consistent v.ew that for governments to work they must rely on
legitimate cons, itu,tons, the stabi.ity and soundness of institutions, and the arrangement
of interests in these institutions to address properly the power of individual self-interest
and the threat to minorities that is posed in governments based on majorifies. He is a
constitutional conservafive who seeks change within a system of revered institutions.
Speed is no, of the essenee, direct participatory systems have no value in and of
themselves, and care must be taken to create effective and strong governments tha, are
limned in their ability to threaten the liberty and property of individuals. Where
Progressives see the threats in institutions that exclude, Taft sees the weakness in
individual citizens who neglect and abuse a republican form of government designed to
account for individual passions and provide moderate and limited government. As Taft
sees it:
The pe°ple do rule and have always ruled in the United States. They have theirW
!
;
,
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!
they have n after a wholesome delay and deliberation which they have
wisely forced themselves to take under the restrictions of a constitution which
ongmally adopted by however small a popular vote, they have fully approved by
one hundred and thirty years of acquiescence. It is a fundamental error to seek
quick action in making needed changes of policy or in redressing wrong. Nations
ive a *on£ time ' and a year or five years is a short period in their life. Most
wrongs can be endured for a time without catastrophe. Reforms that are abiding
are achieved step by step.
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Taft's views once again illustrates his post,,on between TR and Wilson - the
"be,weeness" of a constttutiona, conservative who is sympathetic to progress,ve socia,
change, but worships the cons,,, u,ion and the rule-of-law. 141 I, was front this se, of
views that Taft weighs in on one las, issue central to the Progressive political reform era.
the role ot the chief executive in American politics.
Popular Will, Constitutions, and the Presidency
Taft's ideas surrounding the role of the chief executive in the American republic
‘S ,He m°St difflCUlt t0 discem and the one Anti-progressive issue about which he is most
indirect. Taft's views on the presidency come primarily from his thoughts on the office
while in the office as opposed to a precise and in-depth analysis of the presidency similar
to his critiques discussed earlier in the chapter. Fortunately, his prestdency falls between
two starkly different and outwardly progressive executives that contrast with Taft's
understanding of the "chief magistrate.” Another problem in understanding his views on
the presidency is that they differ somewhat before, during, and after his term as President
as different aspects of the presidency take on varying prominence or emphasis. The
historian Donald Anderson recognizes this in his book on the Taft presidency, where he
writes: In pursuing Taft’s conception of the presidency we can discem three basic
stages - prepresidential, presidential or operational, and postpresidential.” 142 While
Taft s conception ot the presidency is a complicated and sometimes conflicting, he does
Paolo E. Coletta, Presidency of William Howard Taft (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1973), 266.
Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative’s Conception ofthe Presidency
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), 289.
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maintain consistences
,hroughou, most His actons as president and his speeches and
writings about the office. The consistences centet on Taffis argument that executive
power, and actions that follow front it. nrus, find authority within the constitution and the
congressional statutes that define the office. As W. Carey McWilliams argues. "Taft
insists that all presidential power must be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific
gran, of power." Similarly. Anderson claims that Taft had a "preoccupation with
onstitutiona! continuity and [an] almost religious commitment to the rule of law”
including a presidency that operates "within the confines of the separation of powers .” 143
Additionally, Paolo Coletta observes that “trained in the law. Taft took a conservative
and legalistic approach to government,” and, “he must find authority in the Constitution
or in law prior to acting,” while David Potash, in his commentary on Taft's Popular
Government, argues that “Taft’s message as president, judge, and professor was
remarkably consistent. He sought the continuance of constitutionalism, liberty under law.
and representative government .” 144
What makes Taft’s views of the presidency Anti-progressive is his understanding
of power, authority and constitutional order. Taft felt strongly that without the "rule of
law” we would have the "rule of men” and be left to the manipulation and vagaries of
temporary majorities. All branches of government must operate from the foundation of
the constitution and pursue reform from that basis. Taft undoubtedly believed in social
and political reform but not through institutional change and constitutional reform that
undermined the founders' original plan of separated institutions that moved deliberately
McWilliams, 6. Anderson, Conservative’s Conception
,
305 and 294.
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and slowly. Taft's A„,i-progressive v.ews on .he executive are only fully understood by
detailing his ideas on the relationshtp between public will, constitutional law, and
presidential authority. It is the connection between these aspects of republican
government that define Taft apart from progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt and
amplify his position as an opponent of progressive attempts at po,ideal and institutional
reform.
Much like other proponents of American democracy including progressive,
conservatives, liberals and even socialists, Taft saw the relationship of the public, its
constitution, and its institutions as critical to the type of resultant governmental action.
Most would agree that Theodore Roosevelt and most other progressives saw the power of
institutions as stemming almost directly from popular will. In this model, the executive
office has a particularly strong claim to authority due to its unique position as the one
branch that is selected by the entire voting population. The stronger the relationship an
executive can forge between the office and the will of the people the more power he can
attain. The Constitution is simply an instrument that places only specific limitation on
action and defines relations between branches. In a lecture at Columbia University. Taft
quotes TR directly as saying that he believed “the executive power was limited only by
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by
Congress. It is a relationship that places a direct connection between the people and
the presidency and leaves the Constitution as a type of addendum to this relationship.
William Howard Taft, Our ChiefMagistrate and His Powers (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1925), 143. These lectures were given at Columbia University in 1915 as well as at other
locations such as the University of Virginia. The quotation that Taft uses is, according to Taft, from TR’s
“Notes for a Possible Autobiography.”
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Taf, sees the relationship between these three parts as more linear in nature. All
power and authority undoubtedly derives from the people, either directly or tacitly in the
case of the constitution. This power ,s expressed, in Taft’s opinion, through the
establishment of the constitution and the rule of law. Through suffrage, the people may
weigh-in on the direction of government and on policy preferences bu, the gran, of
author, ty to a pamcular branch of government comes essentially from the specific details
of the constitution. In both Ins writings and his presidential actions. Taft often refers to
the President's "grant of authority” within the Constitution. In his classic argument on
executive action, Taft contends that “the true view of the Executive functions is
. . . that
the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some
specific gran, ofpower or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper
and necessary to its exercise. Such specific gran, mus, be either in the Federal
C om"nm,n or in an act ofCongress passed in pursuance thereof.” 146 Ultimate authority
is in the hands of the people but executive authority comes from the constitutional
arrangements designed and implemented by the people.
This arrangement of power and self-government from people to constitution to
executive is, tor Taft, an activity of “self-restraint”. It is an admission that we cannot
govern directly or without deliberation and that the best way to arrange this is through
self-imposed constitutional order that limits popular impact on institutions and provides
freedom tor these intuitions to act within the confines of the constitution. During his first
year as president Taft gave a speech to the Union Religious Service in Fresno, California,
Taft, Our ChieJ Magistrate
,
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entitled “He Who Conquers Himselfls
details this often argued point:
Greater Than He Who Take* a City,” where he
McotiS "J,h:;^ur ‘ir^dw uy ri; lerrding ,o iaw and
that Constitution upon themselves in order that the ’"T ,
P aCe the restralnts of
and with the checks that were sure
,' ° V y mlght acl with deliberation
o«. poliees, and '*???**’ WelMhou8>“
now are maintaining it and supXm”Tt as f h ' 7 ^ Consti,uti<» «od
governing themselves, and are more to be credited!,, h^thaul*"a cit^
“*
This ties into and supports his previously detailed argument in favor of a Burkean
concept of representation that calls for independence of aetion for elected representatives.
The “space” that the Constitution provides between the electorate and the executive gives
the President freedom to lead, govern, and make decisions without hesitation. Where TR
sees power stemming from public opinion, Taft sees power stemming from the
constitution. As McWilliams concludes, “In Taft’s theory, the presidency is potentially
stronger than it is in TR’s terms, since it encourages a president who is psychologically
more autonomous, less dependent on public sentiment, and more able to set his or her
own course.” 148
This may imply that Taft felt no sentiment for public opinion or had no regard for
popular opinion in the execution of office. This is not true in either his writings or his
actions as President. Taft traveled often in his presidency and believed strongly in parties
and their ability to give popular force within governmental institutions. It was not a
matter ot the validity of popular interests, which Taft saw as important, but rather an
issue as to how presidents were allowed to act. They could act in the interests of the
47
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pubhc Win as long as their action came from^ derived ftom the Constitmion
Indeed, Taft feft strongly that the public interest is of uttnos, importance and concern for
«he Pres,dent bu,
-.here is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise
because i, seems to him to be in the public interest.-’ On, of the desire for
constitutiona, respect and beiief in law, the President must no, go beyond the defined
bounds of the Consfitution. But
-‘the President fully represents his party,- and tries, as
best he can, to meet the needs of the party and the responsibilities of the office. Taft may
take the constitution seriously, but he is not a "Pollyanna” when it comes to the
president’s duties and responsibilities.
Without a doubt, Taft recognized that, even though the constitution and legislative
statutes are the sole grantor of executive power, these grants are often broad and
sometimes vague. “The Constitution,” he states, "does give the President wide discretion
and great power, and it ought to do so. I, calls from him activity and energy to see that
within his proper sphere he does what his great responsibilities and opportunities
require. As long as the executive can point to the statutory or constitutional source of
his action, then the President can proceed with confidence. Individuals may not agree
with his actions. They may not even agree that there is a constitutional source for a
particular action, but the President should always turn to the Constitution to find his
legitimate source of power. While criticizing TR's claim of popular authority, Taft
addresses one example that TR himself used to compare his leadership style, namely
Lincoln s drastic executive actions during the civil war. Responding to TR's assertion
14
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•ha. there are two types of presidents - Lincoin presidents (which TR claimed to be) and
Buchanan presidents (which TR claimed Taft was) - Taft argues that TR was in no way a
"Lincoln president" because Lincoln's actons proceeded front Constitutional authority or
a. leas, Conshtutional authonty as Lincoin saw it. Citing the example of Lincoln
suspending habeas corpus, Taft argues that "Mr. Lincoln always pointed out the source
of the authority which in his opinton justified his acts, and there was always a strong
ground for maintaining the view which he took. His claim of right to suspend the writ of
babeas corpus ... was well founded.”- Unlike TR. who according to Taft would ac,
simply on the basis of broad and general claim of protecting "the welfare of all the
people,” Taft would insist that executive action must stem from law. Without this, the
executive can simply act on personal interest and instincts and the citizenry loses the
advantages ot employing a self-imposed constitutional order. As he details:
My judgment is that the view of Mr. Garfield and Mr. Roosevelt, ascribing an
undefined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe doctrine and that it
might lead under emergencies to results of an arbitrary character, doingirremediable injustice to private right. The mainspring of such a view is that the
Executive is charged with responsibility for the welfare of all the people in a
general way, that he is to play the part of a Universal Providence and set all things
right, and that anything that in his judgment will help the people he ought to do
unless he is expressly forbidden not to do it. The wide field of action that this
would give to the Executive one can hardly limit. It is enough to say that Mr.
hdofn
6 lt^
aS eXprCSSly Stated h°W far he thou8ht this principle would justify him
Taft was sympathetic to the primary motivations of the progressives in the cause
ot improving the quality of life for all Americans. But he did feel that the foundation -
the means - of ultimately obtaining social goods is through respect for the law. As Taft
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concedes, “the benevolence of [TR's] purpose no one can deny, but no one who looks a,
“ fr0m 'he StandP°iM °f:3 g0Vernment of law could regard it as anything but lawless.” 153
To achieve better social policy and to protect cttizcns from various evils, a government
must rely on the slow process of law. To change institutional arrangements simply to
speed up social reforms is to sacrifice stability and the protection of individual liberty. In
a 1909 speech in the then Territory of Arizona, Taft gave advice to the citizens of the
territory regarding constitution budding and warns them agatns, being lured into
progressive ideas of institutional arrangements. After instructing that “a constitution is
for the purpose of laying down fundamental limitations upon your legislature and your
executive, he warns them more directly:
iKcessdvtf foll!
adS
r ,UP t0 0ne. Iittle sermon ' and that is lhe wisdom andneces tty o follow,ng the law as ,t is. I know that sometimes in the heat and
enthusiasm of reform, there is an impatience with legal limitations and statuteshat seem to be d. reeled against that reform, or to prevent its immediate
‘ comphshment, such as to lead us to disregard it or to ignore it. I do not think.
and I am sure you will agree with me, that that is the best way of getting rid of a
legal limitation that interferes with progress. The best way is to have the people
understand that that limitation ought to be removed, and that the statutes of ourGovernment ought to conform so far as may be to our highest ideals and
ambitions; but that the first thing that we have got to do after arousing the people
to the necessity of change; is to change the law, and not rely upon the Executive
himself to ignore the statutes and follow a law
. . . himself because it is supposed
to be the law of higher morality. ?4
Reform was important to Taft, but constitutionalism was more important because it
guaranteed stability and the protection of individual liberty. It is another example of his
betweeness ’ - of being neither wholly conservative nor wholly progressive. His place
as the ioiemost trust-buster is a case in point. He very much believed that power
4
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..nested in the hands of private citizens needed to be checked by the rule of law and the
will of the people as expressed through their government. Ltkewise, Taft’s prestdency
revealed that as a public representative, institutions and their participants must respect the
law as the source of their power. The progressive him sympathized with the need to
limit corporations and advocate social reforms, while the conservative in him led him to
argue that the executive must do this only within the powers found in the constitution.' 5’
As McWilliams states, “As a champion of the rule of law
. . Taft was concerned to
maintain the supremacy of the law in princtple the more i, seemed questionable in
practice .” 156
In one ot Taft’s early battles in his presidency, the Pinchot-Ballinger dispute, he
argued that the reason for giving up public lands in the pacific northwest was due to the
fact that the original claim on them under TR’s administration was not based on legal
statutes. It was a reversal of TR’s process of using the public popularity of his
presidency to accomplish specific policy goals that were of interest to his constituency.
Tail himself argued that he was not opposed to the acquisition of the lands but rather to
the acquisition ot the lands through anything other than legally grounded means. This
action, based on his concept of constitutionalism, provides a clear example of how he
viewed the presidency.
Taft s primary writing on the Presidency details his arguments for a
constitutionally based executive, but the very way his writings on the presidency are
organized illustrates also his commitment to this Anti-progressive view. In his Our Chief
McWilliams, 8-9.
McWilliams, 8-9.
142
Magistrate and His Pavers, a collection of speeches, Taft plods through each area of
presidential power and iniluence such as legislative affairs, international relations, the
veto power, the power of the pardon, and the appointment power. For each he describes
some of the more basic aspects of the power and then links them to their constitutional or
legislative origins. A, no point does he talk about any particular power of the President
and its link to popular will. Even when he considers the power of the President as party
leader, he describes it in institutional terms - highlighting his belief in parties as the
institution best suited to refine and communicate individual interests. Taft argued that,
"the president so fully represents his party, which secures political power by its promises
to the people, and the whole government is so identified in the minds of the people with
his personality that they are inclined to make him responsible for all the sins of omission
and of commission of society at large. This would be ludicrous if i, did not have
sometimes serious results." 1 ' 7 Likewise, he describes congressional and executive
relations in terms of how and when the legislature is permitted to direct the executive and
in what ways the executive is allowed to manage the agencies of government without
interference from Congress. He does not speak of power, in its own right, or talk of
bringing the will ot the people to bear on legislative activities. Many of his arguments
are like the following: "In theory all the executive officers appointed by him. directly or
indirectly, are his subordinates, and yet Congress can undoubtedly pass laws definitely
limiting their discretion and commanding a certain course by them which is not within
the power ot the executive to vary.
. . . The rule seems to be that Congress may not
control by legislation the constitutional powers of the President when the legislation in
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way limits the discretion which the Constitute plainly confers” 1 ’* And again, he
clearly shows his overriding concern for Constitutional order in a republic:
can cotnpe the other to affirmative action, and each branch cat great i ,d
discretion^®
,£Unment °f ^ °bjeCt °f itS ai’d exLwt
Tatfs writings drive home the conclusion that, “while the President's powers are broad.
the lines of Ins jurisdiction are as fixed as a written constitution can properly make
them.” 160
Like his other Anti-progressive views, this one centers on the purposeful
separation ot laws from reform and progress. They are separate issues. Taft maintained
a somewhat British view of reform as something that is an issue of policy and not an
issue ot constitutional structure. In this way, individuals can be for or against reform -
they can be tor or against any particular proposed policy. But attacks on the
constitutional order to achieve policy aims was not reform nor progressive in Taft’s mind.
During many of his stump speeches in the 1912 campaign Taft would seek the mantel of
true progressive by detailing his accomplishments for fair labor practices, trust-busting,
and better tariff laws. That was progressive to Taft, not legal reforms designed to
undermine self-imposed constitutional government constructed for the protection of
individual liberty.
1 58
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Perhaps wha, makes Taft so unique ,y An.i-progress.ve is his smuggle and baules
wfth the direction of politics and democracy in the United States. many ways, through
his own expression, Taft realizes that he is on the losing side of a major shift in the ways
of Politics in American socrety. He finds himself, in critiquing the political reforms of
the Progressives, labeled as a traitor, a “stand-patter,” as a politician who cared little for
anyone other than trad.tional business. Yet Taft tries the impossible by straddling two
worlds; he tries to differentiate between policy and process. He attempts to show that
policy change and social progress can occur within a system that has been trusted for
over 1 25 years and has proven stable even through a bloody civil war. At the same time,
he tries to defend institutions that are seen by many of the population as inherently
corrupt and unrepresentative of their needs and causes. In Taft’s case, trying to offer
civics lessons to groups that want quick social reform is an impossible project. In
defending the Constitution he is trying to show that corruption stems from aggressive and
ambitious self-interest and the will of active groups who look, regardless of the system,
for ways to use it to their advantage. His stand against the Progressive reforms was.
perhaps, the last big stand in the 20 lh century, as the legacy of such reforms like the direct
primary, the initiative, and candidate-centered campaigns became deeply woven into the
fabric of American politics and the underlying assumptions about democratic institutions.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPANDING THE ANTI-PROGRESSIVE VOICE
The previous chapters have focused on central figures among the Anti-
progressives who offered a consistent ideological critique of the progressive political
reforms of the period. Taft, Ford, and Butler were all national figures, with varying
backgrounds, whose speeches and writings maintained a clear and consistent Anti-
progressive voice. However, the progressive reforms began and found their greatest
success in America at the state and local level. Governors, party bosses, legislators, and
town politicians all participated in the debates over progressive political reform including
such issues as non-partisan town government, direct primaries, ballot reform, state and
local initiative and referendum, and recall of local and state officials. These were often
adopted as local reforms but did not always affect national institutions.
Most political commentators, politicians, and academics also did not necessarily
make all progressive political reforms their concern. Like most people, only a limited
number of issues that are in the public debate can be engaged individually and for many
commentators, they only wrote or spoke to one or perhaps two reforms that were of
primary concern to them. Essentially those who were concerned about reform limited
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.heir interest to issues that directly affected their world. Thts chapter attempts to
htghlight some of the less visible characters in the Anti-progressive camp and illustrate
the importance and relevance of spokesmen who either worked on a more local level or
spoke only to certain aspects of anti-reform topics. These individuals are not necessarily
unknowns, but, in some cases, identifying them as Anti-progressives can only be done by
looktng at one specific contribution they may have offered as opposed to the vast
majority of their writings. But together they add a substantive diversity and breadth to
the voice of the Anti-progressives and to the debates of the time.
I he Anti-progressives considered here include people like Emanuel Philipp, a
two-term governor of Wisconsin, Victor Berger, a founder and leader of the American
Socialist movement, Elihu Root, a United States Senator from New York as well as the
Secretary of War under William McKinley and Secretary of War and of State under
Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Hollingsworth, an academic, and Bernard Freyd, a locally
centered academic and public administrator in Seattle Washington. These, among others,
help round out the premise of this dissertation and illustrate that resistance to progressive
reforms existed and gave voice to various understandings of representative government,
democracy, and politics. Although some of their arguments mirror those offered by the
Anti-progressives of earlier chapters, they offer more regional views and illustrate
responses to progressive reforms which were persistent in states and localities across the
country.
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Emanuel Philipp
On the surface, pulling an Anti-progressive out of Wisconsin during the era of La
Follette seems unlikely, and Emanuel Philipp is in many ways oddly east in this role. He
was a native of Wisconsin, came from Swiss immigrant parents, was dedicated to public
education, was an ardent supporter of La Follette’s candidacy in 1900 and, while Philipp
was governor, no major progressive measure was repealed. But like many of the more
local and state oriented Anti-progressives he lived and participated in an environment that
was not always ideologically consistent or definable by a single label. Even given his
background summarized above, he was also a very successful businessman, a skilled
political organizer, and the manager and owner of one of the most successful refrigerated
transit companies in the country. 1 He is in these ways like many of the Anti-progressives.
He has a diversity of interests and, like many practicing politicians, sees a complicated
world in a diverse way. While Governor, Philipp faced a tumultuous social and political
climate both in the tensions within the factionalized Republican party and in dealing with
the social and political realities of belonging to a state with a large German and European
immigrant population in a country contemplating and then entering World War I. Even
in this setting, his governorship is widely held to have been one of distinguished service
which conducted comprehensive assessments of state agencies that often resulted in
increased resources, provided state aid for the improvement of rural schools, established
the state accounting system and both the State Conservation Commission and the State
Department of Agriculture." Although he aggressively opposed United States entry into
“Emanuel Lorenz Philipp," Dictionary ofAmerican Biography Base Set. American Council of
Learned Societies, 1928-1936.
“ Dictionary of Wisconsin History
,
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World War I, he by all accounts robustly supported the war once the decision to enter had
been made. As a supporter of the war he actively organized and equipped the Wisconsm
National Guard and activated the State Council of Defense and the State Food
Administration. According to biographies, he was active in assuaging concerns and war
hystena of the time and his final reelection was largely attributed to his ability to both
support the war and defend personal liberties. 3 With the war over, Philipp instituted a
system of generous educational bonuses and agricultural land purchasing subsidies for
veterans.
4
Before stepping down at the end of his term in 1921, he also founded the
Wisconsm General Hospital and, at the University of Wisconsin, he established a four-
year medical course.
Philipp’s entry into practicing politics and defining some of his Anti-progressive
ideas begins in the late 1890’s when he emerged as a supporter of La Follette and as an
organizer ot a Republican faction of supporters of his ticket. He did not grow up in an
explicitly political environment. He went to public schools and then straight into
teaching followed by a quick ascension through various business ventures starting out as
a train dispatcher, moving eventually into the lumber industry in Mississippi (where he
founded a town called Philipp), and then back into the rail industry in Wisconsin. We can
certainly assume that his skills at negotiation and networking were developed during his
years as a businessman but his explicit political skills and interest in the operations of
politics and government come from his participation in parties and the heightened interest
in the La Follette ticket that emerged for the election of 1900. Being trained through
3
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party activities, of course, was not unusual for the time and, indeed, one obvious stde
effect of the decline of active and meaningful parties has been the lack of systematic
political education available to a broad spectrum of people.
I. is no wonder then, that Philipp’s main contribution to the Antt-progressives was
his adamant belief in strong parties that develop platforms, organize, and select their own
candidates through debates and votes of identifiable members. His principle explication
of his pro-party beliefs comes in the form of a book that he writes ten years into his
political journey bu, five years before betng elected governor - Political Reform i„
Wisconsin. On the face, it sounds like a volume designed to justify the progressive
reforms ol the time but it actually deals with several subjects such as taxation, the
primary party system, and the regulation of the rail system." His chapter, “Consequences
ot the Direct Primary" takes on a key reform of the Wisconsin Progressive agenda and its
attempt to weaken political parties through the selection of party candidates at the ballot
box. For Philipp, undermining the role of parties was tantamount to destroying a central
component of successful republics and of the American system of representative
government
.
6
At its heart, Philipp’s argument is for a system of responsible parties. He sees
paities and their explicitly political activity as central to the organizing of political
interests, refining ot party strategy and platforms, and the selection of candidates to
represent the party interests in elections. In particular, Philipp saw the counterpart to
Emanuel L. Philipp, Political Reform in Wisconsin: A Historical Review ofthe Subjects of
Primary Election. Taxation, and Railway* Regulation. State Historical Society of Wisconsin- Madison
Wisconsin, 1973.
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parties, politics and elections by individuals, as a tremendous threat to the republican
form of government. As he claims, “Government by part.es and government of parties
by the members of the part.es themselves are essent.al to the perpetuity of our institutions.
Government by individuals, however able, inevitably spells despotism.”7 It is not just
that Parties provide a valuable component to a functioning democracy it is that
dimmished parties give rise to the politics of individuals and the demagogic propensities
that come with them. One senses that Philipp is reflecting on lessons learned from his
one time support of La Follette and the subsequent split that resulted in a d.vided and
weakened Republican party in the first few years of the twentieth century. La Follette
had used the party convention system and his political organization to engineer an upset
in the Republican convention to win the nomination and eventually the office of governor
in 1900. Yet as governor, he immediately targeted parties with direct primary legislation
and thereby undermined the political operation, culture, and organization that Philipp and
others had become a part ot and had used to help elect La Follette. Certainly there were
many other issues that contributed to the split of the Republican Party between the
Piogress.ves led by La Follette and the stalwart party members but without a doubt his
continuing role as individual leader left a bad memory to which Philipp responds. In his
mind, it was no longer a party but a movement of an individual and this was problematic
tor an Anti-progressive like Philipp.
The main thrust of Philipp’s argument for a responsible party system was that
parties protected individual rights by contributing to the overall republican system that
was committed to a system of checks and balances. For Philipp, it was an addendum to
7
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the formal constitutional system of checks and balances. As Philipp explains: "Party
responsibility on the one hand and a wise distribution of powers between the co-ordinate
branches of the government on the other are the means by which the necessary checks
and balances are prov.ded for the protection of our rights and as a guaranty of our
liberties.” 8 At the party level, liberty is protected through the primacy placed on
institutions and its ability to resist individual corruption of a political body. In Philipp’s
mind institutions are difficult to corrupt, provide many points for the inclusion and
consideration of a diversity of opinion and, in a Madisonian way, provides moderate
outcomes that limit the threat to individual liberty. Institutions are the best protector
against corruption, for Philipp, because "the easiest way to use money in politics is to
place the individual officeholder under direct obligation to the contributor.” And in
Philipp s mind the progressive direct primary does just that by providing "an ideal
opportunity for the use of money in this way.”9
To prove this point, Philipp offers an analysis of the use of money in campaigns
before and after the implementation of the direct primary law. In this analysis Philipp
shows the dramatic increase of expenditures for campaigns centered on individuals
versus campaigns centered on parties. In almost every case where a competitive election
was held, there is a dramatic use of funds in candidate-centered campaigns. Additionally,
the high individual cost ot running a campaign, without a party organization, means that
machines centered on individual candidacies still arise in order to organize and raise
funds and therefore the progressive claim of instituting direct primaries to eliminate
8
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machines falls flat. Machines still exist under the direct primary only now they are run
by individuals with no party control and the function of money is a premium in that
influence cannot be established through the process of party loyalty and dedication to
platform principles. As Philipp concludes, “the overthrow of parties through the
ascendancy of the individual destroys party responsibility” and thereby removes a key
check to individual liberty. 10
Destruction of the party as an institution also leads to other problems that
concerned Philipp. His long list ot criticism reads like a precursor to the APSA’s 1950
report “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.” His criticisms focus primarily
on the institutional support and checks that the two-party system provides and, to a lesser
degree, how the direct primary provisions tail to meet their stated objective. As Philipp
argues, it has tailed singly to effect reforms promised and it has brought forth a brood of
political and social abuses of the most serious character.” 11 Altogether, it provides for a
solid critique ot one of the key progressive reforms and probably the one that did the
most to further the progressive agenda. Philipp’s main concern with elections, and the
preservation ot parties, is that republican institutions be supported and sustained. Parties
add to their support by adding levels of control on individual power and by providing
ways tor groups of people to organize and express their interest and develop leaders
grown from the ranks of the party. The shift away from parties, according to Philipp,
does not result in better government and a more moral politics as the progressives claim
but rather contributes to the creation of a politics of personality. Attacking the
10
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progressive claims, Philipp concludes, “The personnel of the officeholding class has no,
been improved, better, more capable, and cleaner men have no, been elected to office;
public officers are no, more devoted to their duties .... Public morals are not elevated
by the change in the method of making nominations.
. . . It has
. . . built up personal
political machines .” 12
In his critique of the rise of individual centered elections he points to both the
sharp increase in money spent on elections and the rise in negativity as evidence of the
negative effect of the direct primary reforms. The need for individuals to raise money
personally is particularly disturbing to him. For individuals who do not have personal
wealth, Philipp feels, cannot possibly contend for office unless they chose to face
personal financial ruin or take money from self-interested individuals and groups. By
accepting “financial aid they assume obligations no public servant should incur.” 13
Additionally, men of “moderate means” cannot possibly unseat incumbents under the
system of direct primaries because of the personal relationships and obligations that
incumbents develop. They have networks of friends to turn to for support and can. due
his personal identification with that office, directly “appeal to the entire electorate .” 14
This rise ot the individual under the direct primary undermines parties and community
groups in other ways as well. Pointing to an issue that still receives attention, Philipp
blames the direct primary and subsequent rise of the perusal campaign on the rise of “a
new industry in this state during primary campaigns - the circulation of the petitions for
Ibid., 89.
Ibid., 90.
Ibid., 9 1
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hire. 1 he party clubs of former
mercenaries who secure names
years have disappeared; in their places have appeared the
on petitions for a consideration. This is an exchange of
patriotism for pelf.” 15
The impact on weakened parties at the electoral and legislative level is also noted
by Philipp. In particular, he points to the fact that responsibility for actions and policy
agendas is minimized under the direct primary system. Without parties, “members of the
state legislature are split up into factions and there is no party responsibility for their acts,
which has resulted in an endless amount of useless and some harmful legislation.-’ 16
Philipp sees individuals as unable to resist the pull of a diversity of interests and within a
large legislative institution, anonymous to the point where they can avoid direct blame for
failed legislation and failure to deliver on campaign promises. It essentially leads to a
more fluid and inconsistent form of politics that changes priorities constantly and distorts
political action among individuals. The simple “bitterness" of each primary battle causes
a new alignment ot personal political machines” and a new set of promises and
failures.
17
It is a system where parties lose control over selecting their candidates and
battles are fought between individuals undermining the collective good that parties
provide. Parties are no longer parties - they do not represent the will of the legitimate
members ol the group. They may be active in the nomination process but, under the
direct primary, they are marginalized out of their core function. As Philipp sees it. “the
members ot the minority party invariably vote in the primaries of the majority party.
15
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Republican candidates with personal machines make trades with Democrats and
Socialists for votes in Republican primaries. Democratic leaders are hopeless, for they
do not have even the consolation of being at the head of party that stands for democratic
principles, a respectable minority party.” 18 Even the most basic electoral party function
is undermined by this system - the ability to select candidates for the primary ballots.
Under the primary election laws anyone can qualify for any particular party ballot
provided that they garner enough qualifying signatures. Philipp sees the problems of
taking control of who a party nominates out of the hands of those faithful to the party:
rhe electors can not vote directly for the men of their choice' at a primary
election. They must vote for some man whose name appears on the primary
ticket, and that ticket is made up of candidates who have circulated nomination
papers or caused nomination papers to be circulated. They may all be
officeseekers and objectionable to 90 per cent of the voters, but the voter must
submit to make his choice from the self nominated primary candidates. 19
I he result is that “nominations at the primaries no longer represent the will of the
members of the parties making the nominations.”20
Perhaps because of his experience of learning and growing within the political
party, Philipp seems to think that the loss of the party is most obvious in its diminished or
non-existent role as a an agent of political socialization - as a conduit for individuals to
gather, discuss, learn, and debate about issues of the day. He sees the direct primary as
an assault on a necessary social institution that provides the milieu in which issues can be
vetted and compromises can be made within a difficult set of republican institutions.
Parties, as Philipp had experienced first hand, provided a way for interests and issues to
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
Ibid., 90.
156
be ironed out and for individuals to learn about politics and its process. It was an
institution that bred and developed leaders that were loyal to party ideals and had been
educated in the art of politics and negotiation through interaction within the party. As
Philipp laments, “[t]he conventions were the schools of politics to which many young
men went for their education and they had an educative value. All the advantages of this
tree intercourse and the exchange of ideas and information disappeared with the abolition
°f the convention .” 21 The direct primary also eliminated the ability of members of a
party from across a state to meet, better understand the issues affecting each others
regions, and work out differences that existed. Philipp describes it in a rather simplistic
but compelling way: “The abolition of all conventions, county, district and state, has
deprived the voters of parties of the opportunity to get together, rub elbows and become
acquainted. In conventions men from different sections of the state met and exchanged
views. They explained the merits and abilities of the several candidates for office and
they made trades’ to the advantage of the party ticket in most cases.” It was a type of
citizenship school that pulled individuals out of their parochial settings and forced them
to appreciate differences across the board. The result for party participants was that they
learned their role as citizen and gained an education hard to find elsewhere:
Young men who became members of these clubs and who attended party
conventions as delegates, having won the confidence of their neighbors, were in
this way given a liberal education in the principles of government. They gained
experience, a knowledge of men, and a familiarity with public affairs that can be
attained only by meeting and mixing with other men who are equally interested
and patriotic. Their minds were broadened, their acquaintance multiplied, and
their ability to become useful citizens increased by their political activities
.
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Loyalty to party platforms is also jeopardized, according to Philipp, with the
introduction of the direct primary. They are no longer necessary in a system that relies
on individuals and their ability to organ,ze, make promises, and then leg, slate as
individuals. As Philipp sees it, the platform shifts from being a refection of the professed
deals of a party and its members to a "catch vote” process designed to bring in as many
voters as possible
.
23
Under this model individual legislators or governors need not
demonstrate responsibility to the execution (and subsequent success or failure) of the
party platform. They can simply use those policies that further their agenda and ignore
the rest - there is essentially no connection to party principles. Philipp argues that they
"go out into the Held with platforms of their own, in many cases carefully prepared,
printed and distributed ."24 It is yet more evidence in Philipp's mind of the complete shift
ot politics from that of community to that of individual passions and rhetoric.
Philipp s call for the repeal of the direct primary and his thoughtful arguments
against it identifies him as an Anti-progressive. While Anti-progressivism was not the
dominate part ot Ins political thought, he did offer a stern and convincing criticism of the
Progressive reforms that is still relevant to current discussions of the role of parties in
American democracy. Considering his place as a prominent businessman and prominent
political activist, Ins opposition to these reforms provides an example of the authentic
place Anti-progressive thought carried. Philipp's rejection of the direct primary was not
the only voice on the subject. Although some other examples will be detailed in this
chapter there were also dozens of court cases brought to challenge the constitutionality of
23
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direct primary laws, many editorials and speeches were given lamenting the destructive
effects of the direct primary, and real political battles in localities and in state legislatures
occurred during the Progressive juggernaut. Perhaps most telling about Philipp's
criticism was the fact that many of his concerns still echo true today. The cos, of direct
pnmar.es, the lack of political education among the broader population, the absence of
responsible parties for most of the twentieth century, and inability of individual
candidates to resist questionable and corrupting influences can clearly be traced back to
the effects of this key progressive reform.
Elihu Root
Elihu Root was a more prominent national figure than others discussed in this
chapter, but unlike Taft and Butler his role was mainly outside of purely partisan politics
and more centered in the legal profession and as an administrator or “statesman.” To be
sure, he was a political figure, but his career was not one driven primarily by party
centered agendas. He was tapped to serve by four presidents in various roles including
Secretary of War, under William McKinley, Secretary of State, under Theodore
Roosevelt, Ambassador and supporter of the League of Nations, for Woodrow Wilson,
and as a delegate to the International Conference on the Limitation of Armaments for
Warren Harding. Even as a Republican Senator from New York he served in more of a
bipartisan role and, by choice, served only one term. Where others politicked, he chaired
the Constitutional Convention for New York; and where others were heavily engaged in
the fieice elections of the Progressive Era, he was an active lawyer, extraordinary
legislator, and tireless advocate for the increased role of international negotiation and
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peace. His tenure as Secretary of State reveals tremendous progress through intricate
processes of arbitration resulting in international agreements with dozens of different
countries around the globe. Once out of office. Root continued to engage in issues of
international peace and diplomacy and served as the first President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace which had been started, in large part, by Nicholas
Murray Butler. In ,912 he was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize which was given
lor Ins prolific work in negotiating agreements on well over forty disputes between
countries around the world and for his work to establish international courts of justice to
settle disputes dealing with a wide variety of issues. 25
In most accounts oi Root, he is described as a dedicated, hard-working, analytical,
and brilliant person with exceptional intellectual skills. His treatment of the progressive
reforms of the time and his analysis of the American Republic and its institutions reveals
this thoroughness and broad knowledge of the founding and the constitution. Although
the bulk ot Ins writings deal with issues of international diplomacy, Root left a clear
record in essays and speeches as to his feelings about the importance of representative
government, civic institutions and the problems that he perceived in the Progressive
agenda. Specifically, Root’s interpretation of Progressive reforms and his views on the
nature ot government in the United States stem from his own dedication and belief in
personal responsibility and civic duty. Root believed that civilized societies were
maintained through the rule ot law. At the heart of this was his belief in the individual
responsibility to maintain a healthy respect for the law and in the institutions created for
Elihu Root," in Encyclopedia of World Biography
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the sole purpose of providing a just and stable government. For Root it was essential that
citizens honor the Constitution and the basis for government from which i, came because
d was "reverence for that great instrument, the belief of mankind in its perpetuity, the
unwillingness of our people to tamper with i, or to change it, the sentiments that are
gathered around it - these, constituting the basis of stability in our Government, are the
most valuable of all the possessions of the nation that inhabits this rich and fertile land .”26
But unlike many of the other Anti-progressives detailed in earlier chapters. Roofs
criticism of the Progressives was not solely based in a defense of the current
constitutional order and the inherent soundness of the American republic. Rather it was
based on a view of civic life that required individual responsibility and integrity. Civic
institutions, the Constitution, or the law are not to blame for the evils of society. For
Root, institutions are only as good as individuals make them. Failure in government and
civic society stems from lack of integrity and attention that individuals pay to civic life,
and not to institutional systems that are designed to provide a sound and stable
framework for government.
Root does not disagree with the critique of politics that the Progressives provide.
He recognizes corruption in government, undue control of party bosses in what he calls
“invisible government,” and is concerned about the types of Senators that state
legislatures are selecting. But he wholeheartedly rejects the progressive answers to
virtually all these problems. Like many other Anti-progressives, Root sees the current
representative government as the necessary evolution of civil society and “the greatest
FJihu Root, “The Direct Election of United States Senators, Address in the Senate of the United
State, February 10, 191 1,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, edited and complied by Robert
Bacon and James Brown Scott (1916; reprint, Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 261.
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g.ft Of our race to the development of freedom."27 Like many others, he argues for the
soundness of the American Constitutional republic because it safeguards the citizens
from themselves - it moves to a higher order of civil life by rejecting mob rule, gaining
all the benefits that stem from sound, reasoned, and deliberate representation. But
regardless of the system of government employed, good government in the end requires
people acting and participating in a virtuous and responsible manner. As he argues on the
Senate floor against the seventeenth amendment, “there is but one safety for a popular
government. No matter what constitutions you have or what statutes you enact, sooner or
later you come to the polls; and if you do not have virtue and public spirit there, your
government goes down."2 * This quote, and his overall interpretation of the Constitution,
rings of Madison’s argument in Federalist 51 that “a dependence on the people is. no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions." Root would completely concur with Madison in this
regard and sees the need for both a strong representative system that can deal with the
problems of direct democracy and personal responsibility in delivering good government.
With this fundamental understanding. Root sees Progressive reforms as
weakening representative institutions and therefore exacerbating the problems of the day.
His solution is to keep these institutions strong or make them even stronger. To view the
civic problems ot the day as stemming from representative institutions is wrong,
according to Root, because representative institutions are primarily dictated by the
Elihu Root, “The New York Constitution and Representative Government: Address Before the
Economic Club of New York, October 25, 1915,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, edited and
complied by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (1916; reprint, Freeport, New York’ Books for Libraries
Press, 1969), 228.
Root, “Direct Election of United States Senators,” 271-72.
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ac«,ons of individual If individuals do no, choose good leaders, do no, hold candidates
and represen,a,,ves responsible, do no, vote with civic in.eres, a, ,he hallo, box. ,hen
ins, i,„,ions wil! fad. For Roo, ,he Progressive reforms are based on faulty logic. He
argues repeatedly that if individuals have failed in their responsibilities there is no logic
m calling for a more democratic system that relies even more on and has higher
expectations of the people. “If [the people] will do their duty.” argues Root, “the
Constitution needs no amendment. If they do no, do their duty, you can amend the
Constitution a thousand times without any utility .”29 Mocking the resolution calling for
the diiect election of Senators, Root lashes out:
If the framers of the resolution had made it read so that it would express the trueprinciple on which they base it, they would have made it read like this- Whereasthe peop'e o the several states have proved incompetent to select honest and
Jnh^ H eff TS m ^ °Wn Stat£S: Resolved ' That the Constitution of theUnited States be so amended as to relieve the people from the consequences of
their incompetency by taking from the state legislatures the power to choose
hands
03
^
°* ^ ^ VGSting that P°Wer in the Same incomPetent
It is the call for reforms such as the initiative, referendum, recall, and direct
election of senators that reveals the inherent weakness in direct democracy, according to
Root. The Constitution is designed to protect individual liberty and civil society through
the explicit use of representative institutions so, for Root, the call for directly democratic
arrangements is counterintuitive and destructive. These reforms are, for Root, “an
expression of that weakness of democracies which it is the function of the Constitution to
Ibid., 272.
Ibid., 267.
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guard democrac.es themselves against .” 31 It is the natural pull of more directly
democratic forms that the Constitution is designed to fight against and by undermining
republican institutions you undermine the primary defense the Constitution provides. For
him, ‘'popular will cannot execute itself directly except through a mob.” therefore
institutions, which guide and direct individual action in constructive ways, are key to
stable and c.vilized societies
.
32
The solution that is being offered by Progress.ves both
defies the logic of the problems and undermines the actual method meant to avoid the
problem in the first place.
In addition to constitutional arrangements, Root also sees the importance of
political parties to the health of the American republic. They are a necessary
development in the “course of evolution in popular government” that both calls forth
issues of common importance but also puts a check on individual self-aggrandizement
.
33
In many of his writings and speeches, Root alludes to the evolution or development of
political institutions and civil society. Parties, as an extra-constitutional outgrowth, are
an example of this evolution and the progressive push to undermine this development is
counterintuitive in his mind. He explains this as an evolution from.
the formation of an indefinite number of individuals into parties with the idea of
putting men into office, to the formation of an indefinite number of parties
grouped especially with regard to advancing special interests and ideas, and
thence to the formation of two great parties representing fundamental differences
in the general principles and policies of government. The development is from
31
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Filihu Root, Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the Constitutions,” in Addresses
on Government and Citizenship, edited and complied by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (1916;
reprint, Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 83.
Elihu Root, “The Citizen’s Part in Government,” in Addresses on Government and Citizenship,
edited and complied by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (1916; reprint, Freeport, New York: Books
for Libraries Press, 1969), 47.
164
3S
d Se ' f,Sh m
°:
iVeS 40 ,he
personal aggrandizem^ am by noC/ansZ^X^*** “d deS 're f°r
a constant tendency in
I»,iticalUe,rn^ t^^r ,here is
Tltey are the natural outgrowth of a properly evolving form of popular government and
evidence of the virtue of a more complex form of representative republics. Root is
eons,sternly emphatic as to their importance, even if they might need reform, and to their
necesstty. For him “they are not merely the best and most practical way in which the
operations of popular government can be carried on, but they furmsh the only way to
carry on those operations so far as we can judge from the experience of the world up to
this time. In no large country has any real popular government ever existed for any
considerable time without them.”3 ’ Parties are the setting in which “the great work of
popular government is done,” for Root. It is where politics occurs, where opinions are
expressed, where priorities are argued over, where leaders develop and are chosen, and
where, from little villages to large states, struggles percolate up to a state and national
legislative process that eventually results in legislation, budgets, and executive action
.
36
But, like formal governmental institutions, they can only prosper and fulfill their
appropriate role it individuals take responsibility for their well being. Root sees the
control of parties by boss-centered machines as problematic, much like the progressives,
but does not see parties as evil but rather as important and necessary organizations in
advanced societies. The Progressive solution to corruption and failure in institutions is to
move away from institutions, for Root the solution is reinvigorate, reform, and reestablish
Ibid., 47-8
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.he importance of institutions. If bosses are undermining the nnportan, ro!e that part.es
Play in the political system then we should remove bosses and prevent them from
derailing the process. As he claims, “the duty is to enter into the work of party activity
and help make the party organization what it ought to be.”” To simply do away with
parties because of the "pernicious" nature of machines is simply the wrong approach. "It
is,” argues Root, "mere folly to say that the existenee of such an evil furnishes a reason
why educated, self-respecting Americans should not take par, in the work of the political
parties with which they vote. On the contrary, the existence of the evil presents a
manifest and urgent duty to the conscience and patriotism of every competent
American.” 38 By taking back parties and returning them to their central role as
organizers and promoters of policy agendas, and principles. Root argues that they can
continue to function as relevant, important institutions that help minimize the natural
inclination toward self-ends and promote the common good . 35 Simply reverting to a
lower stage of political evolution defies logic and threatens the progress and greatness of
the American Republic.
But unlike some of the other Anti-progressives who argue for the institutions of
parties from the angle of their important role or from a disagreement with the
Progressives over the extent of the problem. Root agrees with the Progressives and sees
the problem as “pernicious and discreditable to American citizenship” but sees the
37
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manage
and control institutions.
cnange ot control, provided he is willing to take the
™ l0t contribute materially to a
pains and give the time andeffort necessary to the creation and
the party
.
41
exercise of influence among the members of
Roofs criticism of the initiative and referendum stands on a similar belief in the
centrality of institutions and individual responsibility for the performance of institutions.
displays the ultimate trust in individuals according to Root. By shifting toward direct
forms ot democracy. Root argues, we diminish the prestige of institutions, undermine the
inherent trust we place in individuals to manage these institutions, and falsely convince
ourselves that a change in the form of government will cure the lack of individual civic
duty and responsibility. Rather than electing good representatives and maintaining
institutional prestige, we attempt to limit the power of legislatures and executive branches
and undermine the real strengths offered by a representative republic. As reliance on
direct forms of democracy increase, representative institutions (the highest form of
government) must therefore decline: “if legislation is to be direct, if the laws of the state
or nation are to be made at the polls upon the initiative of any group of men who have
In tact, reliance on institutions, and on good, civic-minded individuals to run them
Ibid.
Ibid., 34.
167
ideas that they wish to propose, the dignity and the
must decline .”42
power or representative assemblies
Th,s decline results, in part, from the prestige and trust that is taken away from
representative institutions with Progressive reforms. By demonstrating mistrust m
representative institutions and in those who serve in them, qualified, civic-minded
individuals shy away from their “patriotic service." Reliance on directly democratic
mechanisms lessens the appeal, prestige, and force of necessary representative
institutions and. for Root, represents a regression and not a progression in the state of
civic affairs. Strengthening institutions, for Root, is “the most vital thing to be done in
the United Mates .'
1
The implementation of direct forms of democratic government “is
an expression of distrust for representative government.”44 Speaking on the floor of the
Senate regarding the direct election of Senators Root frames his concerns:
[the direct election of senators] is a part of the great movement which has beengoing on now in these recent years throughout the country, and in which ourpeople have been drifting away from their trust in representative government
These modern constitutions which are filled with specific provisions, limiting and
directing the legislature in every direction, furnishing such startling contrasts to
the simplicity of the Constitution of the United States, are an expression of
distrust in representative government. The “initiative” is an expression of distrust
in representative government. The "referendum” is an expression of distrust in
representative government. This resolution is an expression of the same
sentiment.
. . . the development of our country in its business and social and
political life makes it all the more necessary that we should depend upon
representative government.4 '
42
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The end result of such a trend, in Roofs mind, is tha, you “rob [institutions] of power, of
dignity, of consequence. Ultimately, quality of representation diminishes too and “you
will find the members of our state legislatures growing less and less competent, less and
less worthy of trust, and less and less efficient in the performance of their duties .” 46
The logic of the Progressive reform simply does not calculate for Root. The
response to weakness in government is not to make it weaker but to strengthen those
components that contribute to success and stability. “The true remedy for the evils that
we see,” Root argues, “is not to abandon our duty, but to perform it.
. . . there is no
weaker course for men to take than to endeavor to make up for the failure to do their duty
by changing the form ol the duty. It is a proposition that the people who cannot elect
honest men from their own neighbors can elect honest men to the Senate .”47 It is as
though the Progressives, for Root, are abandoning a process that has been taking place for
hundreds ot years tor reasons that are temporary and fixable through the system that has
evolved to date. Root recognizes the failings of government in his day and is sympathetic
to the need to change. But, like many other Anti-progressives, he sees the Progressive’s
abandonment of representative institutions as a failing proposition and a threat to
individual liberty and progress. “Recognition of shortcomings or inconveniences in
government, argues Root, “is not by itself sufficient to warrant a change of system .”48 It
would be an abandonment of century-long principles to embrace a system of direct rule
4,1
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ha, resulted in nothing bu, failure in early Roman and Greek democracies. The United
State Constitution, and its system of
larger story:
representative government, for Root, is part of
the idea
**** and
,
bU"d UP a V*® under
Bill of Rights or the Dednon
find that our system of government which has been
~
through so many centuries, and the whole history of which is potentprov,s,ons of our Constitution, has done more preserve liberty, jusdce securi 1nd freedom of opportunity for many people for a long period and over a greatportion of the earth, than any other system of government ever devised by man. 49
Charles Hollingsworth
The next two Anti-progressives are minor historical figures of which there
appears to be little record of their lives, activities, and professions. They serve as strong
examples of a more localized response to Progressive calls for reform. The first of these
is Charles M. Hollingsworth for whom there is almost no readily available biographical
information except tor the handful of writings he published. Although his work probably
targeted broader, and perhaps even national, audiences, his Anti-progressive attacks were
aimed mainly at early reforms that originated in Oregon. Extensive research into his
background reveals only three publications- two of which were self-published (a book
and a short essay) and one article found in an academic journal. His book. From
Freedom to Despotism was self-published in Washington D.C. in 1911 and was given
little or no attention except tor a short one-line acknowledgment of its publication in The
Nation. His two other published pieces were both attacks on Progressive reform. The
first of these was a short, self-published pamphlet titled “The Oregon Plan: Is it a
Ibid., 88.
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Political Panacea?” that was printed in 1911. It is essentially an attack on the
Progressives that criticizes the famous Oregon Senator and Progressive Jonathan Bourne.
The second of these is an essay that was part of an edited volume published by the
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1912. The selection
of edited essays include those (hat offered positive views of the Progressive reforms,
some that were essentially numerical or historical analysis of the extent of the
Progressive impact, and then a couple, mcludmg Hollingsworth's, which were attacks on
the Progressive movement.
Hollingsworth's criticism of Progressivism differs from other Anti-progressives in
that his arguments are aimed at the effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed reforms.
That is, he takes on the Progressives directly and does not spend much time defending
constitutional arrangements and other issues regarding representative republics. He
essentially makes the argument that the reforms will not deliver what they promise and
that, in addition to failing to make good on their claims, they will be injurious to the
American state. In his more thorough examination of the Progressive agenda, published
in the Annals of the American Academy
,
Hollingsworth aims to show the failure of the
Progressive claim to “restore government to the people.” It is this type of approach and
attack that sets Hollingsworth apart from his Anti-progressive contemporaries.
One of Hollingsworth’s main arguments against the Progressive agenda deals
with issues of class and property rights. Unlike other writers, he is particularly concerned
with what he sees as the “radical-ness” of Progressive reform and its underlying agenda
to shift society away from governmental protection of individual property rights. It is not.
as he sees it, returning government to “the people” but is an attempt to shift power from
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one se, of peop.e to another and. in the process, control other classes and their rights of
property and free entetprise. As he writes, their reform program “is no, in the true and
broad sense democrat in its basis and objects, nor constitutional in its spirit, bu, is
distinctively a class movement, aiming at arbitrary control of other classes ."50
The argument is based on the assessment that while the progressive movement
might try to empower larger, more middle-class groups of people, i, will only do so a, the
cost of property owners and the wealthy. The reforms, claims Hollingsworth, are
“avowedly in the interest of the 'plain people,’ the ‘common people,’ the ‘masses’
.
”51
But they are simply a shift from one form of power (elites) to another form of power
centered on the control of the masses by a “demagogue.” It is a class battle, and one that
pits classes against each other, denies property rights to elites, and foments revolutionary
motivations. Hollingsworth sees it as a failure of the Progressive promise to deliver a
truly democratic and inclusive system. Since he sees it as an attack on property owning
elites and industrialists, it cannot possibly deliver on its claim to be inclusive and broad-
based. Indeed, "the ‘Progressive’ movement,” writes Hollingsworth, “is not in the
interest ot the whole people in the all-inclusive sense in which the term ‘people’ was
employed by the constitution s makers .”52 Where others might see flaws in the outcomes
ot proposed retorms, Hollingsworth sees a more purposeful movement with aims he finds
distasteful and destructive: "It is a class movement as distinguished from a broadly
democratic movement, and it aims to gain compete control of government in the interest
Charles M. Hollingsworth. “The So-Called Progressive Movement: Its real nature, causes and
significance.” The Armais ofthe American Academy, XLIl (September 1912): 33.
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Ibid., 35.
172
of a numerous, not wealthy, class which it terms the
-people,’ to the entire exclusion of
any determining or controlling voice on the part of the smaller class who are identified
wtth the large economtc interest of the country.”* More specifically, i, is an attempt to
ge economic tealities not just political power and organization. Writes
Hollingsworth, “fi]he endfinally aimed at in the movement is not political hut economic.
The attack is not upon political inequality and privilege - which do not exist - but upon
economic inequality and privilege.”54 In his criticism of the Oregon reform movement he
is even more direct as to their motivations, “we have here, no, the language ofpeaceful
and orderly reform, by persuasion and appeals to reason, hut the language ofstubborn.
uncompromising revolt It is not the patriotic national spirit of '76 hut the rebellious
sectional spirit of '60 to '65 .
”
55
Short ot being a simple defense of the rights of property owners and industrialists,
Hollingsworth is also concerned with the denigration of civil society through the division
ot classes and the rise of new rulers supported by the masses. He believes that
Progressives fail to deliver a more inclusive version of government and, rather than
replace machine bosses with truly representative leaders, the movement simply aims to
take control of government with "dictators” who are motivated by "the mob ” Although
Hollingsworth is not the first to implicate the Progressives with encouraging demagogues,
he is certainly the most emphatic on this point: “these willing individuals, the real
originators and promoters of the [progressive] movement, take care to declare that they
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is precisely the literal
are not bosses or dictators but only leaders of the ’people.’ But that t
meaning of the word demagogue .”56
For Hollingsworth, the primary failure of the Progressive reform agenda is its
inability to deliver on the promise to eliminate the boss system and provide a truly
democratic, bottom-up system of government. He certainly agrees that the Progressive
system is different but feels strongly that one “boss system” is simply being replaced by a
different kind. Instead of having a boss system in a political party, the Progressives are
simply offering a boss system of political opportunists who “lead” the people in their own,
self-serving way. It is a “mockery” according to Hollingsworth for reformers to
eliminate party delegated government and then immediately resort to delegating power to
the individual leader of the movement - the demagogue in his eyes
.
57 He once again
turns to the language of “revolution” when arguing this point. Turning over power from
a broader group, such as a party, to an individual leader, like Senator Bourne of Oregon
or LaFollette of Wisconsin, represents a real threat. It is a concentration of power and “it
is in its actual working out really the first step of a revolution to the most narrowly
restricted of all forms of government, namely, the arbitrary personal rule of a single
individual.” 58 By definition, the progressive movement, which is of the broader
electorate, must find its organizing power with an individual leader only loosely
connected to the broader concept of the “electorate.” It is in the words of Hollingsworth
a “personal, one-man government .”59
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Hollmgsworth argues that this shift from one form of bossism to another stems
from the faet that reform in the form of dlreet legislation and direet primaries does not
change the location of power and the type of power individuals possess. Whether
individuals are delegating power via a party convention and the ballot box to
representatives or delegating it to governmental authority more directly, they are still
delegating power. In either ease they are still simply voting to approve of those in power,
those who engage in the actual execution of government. “In fact,” argues Hollingsworth,
“the act of voting is in its very nature a delegation of power.” 60 In this view.
Hollingsworth is arguing that the ballot box is still the central form of political activity
and therefore the Progressives do not provide a new method of government, just a more
destructive one. He attacks these “so-called Progressive” reforms directly as failing to
accomplish their stated goals. If the proposed reforms of direct democracy are put into
effect, “no new power, no new mode of exercising political power or functions, is thereby
conferred upon the electorate.
. . . the one means which the electorate have of exercising
political power is by voting; and with all of these reform measures adopted that would
still remain their only means ot doing so .” 61 Essentially he is arguing that more voting
does not equal more power - just unsatisfactory execution of government. In particular
judicial and executive powers do not move under the progressive reforms and even the
ability to frame the laws stays with the legislature. Even the initiative, according to
Hollingsworth, is framed by the individual or group which offers up the proposed law as
a petition. Voters are simply left to adopt or reject the proposals and he concludes that “a
w
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vote of yes or no on the proposition presented is the whole extent of the powers of the
‘people ’.”62
In the end. Hollingsworth rejects the claims of the Progressives and laments the
potential for the broadly negative impact the reforms will have. Their reforms fail on the
promise of putting the government in the hands of the people and. worse, they will
actually put it in the hands of opportunists who are “pre-eminent as demagogues rather
than as statesmen.”" It is this threat, the control of a single leader bolstered by the
temporary whims of a democratic mob, that is of most concern to him. It is one thing for
the promises ot the reform to fail but the consequences of the impact of these reforms is
much more serious. Hollingsworth anticipates a society where a political majority, with
abundant access to the polls, eventually gives too much power to individuals that cannot
manage the demands of a country and must rely on the personal power and interests of an
individual demagogue. Additionally, the Progressive rejection of the democratic republic
designed by the founders and their attachment to systems that threaten property rights and
lepresentative government, defines them, in Hollingsworth’s eyes, as a radical element:
there is no clear line of separation between ‘progressivism’ and socialism; and none
between socialism and some of the forms or aims of anarchism.” It leaves an unstable
system where society, leadership, and government is constantly shifting:
Demagogues, in their strife for the votes of the “people,” will constantly be
impelled to shift and extend their grounds of attack on efficient and conservative
government, so as to win supporters from all orders of malcontents, even
including the most extreme, with correspondingly increasing peril to the existing
system .
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Bernard Freyd
Bernard Freyd is another example of local resistance to Progressive reforms. Like
Hollingsworth, there is scant evidence of Freyd's background. In terms of his Anti-
progressive writings, there is only one small book published in 1925. It appears that he
had some level of academic affiliation and was. perhaps, a professor or faculty member at
a university or college - most likely in the Seattle, Washington area. In addition to his
book criticizing the direct primary, he also completed the translation of a book of
political theory from the original German, The Development ofPolitical Theory by Otto
Von Gierke. There is some additional evidence that he participated on one or more
commissions or projects on the county level that were funded by the New Deal
administration. What is clear is that Freyd was involved in local public policy, had a
background in politics and social sciences, and was educated and steeped in issues
surrounding government and democracy.
His sole Anti-progressive publication is the small book. Repeal the Direct
Primary, which was published by a local, Seattle-based publishing company and was not
widely distributed. As indicated by the title, it deals directly with the institution of the
direct primary and its impact on politics and governance at both the state and national
levels. Freyd provides a thorough explication of his argument for how the direct primary
fails to deliver its promise and why, in the end, it should be fully rejected. His main point
is that direct primary laws violate the right of free assembly and the right of association.
Hie result ot this violation is that they undermine the principles that parties are designed
to protect, and they destroy any meaning as to party identification that even the
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proponents of direct primary sees as important. The reform thus damages the system of
party identification that it is essential even to a direct primary system.
What concerns Freyd most, however, is the fact that the direct primary system
attempts to legislate an organization that is formed through the private association of
individuals. The direct primary is a peculiar arrangement, Freyd asserts, and one that is
not viewed with favor by other democracies around the world. The very nature of direct
primaries is to control the political system of private gatherings, meetings, and caucuses.
Much like the limits on government to regulate churches or other community groups,
Freyd argues that the regulation of party association violates free assembly provisions
that, up to this point, have been guaranteed
.
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The direct primary, argues Freyd, “is flatly
contrary to the principle of liberty of association.” Freyd continues, “If we accept tile
principle of liberty of association, and are willing to abide by it, it is impossible to accept
any such scheme as the direct primary .”66
A key part of this argument is that the ability to associate freely with a group,
such as a party, undercuts the capacity to protect that name and the principles associated
with it. It deprives party organizations of maintaining the “meaning” of the party - its
reputation and its identifiable members. “On the one hand it may,” writes Freyd, “ and
often does, deprive party organizations of the possession of their legitimate names. On
the other hand it creates a greater or lesser degree of confusion in the minds of the voters
by making the same party name denote now one thing and next year perhaps something
quite opposite, according as the rough-and-tumble of factional squabbling may from time
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.0 time determine.”67 Without the ability to name, identify, and “market” an organization,
“it is almost impossible for party names to retain any definite meaning.”68
However much reformers want to rid the system of party bosses and industrial
influence, Freyd insists that the right of free assembly takes precedence, just as it does
with regard to religious and other community based organizations. Indeed, free
association actually provides additional options to deal with bosses by allowing for
groups to assemble new parties as a response to failings and corruption in current parties.
1 o undermine this constitutional provision is to undermine a fundamental right for the
purpose of a temporary end (the end of boss-centered machines). Ultimately, this not
only damages machine politics but all forms of politics- regardless of the orientation. As
Freyd argues:
In spite of all tirades against bossism, there is one thing which must be recognized
Reformers may, if they wish, organize a party to serve their own purposes. Any
other group has an equal right to organize a party, if it wishes, in order to supportw atever policies it may advocate. The so-called machine politicians, however
obnoxious they may seem in the eyes of Mr. La Follette, have an equal right to
assemble, to organize conventions, and to maintain their own party organizations,
free from any interference. When the law attempts to suppress bossism by
placing party affairs under its own control, it invades a field which lies beyond its
own jurisdiction. There are certain permanent landmarks which ought never to be
lost sight of in our legislation. Among these is the constitutional principle of
freedom of assemblage. 9
Without this ability to associate freely, which includes the ability to control membership
and maintain organizational identification, parties will cease to have any real meaning. If
parties cannot determine membership but, under the force of governmental regulation, are
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required to have open membership, then parties cannot control their platforms or their
activities and 'are deprived of the right to regulate their own principles. They must
submit to be invaded, and in many cases dominated, by hostile elements.”70 Ultimately,
“if PanieS haVe n° prindples which they can call their own, they have no function to
perform and no reason for existing. ’ 7
1
Freyd draws mother conclusion regarding the desirability and usefulness of the
d.rect primary based on his arguments detailed above. He poses the question: “Is the
party system desirable?” For Freyd, that is most basic question to be asked when
assessing any system, including the direct primary, that attempts to reform or alter the
system as a whole. The answer for Freyd completely undermines the logic or purpose of
the reform. As Freyd sees it, if the answer is "yes,” then the direct primary should be
repealed in that it undermines the ability of party organizations to function in any
meaningful way. As long as they are treated as organs of the state that must be open to
everyone, they lose all meaning, and "it need not be expected that any system of parties
can endure, or that politics will hold out any particular attractions as a career for men of
capacity.” 72 Under such a system they “can only be called parties by euphemism
where parties are content to remain mere creations of the law, they are reduced to a state
of impotence and almost chaos .” 73 If a robust party system that has meaning and self-
control is desirable, then clearly the direct primary is detrimental to its existence and
should not be allowed to continue.
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The alternate answer to the question of desirability of a party system reveals, for
Freyd, the failed logic of the direct primary. If the answer is “no,” that a party system is
not desirable, then the direct primary also fails to be a reasonable institution. As Freyd
sees it, the direct primary is a system that, in its stated purpose, is destgned to support and
extend the party in its role of selecting candidates for the general election. If the desire is
not to have a party system, then not only should there not be parties but there should not
be a direct primary either. It essentially “supports” the party by institutionalizing the
concept of party in the primary. As he concludes, “[i]f the party system is to be
abandoned, the direct primary must be abandoned, and all party distinctions must be
eliminated from the ballot .”74 In either case, whether it is or is not desirable to have a
party system, the direct primary does nothing to warrant its use. It is a clear flaw in the
logic ol direct primaries that undermines its continued use. “The dilemma is too plain to
be paltered with ” argues Freyd. “Either we want party government or we do not.
Whichever choice we make, the direct primary must go by the board .' 5 With a bit of
iiony he challenges the reformers, “[i]f there is any advocate of the direct primary who
finds himself able to escape from our first dilemma [that the direct primary destroys
parties], he will no doubt be quite as successful in dealing with the second .” 75
But ultimately, the direct primary, besides failing to stand on its own, is a legal
transgression that should ultimately be checked by the courts or by defenders of the
constitution. There is reason why other democracies, even ones who based their own
system on American principles, view the direct primary as a bewildering process that
74
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rnes to codify a process that is decidedly outside the realm of government regulation *
He sees the institution of direct primary laws as an “infringement of our constitutional
safeguards of freedom of assemblage .”77 The law itself essentially forces upon social
organizations what he calls the ‘reciprocal willingness to co-operate ” That is, groups are
forced to cooperate with others, regardless of their desire to do so, and this clearly
violates the basic principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. For law to venture
into this arena is questionable and counterintuitive to the system we subscribe to. As he
concludes:
[A]ny organization, whatever its sphere of activity may be, should preserve the
right to regulate its own procedure and to determine who shall be its own
members. It is beyond the power of the law to create this “reciprocal willingness
o co-operate. It is equally beyond the power of the law to provide any substitute
tor it. There is no substitute
.
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With such a law as the direct primary the result is that obligation of membership and
responsibility for the organization disappears. Freedom to associate (in a party or
otherwise), Freyd argues, does not imply that one has the freedom to reject or ignore the
rules and principles of the association. It does allow for the freedom to dis-associate
from any particular assembly - that is to say, individuals who do not believe in the rules
and principles of an organization can ultimately leave (or be barred from membership).
But in Freyd s mind freedom does not extend to the freedom to destroy from within. The
lesult ot such a force of law is that “when a political party is compelled to throw itself
open to those who refuse to support its objects, membership in it becomes, like the
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pos.t.on taken by La Follette and his associates in the Republican party, 'membership
w.thout obligation.’ The party itself tends to become 'meaningless and self-stultified.”’™
Freyd’s solutton is that part.es should be taken on, of the legal mechanism that
•hey have been in by legislative acts and returned to freely associating private
organizations. Reforms might be necessary to correct ''bossism” within parties but this
does no. justify undermining the entire system and the legal rights of individuals. "We
must, argues Freyd, "as the theologian would say 'disestablish’ our parties. We must
restore them, as the economist would say, to private enterprise.”80 Freeing parties and
returning their ability to maintain their principles is a necessary step even with some of
the "ugliness" that comes with a system who’s primary aim is political. But "[w]hen it
comes to a choice between bosses’ and demagogues, it is not difficult to see in whose
hands the interests of civilization are safer. An excess of mob-rule is more dangerous
than the obstructions of conservatism .” 81
Victor Berger
Critics of the direct democracy reforms of the Progressives spanned the
ideological continuum from conservatives on the right, like Nicholas Murray Butler, to
socialists on the left, like our next subject Victor Berger. Berger may have had less in
common with many of the other Anti-progressives, as he agreed and disagreed with Anti-
progressive claims, just as he did with those of the Progressives.
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Berger is one of the most identifiable politicians and writers of the American
Socialists movement. Unlike the famous Socialist Eugene Debs, who focused more on
issues of economics and capitalism and eschewed the value of democratic politics. Berger
was more engaged in the direct political activity of the day and believed strongly i„ the
value of the American system and the ability to influence change through the ballot box.
In fact, his active participation in office and his willingness to compromise and work with
political and economic opponents often set Berger at odds with Debs. Where Debs is the
most recognizable Socialist, Berger was politically the most successful Socialist, serving
multiple terms in Congress as well as successfully leading the Socialist capture and
control of Milwaukee city government for the first half of the twentieth century. A
German immigrant and a successful newspaper publisher, Berger believed strongly both
in politics and in the importance of the ballot box. He saw himself as a “constructivist”
who believed in the value of building party structure and securing power and influence
through the slow process of elections and negotiation. Where he called himself a
constructivist he saw more radical socialist approaches as “impossibilists .”82 Where
his more famous contemporary, Eugene Debs, saw an economic system that could not be
tolerated, Berger saw one that could be coaxed and reformed.
In general, the central criticism the Socialists level at Progressive reform has to do
with their attacks on political parties. This is particularly the case with Victor Berger
who saw the political party as a key organizing institution to lead change and reform in
the current political system. It is easy to understand why Berger would support the free
association ascribed to parties as he was a founder and leader of a movement based on
82
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parties and political organization. He viewed i, as a way for men of common interest to
organize themselves and ehange the current system. Sounding a bit like some of his
conservative contemporaries. Berger claims that “a democracy
. .
. „r a republic
... is
impossible without political parties .”83 Berger sees them as a natural outgrowth of the
social human condition “whether they call it a party or not.”83 Cttizens are inclined to
organize around issues that are of common concern to them and in democratic and
representative systems parties and social organization must exist and function well if
issues are to be expressed, evaluated, and supported. “As long as we have democracy.”
argues Berger, "and particularly, representative democracy, parties will be absolutely
necessary for its expression. There will be either anarchy and crude factionalism or
organized political parties .”85
Berger is particularly concerned with the Progressive push to eliminate parties on
the local level. Considering his success in organizing and managing the political machine
in Milwaukee, it may not be surprising that he makes this his main concern. As part of
his attack on this local reform Berger questions the logic of local Progressives who
identify local parties as evil yet do not call for the elimination of parties at the state and
national level. As he argues, “if parties are such an evil in local elections, why are they
not an evil in state elections? A state election is a local election on a larger scale. And
why not also banish parties from national tickets? A national election is a state election
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on a larger scale.'"
1
" To extend the problems of corruption from the nt
elections does not make
ational level to local
sense to Berger. Again, like many other Anti-progressives.
Berger finds fault in the Progressive conclusion that party systems themselves are to
blame for corruption. It is no. the system or institution that fa, Is political organizations
but rather the people who make up these organizations. To go one step further and blame
local corruption on state or federal corruption is simply an excuse in Berger's eyes to
ignore the real problem. What he sees happening is “the average bourgeois ideologist,
who is looking for some explanation of the political rottenness, and would under no
circumstances charge it to 'business men in politics’ and to legal graft. Such an opinion
might interfere with the respect for himself, his best friends, and for capitalism in
general .”87
This misplaced blame that Berger points out is similar to previous Anti-
progressives but takes its own flavor in the mind of a Socialist. Where Root would
simply say that people need to do their civic duty and fix the problems of an important
and necessary institution, Berger argues that there are underlying problems that have
nothing to do with the institution but rather with the overwhelming control of the
economic and political system by the capitalist. As he describes:
[those] who are trying to smash parties because they are corrupting political life,
are acting in exactly the same way as the workmen of old, who wanted to smash
the machines because hey thought that the machines were responsible for their
poverty. However, it is not the machine that keeps the workmen poor, but it is the
capitalist ownership of the machine.
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Additionally, Berger adds his own flair to understanding the role of parties and their
connection to economic realities. Where other Anti-progressives see parties as essential
to the workings ol the republic and the expression of political preferences, Berger sees
parties as essential because “in the end [they] are simply the political expression of
econotnic interests.” The result of this view is that it is “only natural that class interest
must sooner or later prevail in all parties. And any effort to suppress this is stupid.
reactionary and absolutely undemocratic .’’89 For Berger, the result of stifling the natural
inclination to organize into political parties is that opinions and interest will find other
ways to express themselves whether through “the bomb, the dagger, the pistol and finally
through bloody revolution .”90
Berger also makes many of the traditional arguments against non-partisan
elections much like other Anti-progressives. Issues of responsibility to the electorate,
elections centered on personality, the influence of personal wealth, and the rise of
corporate influence on politics are all of concern to Berger. He perhaps sums up his
views on these issues best by concluding that if non-partisan city elections are
implemented “it will eliminate all principles and ideas from municipal elections and
concentrate all attention upon the office seekers .”91 There are very few things on which
that Nicholas Murray Butler, William Howard Taft, and Victor Berger would agree but
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undoubtedly this statement is one of them. Berger goes on to predict that the elimination
of parties wouid be the “Eldorado for boodler, grafters and crooks.” and “would
infinitely increase the chances for corruption. The corporations and grafters would have
eal with individuals only, instead ot dealing with organizations.”92 Additionally he
points to what will be the new premium placed on private wealth to achieve political
success. It is the candidate with the most money that will be able to spend it as a “so -
called 'good fellow,’ who knows how to spend it in the saloons to the best advantage, or
who has friends who can do the trick for him.
... Or the men who can afford to advertise
the most, or those backed up by the biggest newspapers, would have the best chances to
win out. He also points out, in a way that is particularly poignant today, that
individuals who belong to other non-political organizations will also have an advantage
including the candidate “who belongs to many secret societies or to many church
societies, where they distribute ballots, after the church service on the Sunday before
election. The end result in all of this, for Berger, is that “nobody would be responsible
to the people. We should have absolute political anarchy.”95
Conclusion
Together, these series ot more local or limited Anti-progressives provides clear
evidence as to the breadth and extent of resistance to Progressive political reforms. As
w ith any collection ot critics, there are differences of opinion and emphasis, and the Anti-
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progressives are no exception. The group of individual discussed in this chapter focused
on a broad range of issues and often were concerned only with local politics. Ye, they
prov.de clear and consistent arguments and po.nts of resistance to the Progressive reform
which so successfully transformed political ins,nations at all levels of government.
Coupled with the more well-known figures of earlier chapters, we can see arguments and
battles being expressed in a variety of places and at every level of government. In
revealing this, we see that the Progressive wave that changed the workings of politics for
the 20"’ century and beyond did no, evolve without dissent from Anti-progressives
.ha,
disagreed with many of the direct democracy changes proposed. This can be particularly
insightful when the criticisms of the Anti-progressives so clearly become reality in the
politics of today in such a clear way. From the role of private money to candidate-
centered elections, the Anti-progressives had a keen eye on why these republican systems
worked and how proposed changes would significantly and permanently change the
political development of the American republic.
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CONCLUSION
The direct-democracy reforms of the Progressives - the feet primary, recall, and
direct legislation (the initiative and referendum) - came to define the idea of
“democracy" in twentieth-century America. They have, the political sociologist Arthur
Lipow writes, “proven to be peculiarly resistant to critical historical analysis
remarkably tree from serious ideological or organized political challenge.” “In short,” he
continues, “the reforms themselves, as well as the underlying ideological assumptions
have come to be regarded as part of the natural political order in the United States.” 1
Democracy - indeed, popular government itself - has come to be understood as a
political system in which citizen participation directly controls governance. The
institutions of government are measured not in terms of whether they encourage
deliberation or virtue (the aims of the American Founders), but rather by how well they
facilitate and how completely their product reflects the immediate will of the people.
Direct democracy - or “participatory democracy,” as it came to be called in the
1960s - is today accepted as “self-evident truth” by academic and political reformers
alike. It has become a kind of secular religion in American politics, to be accepted on
Arthur Lipow, Political Parties and Democracy (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996), 13.
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faith alone, widely accepted on the left and rarely questioned on the right. Not even the
conservative chantpions of “Framers’ intent” in constitutional interpretation cite direct
democracy as a repudiation of the republican ideals - the representational institutions and
system - embodied in the Constitution as it was drafted and ratified in 1 788
. It is as if the
Progressive reforms were always what the idea of democracy meant in America, yet as
this dissertation shows there were serious constitutional and political challenges to these
reforms m the early decades of the twentieth century. Their criticism of direct democracy
have largely disappeared from political debates in America, yet it is a criticism that is
authentically American, grounded in the constitutionalism of the founding generation.
This study of the Anti-progressives reveals several themes and consistencies
among the various thinkers discussed. As a whole, these elements offer a substantial and
serious critique of the Progressive vision. Foremost of these themes is a belief in the
centrality of the Constitution and the institutional arrangements set forth in its articles.
Indeed, constitutionalism is perhaps the one theme that runs through all other themes.
From national commentators to local politicians, from conservatives to socialists, there is
a strong belief in the virtue of the type of politics that can be generated by the
Constitution and its amendments. For some Anti-progressives like Butler,
constitutionalism was part of a Anglo-Saxon teleology of which the American
incarnation was the most recent and advanced step of progress. Others like Taft, Root,
and Hollingsworth saw a constitutional system that defined reasonable and proven
institutions that were only flawed to the extent that people failed them. Overall, however,
it was the kind of politics that the Constitution created and the protection it offered
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individual liberty that convinced Anti-progressives of the folly of direct democracy
reforms.
These Anti-progressive's views of the Constitution also shared a common
understanding of the importance of history. Although some of (he thinkers held an
abundance of "reverence” for the Constitution or even saw it as “inspired” in some way.
.hey all believed in its central contribution to the historical development of government.
That is, they all had a strong historical understanding of the development of the state in
Western Civilizations and this historical view guided them to believe deeply in the
soundness of the U.S. Constitution. This historicist view manifests itself in two ways
with the Anti-progressives. First, it brings out their view of the teleological progression
of popular government and the continued path toward some form of "better” government.
It is a developmental march from the failures of ancient democracies to the rise of
empires, to western monarchies, to the Magna Charta, to more liberal forms of
government, to the founding of the American Republic and its unique representative form
of government which, in their eyes, provided the best guarantee of stable government and
the protection ot individual liberties. The American founding was simply the next step in
a historical march toward freedom.
Second, and closely related, was the reified view of history that the Anti-
progressives held. History, for the Anti-progressives, was a text and guide - a teacher of
sorts - that taught mankind lessons to be learned. There was historical evidence of the
success and failure ot direct democracies in Florence or Rome and, because history is the
ultimate guide, there is no reason to doubt it. Study of historical political development.
for the Anti-progressives, revealed a progression toward a more liberal form of
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government and, as such, provides us with a guide-book to make decisions today. The
tmpac, of this treatment of history as a definable entity is that, coupled with the newly
emerged science of Darwin, history gains even more force for the Am,
-progressives, jus,
as science reveals the evolutton of species, histoty also provides a gutde of wha, was and
Wha, should be. In many instances. Anfi-progressive speak of the virtuous evolution of
government from simple forms to more complex forms and, conversely, of the regressive
nature of Progressive reforms from complex systems to simple forms. To be certain.
Progressives also hailed Darwin's new science; but where Ami-progressives used i, to
fortify their view of history Progressives used i, as a way to break away from history and
embrace the possibilities of new science and new ways to look at an evolving and modern
world.
Th18 Anti-progressive position, for the most part, is seen as an implicitly
conservative stance but many of them simply saw it as a basis of fact from which
decisions regarding constitutional development and change could be guided. Direct
democracy and mob rule caused the eventual downfall of ancient societies, reasoned the
Anti-progressives, and, therefore, in order to protect the individual from the state and the
mob, societies developed constitutional republics. Progressives embraced the “future”
and the new understandings ushered in by social science and sought ways to apply this
new conscious in their reforms. The Anti-progressives held a variety of views as to the
utility of government in the modern United States but together they all recognized the
history of governmental development as an important guidepost.
A second common theme among Anti-progressives, closely related to
Constitutionalism, is the belie! in representative government and its expression through
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legislative bodies. The Progressive belief in a strong executive respond,ng to the now
knowable votee of
-public opinion” was no, an accepted understanding for ntos, Anti-
progressives. Although some, like Butler and Hollingsworth, believed i„ strong
leadership, all the Anti-progressives belteved strongly in the concept of representation
and, m particular, the realization of representation through elected representatives
allowed to function as mostly independent and respected legislators. Some expressed this
behef in representative government primarily in Burkean terms of highly independent
representatives and others identified more with the concept of representatives engaged in
a legislative process where deliberation and slow consideration of issues could take place.
I he most important feature of representative government for which Anti-
progressives argued was the political and deliberative effects representative government
has on constitutional systems. It may be expressed in different ways by specific
individuals but all of them believed in the inherent value of conducting politics in a
representative system. Taft saw representative government as more “representative” than
direct democracy because elected leaders can see beyond their individual self-interest and
therefore consider views from a broader selection of citizens. Ford saw a strong
representative system as providing a more ideal way to insure responsibility in
government. He saw it as a way for representatives to act as leaders, to take
responsibility for their (or their party’s) agenda and allow the voters to give praise or
punish representatives as they saw fit. Butler, on the other hand, simply saw
lepiesentation in a republican system as the highest development of government to date,
and a system that will, to the greatest extent possible, guarantee personal liberty.
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In all these cases, and with other Anti-progressives as well, legislative bodies also
gain importance as the method best designed to carry ou, the decision and policy making
of government. Deliberative, slow, thoughtful, compromising legislative processes were
viewed as highly desirable by the Anti-progressives. The initiative and referendum, and
then inherent lack of debate and discussion, were offensive to the Anti-progressives
across the board as they felt that they undermined the protections legislatures provided
minority groups and decreased the ability to place responsibility on legislative actions on
a recognizable individual or political group. In addition, they saw attacks on
representative government and legislatures as undermining the prestige of the institutions
and argued that it would drive leaders and other civic-minded individuals away from
public service. As legislatures are denied the ability to legislate and as they are denied
their role as electors of U.S. Senators, the Anti-progressives felt that representatives with
ti ue leadership would be replaced with individuals of lesser merit who would then go into
elective politics resulting in a poorly functioning government. As with many of the
reforms, the Anti-progressives felt that the design of the various institutions of
government dictated to a large extent the quality and type of politics we have. To that
end, weakening ot legislatures through changes in their roles would adversely affect the
ability of that institution to function.
A third theme that runs consistently through Anti-progressive thought is the
importance ot an independent judiciary that is removed trom influence ot popular opinion.
Although not all of the Anti-progressives addressed this issue, those that did were highly
critical of judicial reform in the form of popular recall of judges or of recall of judicial
decisions. Ford, Butler, and Taft all saw the independent judiciary as one of the
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cornerstones of the American republic and argued that its role was particularly unique
and important. Taft, the only juris, ou, of this group, was critical of attempts to change
the nature of the judiciary and. as was detailed, even rejected Arizona's appiicatton for
statehood solely because of the provision for judicial recall tha, was initially included in
their proposed state constitution.
Anti-progressive support for an independent judiciary finds its basis in two
primary views. First is the belief in the importance of unique institutions within a system
ot checks and balances. That is, they believed that each of the three branches of
government was designed to have its distinctive character, mostly defined by its
constituency, and that it is from this uniqueness that the system of checks and balances
works. To make the Senate more like the House, to make the executive more like the
legislature, or to make the judiciary more like an elected body would change the very
nature of the American republic. Second, many Anti-progressives felt that judicial recall
(or even the direct election of judges) undermined what should be the logical
“constituency’' of judges. Progressives thought that judges should answer to the people
where Anti-progressives believed that judges’ loyalty should be to the Constitution and
the law. To change the locus of judicial responsibility made little sense to the Anti-
progressives since it would change the very nature of the judicial branch and its reason
tor being. There was no natural or necessary connection to the people, according to Taft
and others, nor should there be. The Supreme Court (and the ability of Congress to create
lower courts) was designed by the founders and approved by the citizens of the founding
colonies with the explicit intent for it to be a body that would serve to protect the
constitution exclusively. Its legitimacy stems not from frequent elections or popular
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ques.ion.ng of decisions bu, from
.he consen. g.ven a, ,he founding, by the states and |(s
citizens, to play an important and specific role in serving the repub, ,c without attachment
.0 public will. To change the very nature of this role would completely undermine the
independence of the judiciary and the role it was intended to play.
The final theme .ha, is shared by many of the Anti-progressives is a strong belief
in "Politics” and political activity. This common element is expressed in a variety of
ways, most prominently as a bel.ef in the importance of the role of political parties. In
general, Anti-progressives viewed the process of politics as one in which individual
opinions could be expressed, where values could be weighed, and. eventually, where
policy choices could be made. For Anti-progressives like Philipp and Freyd. to
undermine systems and processes that encouraged personal political engagement would
be to undermine the social value of politics - its ability to allow citizens to engage in the
process of value choices, policy making and selection of candidates.
Parties are the most explicit expression and source of political activity for the
Anti-progressives and across the board they viewed attacks on political parties as
detrimental to the American state. Butler and Root spoke of the natural inclination for
individuals to divide into two great parties and the important role parties play, even when
out of power. Ford saw politics as a primary human activity and as a truly popular
method for which citizens could express their preferences. Freyd, Philipp, Berger, and
even Hollingsworth viewed parties as essential institutions for the private organization of
\ allies and principles and as necessary to the proper functioning of government. Without
parties, most Anti-progressives believe that the electorate will lose the ability to assign
responsibility for legislative and executive action, subject individual officials to undue
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persona, pressure, place a primacy on individual candidacies, and usher in a polit.es of
confusing and changing priorities. It is, for many of them, an organize,,onal issue:
parties can best organ,ze individuals, clarify values, and be responsible for political
decisions and choices. Without them, individual views on issues will be unstable, offer
little resistance to the overwhelming influence of money, and simply blur the ability of
citizens to make choices at the ballot box.
Both Philipp and Root also saw parties as an additional system of checks and
balances in the American republic. Part.es, for these two, were a way to keep indiv.dual
“self-aggrandizement” to a minimum and place the values of the broader society in a
primary position. It is a natural outgrowth of the republic and further evidence, for many,
of the ever-evolving nature of the American state from a decentralized system with
tremendous confusion to a more centralized system that offers clarity and responsibility.
This additional check that parties provide, for Philipp, was particularly important for the
protection of individual liberty. Many of the Anti-progressives agreed, warning of the
rise of "demagogues” in a direct primary system. Without the institutional check of
parties, individuals become the centerpiece and. according to the Anti-progressives,
problems of un-harnessed self-interest, that were once held in check by parties, now
become real threats to politics and responsibility. In one form or another, all the Anti-
progressives expressed major concerns about the possible rise of demagogues, of the
overwhelming influence of corporate and private wealth in elections, and of the
threatened independence ot elected officials and formal governmental institutions.
Indeed, Anti-progressives like Berger warned of “anarchy without the organizing and
institutional influence that parties provide.
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saw the social value of
Both Philipp and Berger also d , parties and the type of
politics i, generated. Philipp saw parties as a training ground for crvie minded
individuals - a type of eivrcs aeademy that allowed young minds to develop and learn the
skills necessary to lead parties and to function in legislative and executive bodtes. Berger
saw them as afford,
„g the working class a way to organ,ze. realize common problems
and find common political solut.ons. Without this socializing force, Berger worries that
violence and other non-political methods will be used to express the concerns of the
working class. Additionally, Berger sees it as a proper way to organize around
-class” -
for him, a natural condition - and facilitate the construction of political relationships
around common interests and desires. To derail this natural organization and its
socializing influence is to hand power over to business and industrial elites. Philipp sees
the impact somewhat differently, arguing that the socializing and organizing effects of
parties provide a moderating influence which allows a variety of views to be molded into
common beliefs. Parties bring individuals together from various geographic and social
centers and force them to sympathize with one another, to find common ground. In either
case, whether it is Berger's sense that parties are an alternative to violent action or
Philipp s belief that parties moderate outcomes that protect individual issues, they both
lecognize the importance ot parties in the socialization and education of voters.
In all cases, they saw the direct primary reforms as an attack on parties and, in
turn, on broad-based politics. In most cases, the Anti-progressives did not romanticize
political parties or machines that often controlled them. Rather, individuals like Root
saw them as essential institutions that needed civic attention to fix the current problems
posed by bossism and not, as the Progressives suggest, by eliminating their influence
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from the public sphere, in fact, the Progressive solution for eliminating bosses, the Ami-
progressives felt, would lead to an even more evil type of political tyranny. Ford. Taft,
and Freyd all saw the direct primary as leading to the development of a professional
"political class” that would participate in politics to the exclusion of most others. It
would factional ize politics and remove it from the popular sphere, according to some, and
lead to a more confused and blurred vision as to the roles and responsibilities in
government. Without the education, socialization, and organizing influences that parties
can provide, most Anti-progressives saw a future in which “oligarchic” political
leadership would lead to a decline in popular participation in politics.
These four central themes - a belief in constitutionalism, representative
institutions, an independent judiciary, and the primacy of politics and parties
- provide a
strong basis for which to define the thoughts and reasoning of the Anti-progressives.
Although individual critics maintained their own understandings of politics and
emphasized different concerns, they clearly provide a consistent argument against the
direct-democracy reforms of the Progressives. From this, we can further develop our
understanding of this important reform period that resulted in a dramatically different
type of politics for the United States.
This work does not contend that the critics of direct democracy were right and the
Piogressives wrong. It seeks instead to recover a tradition in American political thought
that seems to have been lost in the past century — a tradition that poses questions for the
present practice ot democracy, a tradition whose recovery might encourage a richer and
more fruitful deliberation about the assumptions underlying as well as the outcomes of
present arrangements. The criticisms of Progressivism's direct democracy reforms may
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have come more from constitutional conservatives, owing perhaps to the polities 0f the
day, but as this dissertation has shown, they came as well from a broad ideological range.
from the left as well as the right. The contention here is simply tha, the Anti-progressives
deserve serious attention and consideration as an important part of the American reform
period of the early twentieth century.
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